From 523b02ea23b175dd3e46e3daf1bc9354376640a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2011 22:28:01 +0200
Subject: mac80211: fix TKIP races, make API easier to use

Our current TKIP code races against itself on TX
since we can process multiple packets at the same
time on different ACs, but they all share the TX
context for TKIP. This can lead to bad IVs etc.

Also, the crypto offload helper code just obtains
the P1K/P2K from the cache, and can update it as
well, but there's no guarantee that packets are
really processed in order.

To fix these issues, first introduce a spinlock
that will protect the IV16/IV32 values in the TX
context. This first step makes sure that we don't
assign the same IV multiple times or get confused
in other ways.

Secondly, change the way the P1K cache works. I
add a field "p1k_iv32" that stores the value of
the IV32 when the P1K was last recomputed, and
if different from the last time, then a new P1K
is recomputed. This can cause the P1K computation
to flip back and forth if packets are processed
out of order. All this also happens under the new
spinlock.

Finally, because there are argument differences,
split up the ieee80211_get_tkip_key() API into
ieee80211_get_tkip_p1k() and ieee80211_get_tkip_p2k()
and give them the correct arguments.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
---
 net/mac80211/key.h | 10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/mac80211/key.h')

diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.h b/net/mac80211/key.h
index d801d535133..1493c3e56b9 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.h
@@ -52,9 +52,10 @@ enum ieee80211_internal_tkip_state {
 };
 
 struct tkip_ctx {
-	u32 iv32;
-	u16 iv16;
-	u16 p1k[5];
+	u32 iv32;	/* current iv32 */
+	u16 iv16;	/* current iv16 */
+	u16 p1k[5];	/* p1k cache */
+	u32 p1k_iv32;	/* iv32 for which p1k computed */
 	enum ieee80211_internal_tkip_state state;
 };
 
@@ -71,6 +72,9 @@ struct ieee80211_key {
 
 	union {
 		struct {
+			/* protects tx context */
+			spinlock_t txlock;
+
 			/* last used TSC */
 			struct tkip_ctx tx;
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2


From aba83a0b301c32dbb91c017f33307611e1a1d384 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2011 21:59:39 +0200
Subject: mac80211: fix CCMP races

Since we can process multiple packets at the
same time for different ACs, but the PN is
allocated from a single counter, we need to
use an atomic value there. Use atomic64_t to
make this cheaper on 64-bit platforms, other
platforms will support this through software
emulation, see lib/atomic64.c.

We also need to use an on-stack scratch buf
so that multiple packets won't corrupt each
others scratch buffers.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
---
 net/mac80211/cfg.c         | 14 ++++++++------
 net/mac80211/debugfs_key.c |  6 ++++--
 net/mac80211/key.h         |  5 +----
 net/mac80211/wpa.c         | 32 +++++++++++++++++++-------------
 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/mac80211/key.h')

diff --git a/net/mac80211/cfg.c b/net/mac80211/cfg.c
index 295ab747663..3000b4c3b52 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/cfg.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/cfg.c
@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ static int ieee80211_get_key(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *dev,
 	u8 seq[6] = {0};
 	struct key_params params;
 	struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL;
+	u64 pn64;
 	u32 iv32;
 	u16 iv16;
 	int err = -ENOENT;
@@ -256,12 +257,13 @@ static int ieee80211_get_key(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *dev,
 		params.seq_len = 6;
 		break;
 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
-		seq[0] = key->u.ccmp.tx_pn[5];
-		seq[1] = key->u.ccmp.tx_pn[4];
-		seq[2] = key->u.ccmp.tx_pn[3];
-		seq[3] = key->u.ccmp.tx_pn[2];
-		seq[4] = key->u.ccmp.tx_pn[1];
-		seq[5] = key->u.ccmp.tx_pn[0];
+		pn64 = atomic64_read(&key->u.ccmp.tx_pn);
+		seq[0] = pn64;
+		seq[1] = pn64 >> 8;
+		seq[2] = pn64 >> 16;
+		seq[3] = pn64 >> 24;
+		seq[4] = pn64 >> 32;
+		seq[5] = pn64 >> 40;
 		params.seq = seq;
 		params.seq_len = 6;
 		break;
diff --git a/net/mac80211/debugfs_key.c b/net/mac80211/debugfs_key.c
index 33c58b85c91..4433760db4c 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/debugfs_key.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/debugfs_key.c
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static ssize_t key_tx_spec_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	const u8 *tpn;
+	u64 pn;
 	char buf[20];
 	int len;
 	struct ieee80211_key *key = file->private_data;
@@ -94,9 +95,10 @@ static ssize_t key_tx_spec_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
 				key->u.tkip.tx.iv16);
 		break;
 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
-		tpn = key->u.ccmp.tx_pn;
+		pn = atomic64_read(&key->u.ccmp.tx_pn);
 		len = scnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x\n",
-				tpn[0], tpn[1], tpn[2], tpn[3], tpn[4], tpn[5]);
+				(u8)(pn >> 40), (u8)(pn >> 32), (u8)(pn >> 24),
+				(u8)(pn >> 16), (u8)(pn >> 8), (u8)pn);
 		break;
 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
 		tpn = key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn;
diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.h b/net/mac80211/key.h
index 1493c3e56b9..05ce4c0203f 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.h
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ struct ieee80211_key {
 			struct tkip_ctx rx[NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES];
 		} tkip;
 		struct {
-			u8 tx_pn[6];
+			atomic64_t tx_pn;
 			/*
 			 * Last received packet number. The first
 			 * NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES counters are used with Data
@@ -92,12 +92,9 @@ struct ieee80211_key {
 			u8 rx_pn[NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES + 1][6];
 			struct crypto_cipher *tfm;
 			u32 replays; /* dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
-			/* scratch buffers for virt_to_page() (crypto API) */
 #ifndef AES_BLOCK_LEN
 #define AES_BLOCK_LEN 16
 #endif
-			u8 tx_crypto_buf[6 * AES_BLOCK_LEN];
-			u8 rx_crypto_buf[6 * AES_BLOCK_LEN];
 		} ccmp;
 		struct {
 			u8 tx_pn[6];
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
index 4ded2ae48a5..7691e4edc74 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/gfp.h>
 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
 #include <net/mac80211.h>
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
 
