From a57de0b4336e48db2811a2030bb68dba8dd09d88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Olsa Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2009 12:09:13 +0000 Subject: net: adding memory barrier to the poll and receive callbacks Adding memory barrier after the poll_wait function, paired with receive callbacks. Adding fuctions sock_poll_wait and sk_has_sleeper to wrap the memory barrier. Without the memory barrier, following race can happen. The race fires, when following code paths meet, and the tp->rcv_nxt and __add_wait_queue updates stay in CPU caches. CPU1 CPU2 sys_select receive packet ... ... __add_wait_queue update tp->rcv_nxt ... ... tp->rcv_nxt check sock_def_readable ... { schedule ... if (sk->sk_sleep && waitqueue_active(sk->sk_sleep)) wake_up_interruptible(sk->sk_sleep) ... } If there was no cache the code would work ok, since the wait_queue and rcv_nxt are opposit to each other. Meaning that once tp->rcv_nxt is updated by CPU2, the CPU1 either already passed the tp->rcv_nxt check and sleeps, or will get the new value for tp->rcv_nxt and will return with new data mask. In both cases the process (CPU1) is being added to the wait queue, so the waitqueue_active (CPU2) call cannot miss and will wake up CPU1. The bad case is when the __add_wait_queue changes done by CPU1 stay in its cache, and so does the tp->rcv_nxt update on CPU2 side. The CPU1 will then endup calling schedule and sleep forever if there are no more data on the socket. Calls to poll_wait in following modules were ommited: net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c net/irda/af_irda.c net/irda/irnet/irnet_ppp.c net/mac80211/rc80211_pid_debugfs.c net/phonet/socket.c net/rds/af_rds.c net/rfkill/core.c net/sunrpc/cache.c net/sunrpc/rpc_pipe.c net/tipc/socket.c Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/sock.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/core/sock.c') diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index b0ba569bc97..6354863b1c6 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -1715,7 +1715,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sock_no_sendpage); static void sock_def_wakeup(struct sock *sk) { read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); - if (sk->sk_sleep && waitqueue_active(sk->sk_sleep)) + if (sk_has_sleeper(sk)) wake_up_interruptible_all(sk->sk_sleep); read_unlock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); } @@ -1723,7 +1723,7 @@ static void sock_def_wakeup(struct sock *sk) static void sock_def_error_report(struct sock *sk) { read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); - if (sk->sk_sleep && waitqueue_active(sk->sk_sleep)) + if (sk_has_sleeper(sk)) wake_up_interruptible_poll(sk->sk_sleep, POLLERR); sk_wake_async(sk, SOCK_WAKE_IO, POLL_ERR); read_unlock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); @@ -1732,7 +1732,7 @@ static void sock_def_error_report(struct sock *sk) static void sock_def_readable(struct sock *sk, int len) { read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock); - if (sk->sk_sleep && waitqueue_active(sk->sk_sleep)) + if (sk_has_sleeper(sk)) wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(sk->sk_sleep, POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLRDBAND); sk_wake_async(sk, SOCK_WAKE_WAITD, POLL_IN); @@ -1747,7 +1747,7 @@ static void sock_def_write_space(struct sock *sk) * progress. --DaveM */ if ((atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) << 1) <= sk->sk_sndbuf) { - if (sk->sk_sleep && waitqueue_active(sk->sk_sleep)) + if (sk_has_sleeper(sk)) wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(sk->sk_sleep, POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM | POLLWRBAND); -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From e912b1142be8f1e2c71c71001dc992c6e5eb2ec1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2009 19:36:05 +0000 Subject: net: sk_prot_alloc() should not blindly overwrite memory Some sockets use SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU, and our RCU code correctness depends on sk->sk_nulls_node.next being always valid. A NULL value is not allowed as it might fault a lockless reader. Current sk_prot_alloc() implementation doesnt respect this hypothesis, calling kmem_cache_alloc() with __GFP_ZERO. Just call memset() around the forbidden field. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/sock.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/core/sock.c') diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index 6354863b1c6..ba5d2116aea 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -939,8 +939,23 @@ static struct sock *sk_prot_alloc(struct proto *prot, gfp_t priority, struct kmem_cache *slab; slab = prot->slab; - if (slab != NULL) - sk = kmem_cache_alloc(slab, priority); + if (slab != NULL) { + sk = kmem_cache_alloc(slab, priority & ~__GFP_ZERO); + if (!sk) + return sk; + if (priority & __GFP_ZERO) { + /* + * caches using SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU should let + * sk_node.next un-modified. Special care is taken + * when initializing object to zero. + */ + if (offsetof(struct sock, sk_node.next) != 0) + memset(sk, 0, offsetof(struct sock, sk_node.next)); + memset(&sk->sk_node.pprev, 0, + prot->obj_size - offsetof(struct sock, + sk_node.pprev)); + } + } else sk = kmalloc(prot->obj_size, priority); -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From 4dc6dc7162c08b9965163c9ab3f9375d4adff2c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2009 23:13:10 +0000 Subject: net: sock_copy() fixes Commit e912b1142be8f1e2c71c71001dc992c6e5eb2ec1 (net: sk_prot_alloc() should not blindly overwrite memory) took care of not zeroing whole new socket at allocation time. sock_copy() is another spot where we should be very careful. We should not set refcnt to a non null value, until we are sure other fields are correctly setup, or a lockless reader could catch this socket by mistake, while not fully (re)initialized. This patch puts sk_node & sk_refcnt to the very beginning of struct sock to ease sock_copy() & sk_prot_alloc() job. We add appropriate smp_wmb() before sk_refcnt initializations to match our RCU requirements (changes to sock keys should be committed to memory before sk_refcnt setting) Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/net/sock.h | 32 +++++++++++++++++++------------- net/core/sock.