From 6e22f8f2e8d81dcab4c40bc229d53388fda63dbc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Will Deacon Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2013 10:58:12 +0100 Subject: alpha: perf: fix out-of-bounds array access triggered from raw event Vince's perf fuzzer uncovered the following issue on Alpha: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffffbfe4e46a0e8 CPU 0 perf_fuzzer(1278): Oops 0 pc = [] ra = [] ps = 0007 Not tainted pc is at alpha_perf_event_set_period+0x60/0xf0 ra is at alpha_pmu_enable+0x1a4/0x1c0 v0 = 0000000000000000 t0 = 00000000000fffff t1 = fffffc007b3f5800 t2 = fffffbff275faa94 t3 = ffffffffc9b9bd89 t4 = fffffbfe4e46a098 t5 = 0000000000000020 t6 = fffffbfe4e46a0b8 t7 = fffffc007f4c8000 s0 = 0000000000000000 s1 = fffffc0001b0c018 s2 = fffffc0001b0c020 s3 = fffffc007b3f5800 s4 = 0000000000000001 s5 = ffffffffc9b9bd85 s6 = 0000000000000001 a0 = 0000000000000006 a1 = fffffc007b3f5908 a2 = fffffbfe4e46a098 a3 = 00000005000108c0 a4 = 0000000000000000 a5 = 0000000000000000 t8 = 0000000000000001 t9 = 0000000000000001 t10= 0000000027829f6f t11= 0000000000000020 pv = fffffc000031fb60 at = fffffc0000950900 gp = fffffc0000940900 sp = fffffc007f4cbca8 Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Trace: [] alpha_pmu_enable+0x1a4/0x1c0 [] perf_pmu_enable+0x48/0x60 [] __perf_install_in_context+0x15c/0x230 [] remote_function+0x80/0xa0 [] __perf_install_in_context+0x0/0x230 [] smp_call_function_single+0x1b4/0x1d0 [] task_function_call+0x60/0x80 [] __perf_install_in_context+0x0/0x230 [] task_function_call+0x34/0x80 [] perf_install_in_context+0x9c/0x150 [] __perf_install_in_context+0x0/0x230 [] SYSC_perf_event_open+0x360/0xac0 [] entSys+0xa4/0xc0 This is due to the raw event encoding being used as an index directly into the ev67_mapping array, rather than being validated against the ev67_pmc_event_type enumeration instead. Unlike other architectures, which allow raw events to propagate into the hardware counters with little interference, the limited number of events on Alpha and the strict event <-> counter relationships mean that raw events actually correspond to the Linux-specific Alpha events, rather than anything defined by the architecture. This patch adds a new callback to alpha_pmu_t for validating the raw event encoding with the Linux event types for the PMU, preventing the out-of-bounds array access. Cc: Peter Zijlstra Acked-by: Michael Cree Acked-by: Matt Turner Signed-off-by: Will Deacon --- arch/alpha/kernel/perf_event.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/alpha') diff --git a/arch/alpha/kernel/perf_event.c b/arch/alpha/kernel/perf_event.c index d821b17047e..c52e7f0ee5f 100644 --- a/arch/alpha/kernel/perf_event.c +++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/perf_event.c @@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ struct alpha_pmu_t { long pmc_left[3]; /* Subroutine for allocation of PMCs. Enforces constraints. */ int (*check_constraints)(struct perf_event **, unsigned long *, int); + /* Subroutine for checking validity of a raw event for this PMU. */ + int (*raw_event_valid)(u64 config); }; /* @@ -203,6 +205,12 @@ success: } +static int ev67_raw_event_valid(u64 config) +{ + return config >= EV67_CYCLES && config < EV67_LAST_ET; +}; + + static const struct alpha_pmu_t ev67_pmu = { .event_map = ev67_perfmon_event_map, .max_events = ARRAY_SIZE(ev67_perfmon_event_map), @@ -211,7 +219,8 @@ static const struct alpha_pmu_t ev67_pmu = { .pmc_count_mask = {EV67_PCTR_0_COUNT_MASK, EV67_PCTR_1_COUNT_MASK, 0}, .pmc_max_period = {(1UL<<20) - 1, (1UL<<20) - 1, 0}, .pmc_left = {16, 4, 0}, - .check_constraints = ev67_check_constraints + .check_constraints = ev67_check_constraints, + .raw_event_valid = ev67_raw_event_valid, }; @@ -609,7 +618,9 @@ static int __hw_perf_event_init(struct perf_event *event) } else if (attr->type == PERF_TYPE_HW_CACHE) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } else if (attr->type == PERF_TYPE_RAW) { - ev = attr->config & 0xff; + if (!alpha_pmu->raw_event_valid(attr->config)) + return -EINVAL; + ev = attr->config; } else { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2