 #include "ieee80211_i.h"
 #include "michael.h"
@@ -290,6 +291,8 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch,
 	unsigned int hdrlen;
 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
 
+	memset(scratch, 0, 6 * AES_BLOCK_LEN);
+
 	b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_LEN;
 	aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_LEN;
 
@@ -380,8 +383,10 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
 	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
 	int hdrlen, len, tail;
-	u8 *pos, *pn;
-	int i;
+	u8 *pos;
+	u8 pn[6];
+	u64 pn64;
+	u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_LEN];
 
 	if (info->control.hw_key &&
 	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) {
@@ -409,14 +414,14 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos;
 	pos += hdrlen;
 
-	/* PN = PN + 1 */
-	pn = key->u.ccmp.tx_pn;
+	pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.ccmp.tx_pn);
 
-	for (i = CCMP_PN_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-		pn[i]++;
-		if (pn[i])
-			break;
-	}
+	pn[5] = pn64;
+	pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
+	pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
+	pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
+	pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
+	pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
 
 	ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
 
@@ -425,8 +430,8 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		return 0;
 
 	pos += CCMP_HDR_LEN;
-	ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, key->u.ccmp.tx_crypto_buf, 0);
-	ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, key->u.ccmp.tx_crypto_buf, pos, len,
+	ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 0);
+	ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch, pos, len,
 				  pos, skb_put(skb, CCMP_MIC_LEN));
 
 	return 0;
@@ -482,11 +487,12 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 	}
 
 	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
+		u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_LEN];
 		/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
-		ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_crypto_buf, 1);
+		ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 1);
 
 		if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
-			    key->u.ccmp.tfm, key->u.ccmp.rx_crypto_buf,
+			    key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch,
 			    skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN, data_len,
 			    skb->data + skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN,
 			    skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2


From 75396ae6d433b49482e377e6f8dbf1f42ad53f3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2011 22:00:35 +0200
Subject: mac80211: fix CMAC races

Just like TKIP and CCMP, CMAC has the PN race.
It might not actually be possible to hit it now
since there aren't multiple ACs for management
frames, but fix it anyway.

Also move scratch buffers onto the stack.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
---
 net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c    |  8 ++++----
 net/mac80211/aes_cmac.h    |  2 +-
 net/mac80211/cfg.c         | 13 +++++++------
 net/mac80211/debugfs_key.c |  7 +++----
 net/mac80211/key.h         |  5 +----
 net/mac80211/wpa.c         | 30 +++++++++++++++++-------------
 6 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/mac80211/key.h')

diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c b/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c
index d502b2684a6..08b0f1768aa 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c
@@ -35,10 +35,10 @@ static void gf_mulx(u8 *pad)
 }
 
 
-static void aes_128_cmac_vector(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *scratch,
-				size_t num_elem,
+static void aes_128_cmac_vector(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, size_t num_elem,
 				const u8 *addr[], const size_t *len, u8 *mac)
 {
+	u8 scratch[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
 	u8 *cbc, *pad;
 	const u8 *pos, *end;
 	size_t i, e, left, total_len;
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static void aes_128_cmac_vector(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *scratch,
 }
 
 
-void ieee80211_aes_cmac(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *scratch, const u8 *aad,
+void ieee80211_aes_cmac(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, const u8 *aad,
 			const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
 {
 	const u8 *addr[3];
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ void ieee80211_aes_cmac(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *scratch, const u8 *aad,
 	addr[2] = zero;
 	len[2] = CMAC_TLEN;
 
-	aes_128_cmac_vector(tfm, scratch, 3, addr, len, mic);
+	aes_128_cmac_vector(tfm, 3, addr, len, mic);
 }
 
 
diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.h b/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.h
index 0eb9a483150..20785a64725 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.h
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 
 struct crypto_cipher * ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_setup(const u8 key[]);
-void ieee80211_aes_cmac(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *scratch, const u8 *aad,
+void ieee80211_aes_cmac(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, const u8 *aad,
 			const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic);
 void ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_free(struct crypto_cipher *tfm);
 