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/core/sock.c') diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h index 2c0da9239b9..950409dcec3 100644 --- a/include/net/sock.h +++ b/include/net/sock.h @@ -104,15 +104,15 @@ struct net; /** * struct sock_common - minimal network layer representation of sockets + * @skc_node: main hash linkage for various protocol lookup tables + * @skc_nulls_node: main hash linkage for UDP/UDP-Lite protocol + * @skc_refcnt: reference count + * @skc_hash: hash value used with various protocol lookup tables * @skc_family: network address family * @skc_state: Connection state * @skc_reuse: %SO_REUSEADDR setting * @skc_bound_dev_if: bound device index if != 0 - * @skc_node: main hash linkage for various protocol lookup tables - * @skc_nulls_node: main hash linkage for UDP/UDP-Lite protocol * @skc_bind_node: bind hash linkage for various protocol lookup tables - * @skc_refcnt: reference count - * @skc_hash: hash value used with various protocol lookup tables * @skc_prot: protocol handlers inside a network family * @skc_net: reference to the network namespace of this socket * @@ -120,17 +120,21 @@ struct net; * for struct sock and struct inet_timewait_sock. */ struct sock_common { - unsigned short skc_family; - volatile unsigned char skc_state; - unsigned char skc_reuse; - int skc_bound_dev_if; + /* + * first fields are not copied in sock_copy() + */ union { struct hlist_node skc_node; struct hlist_nulls_node skc_nulls_node; }; - struct hlist_node skc_bind_node; atomic_t skc_refcnt; + unsigned int skc_hash; + unsigned short skc_family; + volatile unsigned char skc_state; + unsigned char skc_reuse; + int skc_bound_dev_if; + struct hlist_node skc_bind_node; struct proto *skc_prot; #ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS struct net *skc_net; @@ -208,15 +212,17 @@ struct sock { * don't add nothing before this first member (__sk_common) --acme */ struct sock_common __sk_common; +#define sk_node __sk_common.skc_node +#define sk_nulls_node __sk_common.skc_nulls_node +#define sk_refcnt __sk_common.skc_refcnt + +#define sk_copy_start __sk_common.skc_hash +#define sk_hash __sk_common.skc_hash #define sk_family __sk_common.skc_family #define sk_state __sk_common.skc_state #define sk_reuse __sk_common.skc_reuse #define sk_bound_dev_if __sk_common.skc_bound_dev_if -#define sk_node __sk_common.skc_node -#define sk_nulls_node __sk_common.skc_nulls_node #define sk_bind_node __sk_common.skc_bind_node -#define sk_refcnt __sk_common.skc_refcnt -#define sk_hash __sk_common.skc_hash #define sk_prot __sk_common.skc_prot #define sk_net __sk_common.skc_net kmemcheck_bitfield_begin(flags); diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index ba5d2116aea..d9eec153d53 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -919,13 +919,19 @@ static inline void sock_lock_init(struct sock *sk) af_family_keys + sk->sk_family); } +/* + * Copy all fields from osk to nsk but nsk->sk_refcnt must not change yet, + * even temporarly, because of RCU lookups. sk_node should also be left as is. + */ static void sock_copy(struct sock *nsk, const struct sock *osk) { #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK void *sptr = nsk->sk_security; #endif - - memcpy(nsk, osk, osk->sk_prot->obj_size); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct sock, sk_copy_start) != + sizeof(osk->sk_node) + sizeof(osk->sk_refcnt)); + memcpy(&nsk->sk_copy_start, &osk->sk_copy_start, + osk->sk_prot->obj_size - offsetof(struct sock, sk_copy_start)); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK nsk->sk_security = sptr; security_sk_clone(osk, nsk); @@ -1140,6 +1146,11 @@ struct sock *sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, const gfp_t priority) newsk->sk_err = 0; newsk->sk_priority = 0; + /* + * Before updating sk_refcnt, we must commit prior changes to memory + * (Documentation/RCU/rculist_nulls.txt for details) + */ + smp_wmb(); atomic_set(&newsk->sk_refcnt, 2); /* @@ -1855,6 +1866,11 @@ void sock_init_data(struct socket *sock, struct sock *sk) sk->sk_stamp = ktime_set(-1L, 0); + /* + * Before updating sk_refcnt, we must commit prior changes to memory + * (Documentation/RCU/rculist_nulls.txt for details) + */ + smp_wmb(); atomic_set(&sk->sk_refcnt, 1); atomic_set(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc, 1); atomic_set(&sk->sk_drops, 0); -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From f249fb783092471a4808e5fc5bda071d2724810d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rémi Denis-Courmont Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2009 00:47:04 +0000 Subject: Fix error return for setsockopt(SO_TIMESTAMPING) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit I guess it should be -EINVAL rather than EINVAL. I have not checked when the bug came in. Perhaps a candidate for -stable? Signed-off-by: Rémi Denis-Courmont Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/sock.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/core/sock.c') diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index d9eec153d53..bbb25be7ddf 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ set_rcvbuf: case SO_TIMESTAMPING: if (val & ~SOF_TIMESTAMPING_MASK) { - ret = EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; break; } sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_TX_HARDWARE, -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2