From 455cd5ab305c90ffc422dd2e0fb634730942b257 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Rosenberg Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2011 16:59:41 -0800 Subject: kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers from unprivileged users Add the %pK printk format specifier and the /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict sysctl. The %pK format specifier is designed to hide exposed kernel pointers, specifically via /proc interfaces. Exposing these pointers provides an easy target for kernel write vulnerabilities, since they reveal the locations of writable structures containing easily triggerable function pointers. The behavior of %pK depends on the kptr_restrict sysctl. If kptr_restrict is set to 0, no deviation from the standard %p behavior occurs. If kptr_restrict is set to 1, the default, if the current user (intended to be a reader via seq_printf(), etc.) does not have CAP_SYSLOG (currently in the LSM tree), kernel pointers using %pK are printed as 0's. If kptr_restrict is set to 2, kernel pointers using %pK are printed as 0's regardless of privileges. Replacing with 0's was chosen over the default "(null)", which cannot be parsed by userland %p, which expects "(nil)". [akpm@linux-foundation.org: check for IRQ context when !kptr_restrict, save an indent level, s/WARN/WARN_ONCE/] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixup] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix kernel/sysctl.c warning] Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Cc: James Morris Cc: Eric Dumazet Cc: Thomas Graf Cc: Eugene Teo Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: David S. Miller Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- lib/vsprintf.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+) (limited to 'lib/vsprintf.c') diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c index c150d3dafff..6ff38524ec1 100644 --- a/lib/vsprintf.c +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c @@ -936,6 +936,8 @@ char *uuid_string(char *buf, char *end, const u8 *addr, return string(buf, end, uuid, spec); } +int kptr_restrict = 1; + /* * Show a '%p' thing. A kernel extension is that the '%p' is followed * by an extra set of alphanumeric characters that are extended format @@ -979,6 +981,7 @@ char *uuid_string(char *buf, char *end, const u8 *addr, * Implements a "recursive vsnprintf". * Do not use this feature without some mechanism to verify the * correctness of the format string and va_list arguments. + * - 'K' For a kernel pointer that should be hidden from unprivileged users * * Note: The difference between 'S' and 'F' is that on ia64 and ppc64 * function pointers are really function descriptors, which contain a @@ -1035,6 +1038,25 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, return buf + vsnprintf(buf, end - buf, ((struct va_format *)ptr)->fmt, *(((struct va_format *)ptr)->va)); + case 'K': + /* + * %pK cannot be used in IRQ context because its test + * for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless. + */ + if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) { + if (spec.field_width == -1) + spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(void *); + return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec); + } else if ((kptr_restrict == 0) || + (kptr_restrict == 1 && + has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG))) + break; + + if (spec.field_width == -1) { + spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(void *); + spec.flags |= ZEROPAD; + } + return number(buf, end, 0, spec); } spec.flags |= SMALL; if (spec.field_width == -1) { -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2