diff --git a/net/mac80211/cfg.c b/net/mac80211/cfg.c
index 3000b4c3b52..bfc36e90476 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/cfg.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/cfg.c
@@ -268,12 +268,13 @@ static int ieee80211_get_key(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *dev,
 		params.seq_len = 6;
 		break;
 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
-		seq[0] = key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn[5];
-		seq[1] = key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn[4];
-		seq[2] = key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn[3];
-		seq[3] = key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn[2];
-		seq[4] = key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn[1];
-		seq[5] = key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn[0];
+		pn64 = atomic64_read(&key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn);
+		seq[0] = pn64;
+		seq[1] = pn64 >> 8;
+		seq[2] = pn64 >> 16;
+		seq[3] = pn64 >> 24;
+		seq[4] = pn64 >> 32;
+		seq[5] = pn64 >> 40;
 		params.seq = seq;
 		params.seq_len = 6;
 		break;
diff --git a/net/mac80211/debugfs_key.c b/net/mac80211/debugfs_key.c
index 4433760db4c..38e6101190d 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/debugfs_key.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/debugfs_key.c
@@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ KEY_OPS(algorithm);
 static ssize_t key_tx_spec_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	const u8 *tpn;
 	u64 pn;
 	char buf[20];
 	int len;
@@ -101,10 +100,10 @@ static ssize_t key_tx_spec_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
 				(u8)(pn >> 16), (u8)(pn >> 8), (u8)pn);
 		break;
 	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
-		tpn = key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn;
+		pn = atomic64_read(&key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn);
 		len = scnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x\n",
-				tpn[0], tpn[1], tpn[2], tpn[3], tpn[4],
-				tpn[5]);
+				(u8)(pn >> 40), (u8)(pn >> 32), (u8)(pn >> 24),
+				(u8)(pn >> 16), (u8)(pn >> 8), (u8)pn);
 		break;
 	default:
 		return 0;
diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.h b/net/mac80211/key.h
index 05ce4c0203f..fcb52eb2f92 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.h
@@ -97,14 +97,11 @@ struct ieee80211_key {
 #endif
 		} ccmp;
 		struct {
-			u8 tx_pn[6];
+			atomic64_t tx_pn;
 			u8 rx_pn[6];
 			struct crypto_cipher *tfm;
 			u32 replays; /* dot11RSNAStatsCMACReplays */
 			u32 icverrors; /* dot11RSNAStatsCMACICVErrors */
-			/* scratch buffers for virt_to_page() (crypto API) */
-			u8 tx_crypto_buf[2 * AES_BLOCK_LEN];
-			u8 rx_crypto_buf[2 * AES_BLOCK_LEN];
 		} aes_cmac;
 	} u;
 
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
index 7691e4edc74..3452d5e0a3c 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -523,6 +523,16 @@ static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
 }
 
 
+static inline void bip_ipn_set64(u8 *d, u64 pn)
+{
+	*d++ = pn;
+	*d++ = pn >> 8;
+	*d++ = pn >> 16;
+	*d++ = pn >> 24;
+	*d++ = pn >> 32;
+	*d = pn >> 40;
+}
+
 static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s)
 {
 	*d++ = s[5];
@@ -541,8 +551,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
 	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
 	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
 	struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
-	u8 *pn, aad[20];
-	int i;
+	u8 aad[20];
+	u64 pn64;
 
 	if (info->control.hw_key)
 		return 0;
@@ -556,22 +566,17 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
 	mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
 
 	/* PN = PN + 1 */
-	pn = key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn;
+	pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn);
 
-	for (i = sizeof(key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-		pn[i]++;
-		if (pn[i])
-			break;
-	}
-	bip_ipn_swap(mmie->sequence_number, pn);
+	bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
 
 	bip_aad(skb, aad);
 
 	/*
 	 * MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64)
 	 */
-	ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, key->u.aes_cmac.tx_crypto_buf,
-			   aad, skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
+	ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
+			   skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
 
 	return TX_CONTINUE;
 }
@@ -609,8 +614,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
 		/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
 		bip_aad(skb, aad);
-		ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm,
-				   key->u.aes_cmac.rx_crypto_buf, aad,
+		ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
 				   skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
 		if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
 			key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2


From 0cd20a278e1ef9da9f6a987942794c9d65af8c4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2011 22:02:14 +0200
Subject: mac80211: use AES_BLOCK_SIZE

mac80211 has a defnition of AES_BLOCK_SIZE and
multiple definitions of AES_BLOCK_LEN. Remove
them all and use crypto/aes.h.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
---
 net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c  | 37 +++++++++++++++++++------------------
 net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h  |  2 --
 net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c |  2 +-
 net/mac80211/key.h      |  3 ---
 net/mac80211/wpa.c      | 10 +++++-----
 5 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/mac80211/key.h')

diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c
index b9b595c0811..0785e95c992 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
 
 #include <net/mac80211.h>
 #include "key.h"
@@ -21,21 +22,21 @@ static void aes_ccm_prepare(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *scratch, u8 *a)
 	int i;
 	u8 *b_0, *aad, *b, *s_0;
 
-	b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_LEN;
-	aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_LEN;
+	b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
 	b = scratch;
-	s_0 = scratch + AES_BLOCK_LEN;
+	s_0 = scratch + AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
 
 	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, b, b_0);
 
 	/* Extra Authenticate-only data (always two AES blocks) */
-	for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_LEN; i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; i++)
 		aad[i] ^= b[i];
 	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, b, aad);
 
-	aad += AES_BLOCK_LEN;
+	aad += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_LEN; i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; i++)
 		aad[i] ^= b[i];
 	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, a, aad);
 
