From a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2009 09:44:51 -0400 Subject: Networking: use CAP_NET_ADMIN when deciding to call request_module The networking code checks CAP_SYS_MODULE before using request_module() to try to load a kernel module. While this seems reasonable it's actually weakening system security since we have to allow CAP_SYS_MODULE for things like /sbin/ip and bluetoothd which need to be able to trigger module loads. CAP_SYS_MODULE actually grants those binaries the ability to directly load any code into the kernel. We should instead be protecting modprobe and the modules on disk, rather than granting random programs the ability to load code directly into the kernel. Instead we are going to gate those networking checks on CAP_NET_ADMIN which still limits them to root but which does not grant those processes the ability to load arbitrary code into the kernel. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Acked-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: James Morris --- net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c index e92beb9e55e..6428b342b16 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ int tcp_set_default_congestion_control(const char *name) spin_lock(&tcp_cong_list_lock); ca = tcp_ca_find(name); #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES - if (!ca && capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) { + if (!ca && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) { spin_unlock(&tcp_cong_list_lock); request_module("tcp_%s", name); @@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ int tcp_set_congestion_control(struct sock *sk, const char *name) #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES /* not found attempt to autoload module */ - if (!ca && capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) { + if (!ca && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) { rcu_read_unlock(); request_module("tcp_%s", name); rcu_read_lock(); -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2