@@ -57,12 +58,12 @@ void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *scratch,
 	u8 *pos, *cpos, *b, *s_0, *e, *b_0;
 
 	b = scratch;
-	s_0 = scratch + AES_BLOCK_LEN;
-	e = scratch + 2 * AES_BLOCK_LEN;
-	b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_LEN;
+	s_0 = scratch + AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	e = scratch + 2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
 
-	num_blocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(data_len, AES_BLOCK_LEN);
-	last_len = data_len % AES_BLOCK_LEN;
+	num_blocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(data_len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	last_len = data_len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
 	aes_ccm_prepare(tfm, scratch, b);
 
 	/* Process payload blocks */
@@ -70,7 +71,7 @@ void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *scratch,
 	cpos = cdata;
 	for (j = 1; j <= num_blocks; j++) {
 		int blen = (j == num_blocks && last_len) ?
-			last_len : AES_BLOCK_LEN;
+			last_len : AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
 
 		/* Authentication followed by encryption */
 		for (i = 0; i < blen; i++)
@@ -96,12 +97,12 @@ int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *scratch,
 	u8 *pos, *cpos, *b, *s_0, *a, *b_0;
 
 	b = scratch;
-	s_0 = scratch + AES_BLOCK_LEN;
-	a = scratch + 2 * AES_BLOCK_LEN;
-	b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_LEN;
+	s_0 = scratch + AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	a = scratch + 2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
 
-	num_blocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(data_len, AES_BLOCK_LEN);
-	last_len = data_len % AES_BLOCK_LEN;
+	num_blocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(data_len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	last_len = data_len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
 	aes_ccm_prepare(tfm, scratch, a);
 
 	/* Process payload blocks */
@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *scratch,
 	pos = data;
 	for (j = 1; j <= num_blocks; j++) {
 		int blen = (j == num_blocks && last_len) ?
-			last_len : AES_BLOCK_LEN;
+			last_len : AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
 
 		/* Decryption followed by authentication */
 		b_0[14] = (j >> 8) & 0xff;
diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h
index 6e7820ef344..5b7d744e237 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h
@@ -12,8 +12,6 @@
 
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 
-#define AES_BLOCK_LEN 16
-
 struct crypto_cipher *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[]);
 void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *scratch,
 			       u8 *data, size_t data_len,
diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c b/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c
index 08b0f1768aa..8dfd70d8fcf 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c
@@ -11,12 +11,12 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
 
 #include <net/mac80211.h>
 #include "key.h"
 #include "aes_cmac.h"
 
-#define AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16
 #define AES_CMAC_KEY_LEN 16
 #define CMAC_TLEN 8 /* CMAC TLen = 64 bits (8 octets) */
 #define AAD_LEN 20
diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.h b/net/mac80211/key.h
index fcb52eb2f92..05abab05b0a 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.h
@@ -92,9 +92,6 @@ struct ieee80211_key {
 			u8 rx_pn[NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES + 1][6];
 			struct crypto_cipher *tfm;
 			u32 replays; /* dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
-#ifndef AES_BLOCK_LEN
-#define AES_BLOCK_LEN 16
-#endif
 		} ccmp;
 		struct {
 			atomic64_t tx_pn;
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
index 3452d5e0a3c..01684234b70 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -291,10 +291,10 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch,
 	unsigned int hdrlen;
 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
 
-	memset(scratch, 0, 6 * AES_BLOCK_LEN);
+	memset(scratch, 0, 6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 
-	b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_LEN;
-	aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_LEN;
+	b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
 
 	/*
 	 * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	u8 *pos;
 	u8 pn[6];
 	u64 pn64;
-	u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_LEN];
+	u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
 	if (info->control.hw_key &&
 	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) {
@@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 	}
 
 	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
-		u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_LEN];
+		u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
 		/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
 		ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 1);
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2


From 9e26297a56453315ae6829aec609b5a6309af7b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2011 18:45:03 +0200
Subject: mac80211: simplify RX PN/IV handling

The current rx->queue value is slightly confusing.
It is set to 16 on non-QoS frames, including data,
and then used for sequence number and PN/IV checks.
Until recently, we had a TKIP IV checking bug that
had been introduced in 2008 to fix a seqno issue.
Before that, we always used TID 0 for checking the
PN or IV on non-QoS packets.

Go back to the old status for PN/IV checks using
the TID 0 counter for non-QoS by splitting up the
rx->queue value into "seqno_idx" and "security_idx"
in order to avoid confusion in the future. They
each have special rules on the value used for non-
QoS data frames.

Since the handling is now unified, also revert the
special TKIP handling from my patch
"mac80211: fix TKIP replay vulnerability".

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
---
 net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
 net/mac80211/key.h         |  2 +-
 net/mac80211/rx.c          | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++------------
 net/mac80211/sta_info.h    |  3 ++-
 net/mac80211/wpa.c         |  9 ++++-----
 5 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/mac80211/key.h')

diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
index 4f2e424e8b1..4c7a831e7d1 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
@@ -202,7 +202,22 @@ struct ieee80211_rx_data {
 	struct ieee80211_key *key;
 
 	unsigned int flags;
-	int queue;
+
+	/*
+	 * Index into sequence numbers array, 0..16
+	 * since the last (16) is used for non-QoS,
+	 * will be 16 on non-QoS frames.
+	 */
+	int seqno_idx;
+
+	/*
+	 * Index into the security IV/PN arrays, 0..16
+	 * since the last (16) is used for CCMP-encrypted
+	 * management frames, will be set to 16 on mgmt
+	 * frames and 0 on non-QoS frames.
+	 */
+	int security_idx;
+
 	u32 tkip_iv32;
 	u16 tkip_iv16;
 };
diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.h b/net/mac80211/key.h
index 05abab05b0a..beb9c20ff48 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.h
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
 #define TKIP_IV_LEN		8
 #define TKIP_ICV_LEN		4
 
-#define NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES	17
+#define NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES	16
 
 struct ieee80211_local;
 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data;
diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c
index b5493ecd1e9..e6dccc70931 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ static void ieee80211_parse_qos(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 {
 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
 	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb);
-	int tid;
+	int tid, seqno_idx, security_idx;
 
 	/* does the frame have a qos control field? */
 	if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control)) {
@@ -340,6 +340,9 @@ static void ieee80211_parse_qos(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 		tid = *qc & IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
 		if (*qc & IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_A_MSDU_PRESENT)
 			status->rx_flags |= IEEE80211_RX_AMSDU;
+
+		seqno_idx = tid;
+		security_idx = tid;
 	} else {
 		/*
 		 * IEEE 802.11-2007, 7.1.3.4.1 ("Sequence Number field"):
@@ -352,10 +355,15 @@ static void ieee80211_parse_qos(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 		 *
 		 * We also use that counter for non-QoS STAs.
 		 */
-		tid = NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES - 1;
+		seqno_idx = NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES;
+		security_idx = 0;
+		if (ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
+			security_idx = NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES;
+		tid = 0;
 	}
 
-	rx->queue = tid;
+	rx->seqno_idx = seqno_idx;
+	rx->security_idx = security_idx;
 	/* Set skb->priority to 1d tag if highest order bit of TID is not set.
 	 * For now, set skb->priority to 0 for other cases. */
 	rx->skb->priority = (tid > 7) ? 0 : tid;
@@ -810,7 +818,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_check(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 	/* Drop duplicate 802.11 retransmissions (IEEE 802.11 Chap. 9.2.9) */
 	if (rx->sta && !is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1)) {
 		if (unlikely(ieee80211_has_retry(hdr->frame_control) &&
-			     rx->sta->last_seq_ctrl[rx->queue] ==
+			     rx->sta->last_seq_ctrl[rx->seqno_idx] ==
 			     hdr->seq_ctrl)) {
 			if (status->rx_flags & IEEE80211_RX_RA_MATCH) {
 				rx->local->dot11FrameDuplicateCount++;
@@ -818,7 +826,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_check(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 			}
 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 		} else
-			rx->sta->last_seq_ctrl[rx->queue] = hdr->seq_ctrl;
+			rx->sta->last_seq_ctrl[rx->seqno_idx] = hdr->seq_ctrl;
 	}
 
 	if (unlikely(rx->skb->len < 16)) {
@@ -1374,11 +1382,10 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 	if (frag == 0) {
 		/* This is the first fragment of a new frame. */
 		entry = ieee80211_reassemble_add(rx->sdata, frag, seq,
-						 rx->queue, &(rx->skb));
+						 rx->seqno_idx, &(rx->skb));
 		if (rx->key && rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP &&
 		    ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) {
-			int queue = ieee80211_is_mgmt(fc) ?
-				NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES : rx->queue;
+			int queue = rx->security_idx;
 			/* Store CCMP PN so that we can verify that the next
 			 * fragment has a sequential PN value. */
 			entry->ccmp = 1;
@@ -1392,7 +1399,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 	/* This is a fragment for a frame that should already be pending in
 	 * fragment cache. Add this fragment to the end of the pending entry.
 	 */
-	entry = ieee80211_reassemble_find(rx->sdata, frag, seq, rx->queue, hdr);
+	entry = ieee80211_reassemble_find(rx->sdata, frag, seq,
+					  rx->seqno_idx, hdr);
 	if (!entry) {
 		I802_DEBUG_INC(rx->local->rx_handlers_drop_defrag);
 		return RX_DROP_MONITOR;
@@ -1412,8 +1420,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 			if (pn[i])
 				break;
 		}
-		queue = ieee80211_is_mgmt(fc) ?
-			NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES : rx->queue;
+		queue = rx->security_idx;
 		rpn = rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue];
 		if (memcmp(pn, rpn, CCMP_PN_LEN))
 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
@@ -2590,7 +2597,9 @@ void ieee80211_release_reorder_timeout(struct sta_info *sta, int tid)
 		.sta = sta,
 		.sdata = sta->sdata,
 		.local = sta->local,
-		.queue = tid,
+		/* This is OK -- must be QoS data frame */
+		.security_idx = tid,
+		.seqno_idx = tid,
 		.flags = 0,
 	};
 	struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx;
diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
index a06d64ebc17..28beb78e601 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
@@ -287,7 +287,8 @@ struct sta_info {
 	unsigned long rx_dropped;
 	int last_signal;
 	struct ewma avg_signal;
-	__le16 last_seq_ctrl[NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES];
+	/* Plus 1 for non-QoS frames */
+	__le16 last_seq_ctrl[NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES + 1];
 
 	/* Updated from TX status path only, no locking requirements */
 	unsigned long tx_filtered_count;
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
index 01684234b70..7bc8702808f 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -149,8 +149,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 
 update_iv:
 	/* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
-	rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->queue].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
-	rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->queue].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
+	rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
+	rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
 
 	return RX_CONTINUE;
 
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 	res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm,
 					  key, skb->data + hdrlen,
 					  skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
-					  hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->queue,
+					  hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx,
 					  &rx->tkip_iv32,
 					  &rx->tkip_iv16);
 	if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
@@ -478,8 +478,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 
 	ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
 
-	queue = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control) ?
-		NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES : rx->queue;
+	queue = rx->security_idx;
 
 	if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {
 		key->u.ccmp.replays++;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2


From 3ea542d3c2862142ae511fac5ce2dfc7419dcc53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2011 18:58:00 +0200
Subject: mac80211: allow drivers to access key sequence counter

In order to implement GTK rekeying, the device needs
to be able to encrypt frames with the right PN/IV and
check the PN/IV in RX frames. To be able to tell it
about all those counters, we need to be able to get
them from mac80211, this adds the required API.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
---
 include/net/mac80211.h | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/mac80211/key.c     | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/mac80211/key.h     |  5 ++--
 3 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/mac80211/key.h')

diff --git a/include/net/mac80211.h b/include/net/mac80211.h
index 0aae7bc1eea..84770cedae2 100644
--- a/include/net/mac80211.h
+++ b/include/net/mac80211.h
@@ -2591,6 +2591,66 @@ void ieee80211_get_tkip_p1k(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
 void ieee80211_get_tkip_p2k(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
 			    struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *p2k);
 
+/**
+ * struct ieee80211_key_seq - key sequence counter
+ *
+ * @tkip: TKIP data, containing IV32 and IV16 in host byte order
+ * @ccmp: PN data, most significant byte first (big endian,
+ *	reverse order than in packet)
+ * @aes_cmac: PN data, most significant byte first (big endian,
+ *	reverse order than in packet)
+ */
+struct ieee80211_key_seq {
+	union {
+		struct {
+			u32 iv32;
+			u16 iv16;
+		} tkip;
+		struct {
+			u8 pn[6];
+		} ccmp;
+		struct {
+			u8 pn[6];
+		} aes_cmac;
+	};
+};
+
+/**
+ * ieee80211_get_key_tx_seq - get key TX sequence counter
+ *
+ * @keyconf: the parameter passed with the set key
+ * @seq: buffer to receive the sequence data
+ *
+ * This function allows a driver to retrieve the current TX IV/PN
+ * for the given key. It must not be called if IV generation is
+ * offloaded to the device.
+ *
+ * Note that this function may only be called when no TX processing
+ * can be done concurrently, for example when queues are stopped
+ * and the stop has been synchronized.
+ */
+void ieee80211_get_key_tx_seq(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
+			      struct ieee80211_key_seq *seq);
+
+/**
+ * ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq - get key RX sequence counter
+ *
+ * @keyconf: the parameter passed with the set key
+ * @tid: The TID, or -1 for the management frame value (CCMP only);
+ *	the value on TID 0 is also used for non-QoS frames. For
+ *	CMAC, only TID 0 is valid.
+ * @seq: buffer to receive the sequence data
+ *
+ * This function allows a driver to retrieve the current RX IV/PNs
+ * for the given key. It must not be called if IV checking is done
+ * by the device and not by mac80211.
+ *
+ * Note that this function may only be called when no RX processing
+ * can be done concurrently.
+ */
+void ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
+			      int tid, struct ieee80211_key_seq *seq);
+
 /**
  * ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify - notify userspace supplicant of rekeying
  * @vif: virtual interface the rekeying was done on
diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c
index d930d4d4876..739bee13e81 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.c
@@ -626,3 +626,77 @@ void ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify(struct ieee80211_vif *vif, const u8 *bssid,
 	cfg80211_gtk_rekey_notify(sdata->dev, bssid, replay_ctr, gfp);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify);
+
+void ieee80211_get_key_tx_seq(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
+			      struct ieee80211_key_seq *seq)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_key *key;
+	u64 pn64;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(!(keyconf->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)))
+		return;
+
+	key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
+
+	switch (key->conf.cipher) {
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
+		seq->tkip.iv32 = key->u.tkip.tx.iv32;
+		seq->tkip.iv16 = key->u.tkip.tx.iv16;
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
+		pn64 = atomic64_read(&key->u.ccmp.tx_pn);
+		seq->ccmp.pn[5] = pn64;
+		seq->ccmp.pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
+		seq->ccmp.pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
+		seq->ccmp.pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
+		seq->ccmp.pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
+		seq->ccmp.pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
+		pn64 = atomic64_read(&key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn);
+		seq->ccmp.pn[5] = pn64;
+		seq->ccmp.pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
+		seq->ccmp.pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
+		seq->ccmp.pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
+		seq->ccmp.pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
+		seq->ccmp.pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
+		break;
+	default:
+		WARN_ON(1);
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_get_key_tx_seq);
+
+void ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
+			      int tid, struct ieee80211_key_seq *seq)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_key *key;
+	const u8 *pn;
+
+	key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
+
+	switch (key->conf.cipher) {
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
+		if (WARN_ON(tid < 0 || tid >= NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES))
+			return;
+		seq->tkip.iv32 = key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv32;
+		seq->tkip.iv16 = key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv16;
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
+		if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES))
+			return;
+		if (tid < 0)
+			pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES];
+		else
+			pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[tid];
+		memcpy(seq->ccmp.pn, pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
+		if (WARN_ON(tid != 0))
+			return;
+		pn = key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn;
+		memcpy(seq->aes_cmac.pn, pn, CMAC_PN_LEN);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq);
diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.h b/net/mac80211/key.h
index beb9c20ff48..86b216b0141 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #define CCMP_PN_LEN		6
 #define TKIP_IV_LEN		8
 #define TKIP_ICV_LEN		4
+#define CMAC_PN_LEN		6
 
 #define NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES	16
 
@@ -89,13 +90,13 @@ struct ieee80211_key {
 			 * frames and the last counter is used with Robust
 			 * Management frames.
 			 */
-			u8 rx_pn[NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES + 1][6];
+			u8 rx_pn[NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES + 1][CCMP_PN_LEN];
 			struct crypto_cipher *tfm;
 			u32 replays; /* dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
 		} ccmp;
 		struct {
 			atomic64_t tx_pn;
-			u8 rx_pn[6];
+			u8 rx_pn[CMAC_PN_LEN];
 			struct crypto_cipher *tfm;
 			u32 replays; /* dot11RSNAStatsCMACReplays */
 			u32 icverrors; /* dot11RSNAStatsCMACICVErrors */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2


From 95acac61ba66c4abd40e038dae8c1ed2e176c7b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2011 12:30:59 +0200
Subject: mac80211: allow driver to disconnect after resume

In WoWLAN, devices may use crypto keys for TX/RX
and could also implement GTK rekeying. If the
driver isn't able to retrieve replay counters and
similar information from the device upon resume,
or if the device isn't responsive due to platform
issues, it isn't safe to keep the connection up
as GTK rekey messages from during the sleep time
could be replayed against it.

The only protection against that is disconnecting
from the AP. Modifying mac80211 to do that while
it is resuming would be very complex and invasive
in the case that the driver requires a reconfig,
so do it after it has resumed completely. In that
case, however, packets might be replayed since it
can then only happen after TX/RX are up again, so
mark keys for interfaces that need to disconnect
as "tainted" and drop all packets that are sent
or received with those keys.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
---
 include/net/mac80211.h     | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h |  2 ++
 net/mac80211/key.h         |  2 ++
 net/mac80211/mlme.c        | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 net/mac80211/rx.c          |  3 +++
 net/mac80211/tx.c          |  3 +++
 net/mac80211/util.c        | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/mac80211/key.h')

diff --git a/include/net/mac80211.h b/include/net/mac80211.h
index 8ff3d8a1377..ea2c8c36477 100644
--- a/include/net/mac80211.h
+++ b/include/net/mac80211.h
@@ -3023,6 +3023,29 @@ void ieee80211_beacon_loss(struct ieee80211_vif *vif);
  */
 void ieee80211_connection_loss(struct ieee80211_vif *vif);
 
+/**
+ * ieee80211_resume_disconnect - disconnect from AP after resume
+ *
+ * @vif: &struct ieee80211_vif pointer from the add_interface callback.
+ *
+ * Instructs mac80211 to disconnect from the AP after resume.
+ * Drivers can use this after WoWLAN if they know that the
+ * connection cannot be kept up, for example because keys were
+ * used while the device was asleep but the replay counters or
+ * similar cannot be retrieved from the device during resume.
+ *
+ * Note that due to implementation issues, if the driver uses
+ * the reconfiguration functionality during resume the interface
+ * will still be added as associated first during resume and then
+ * disconnect normally later.
+ *
+ * This function can only be called from the resume callback and
+ * the driver must not be holding any of its own locks while it
+ * calls this function, or at least not any locks it needs in the
+ * key configuration paths (if it supports HW crypto).
+ */
+void ieee80211_resume_disconnect(struct ieee80211_vif *vif);
+
 /**
  * ieee80211_disable_dyn_ps - force mac80211 to temporarily disable dynamic psm
  *
diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
index 96600bec44c..dda0d1ab34f 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
@@ -538,12 +538,14 @@ struct ieee80211_if_mesh {
  * @IEEE80211_SDATA_DONT_BRIDGE_PACKETS: bridge packets between
  *	associated stations and deliver multicast frames both
  *	back to wireless media and to the local net stack.
+ * @IEEE80211_SDATA_DISCONNECT_RESUME: Disconnect after resume.
  */
 enum ieee80211_sub_if_data_flags {
 	IEEE80211_SDATA_ALLMULTI		= BIT(0),
 	IEEE80211_SDATA_PROMISC			= BIT(1),
 	IEEE80211_SDATA_OPERATING_GMODE		= BIT(2),
 	IEEE80211_SDATA_DONT_BRIDGE_PACKETS	= BIT(3),
+	IEEE80211_SDATA_DISCONNECT_RESUME	= BIT(4),
 };
 
 /**
diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.h b/net/mac80211/key.h
index 86b216b0141..7d4e31f037d 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.h
@@ -41,9 +41,11 @@ struct sta_info;
  *
  * @KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE: Indicates that this key is present
  *	in the hardware for TX crypto hardware acceleration.
+ * @KEY_FLAG_TAINTED: Key is tainted and packets should be dropped.
  */
 enum ieee80211_internal_key_flags {
 	KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE	= BIT(0),
+	KEY_FLAG_TAINTED		= BIT(1),
 };
 
 enum ieee80211_internal_tkip_state {
diff --git a/net/mac80211/mlme.c b/net/mac80211/mlme.c
index 4b0460ad8c8..c99237cd4b9 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/mlme.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/mlme.c
@@ -2052,7 +2052,7 @@ static void ieee80211_sta_timer(unsigned long data)
 }
 
 static void ieee80211_sta_connection_lost(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
-					  u8 *bssid)
+					  u8 *bssid, u8 reason)
 {
 	struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
 	struct ieee80211_if_managed *ifmgd = &sdata->u.mgd;
@@ -2070,8 +2070,7 @@ static void ieee80211_sta_connection_lost(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
 	 * but that's not a problem.
 	 */
 	ieee80211_send_deauth_disassoc(sdata, bssid,
-			IEEE80211_STYPE_DEAUTH,
-			WLAN_REASON_DISASSOC_DUE_TO_INACTIVITY,
+			IEEE80211_STYPE_DEAUTH, reason,
 			NULL, true);
 	mutex_lock(&ifmgd->mtx);
 }
@@ -2117,7 +2116,8 @@ void ieee80211_sta_work(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
 					    " AP %pM, disconnecting.\n",
 					    sdata->name, bssid);
 #endif
-				ieee80211_sta_connection_lost(sdata, bssid);
+				ieee80211_sta_connection_lost(sdata, bssid,
+					WLAN_REASON_DISASSOC_DUE_TO_INACTIVITY);
 			}
 		} else if (time_is_after_jiffies(ifmgd->probe_timeout))
 			run_again(ifmgd, ifmgd->probe_timeout);
@@ -2129,7 +2129,8 @@ void ieee80211_sta_work(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
 				    sdata->name,
 				    bssid, probe_wait_ms);
 #endif
-			ieee80211_sta_connection_lost(sdata, bssid);
+			ieee80211_sta_connection_lost(sdata, bssid,
+				WLAN_REASON_DISASSOC_DUE_TO_INACTIVITY);
 		} else if (ifmgd->probe_send_count < max_tries) {
 #ifdef CONFIG_MAC80211_VERBOSE_DEBUG
 			wiphy_debug(local->hw.wiphy,
@@ -2151,7 +2152,8 @@ void ieee80211_sta_work(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
 				    sdata->name,
 				    bssid, probe_wait_ms);
 
-			ieee80211_sta_connection_lost(sdata, bssid);
+			ieee80211_sta_connection_lost(sdata, bssid,
+				WLAN_REASON_DISASSOC_DUE_TO_INACTIVITY);
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -2241,6 +2243,24 @@ void ieee80211_sta_restart(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
 	if (!ifmgd->associated)
 		return;
 
+	if (sdata->flags & IEEE80211_SDATA_DISCONNECT_RESUME) {
+		sdata->flags &= ~IEEE80211_SDATA_DISCONNECT_RESUME;
+		mutex_lock(&ifmgd->mtx);
+		if (ifmgd->associated) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_MAC80211_VERBOSE_DEBUG
+			wiphy_debug(sdata->local->hw.wiphy,
+				    "%s: driver requested disconnect after resume.\n",
+				    sdata->name);
+#endif
+			ieee80211_sta_connection_lost(sdata,
+				ifmgd->associated->bssid,
+				WLAN_REASON_UNSPECIFIED);
+			mutex_unlock(&ifmgd->mtx);
+			return;
+		}
+		mutex_unlock(&ifmgd->mtx);
+	}
+
 	if (test_and_clear_bit(TMR_RUNNING_TIMER, &ifmgd->timers_running))
 		add_timer(&ifmgd->timer);
 	if (test_and_clear_bit(TMR_RUNNING_CHANSW, &ifmgd->timers_running))
diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c
index e6dccc70931..fe2c2a71779 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
@@ -1019,6 +1019,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 	}
 
 	if (rx->key) {
+		if (unlikely(rx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_TAINTED))
+			return RX_DROP_MONITOR;
+
 		rx->key->tx_rx_count++;
 		/* TODO: add threshold stuff again */
 	} else {
diff --git a/net/mac80211/tx.c b/net/mac80211/tx.c
index e8d0d2d2266..8cb0d2d0ac6 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/tx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c
@@ -589,6 +589,9 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_select_key(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
 			break;
 		}
 
+		if (unlikely(tx->key && tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_TAINTED))
+			return TX_DROP;
+
 		if (!skip_hw && tx->key &&
 		    tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE)
 			info->control.hw_key = &tx->key->conf;
diff --git a/net/mac80211/util.c b/net/mac80211/util.c
index 190132063c9..5bfb80cba63 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/util.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/util.c
@@ -1334,6 +1334,33 @@ int ieee80211_reconfig(struct ieee80211_local *local)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+void ieee80211_resume_disconnect(struct ieee80211_vif *vif)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
+	struct ieee80211_local *local;
+	struct ieee80211_key *key;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(!vif))
+		return;
+
+	sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif);
+	local = sdata->local;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(!local->resuming))
+		return;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(vif->type != NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION))
+		return;
+
+	sdata->flags |= IEEE80211_SDATA_DISCONNECT_RESUME;
+
+	mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx);
+	list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list)
+		key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_TAINTED;
+	mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_resume_disconnect);
+
 static int check_mgd_smps(struct ieee80211_if_managed *ifmgd,
 			  enum ieee80211_smps_mode *smps_mode)
 {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2