From 7d4c04fc170087119727119074e72445f2bb192b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Keller, Jacob E" Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2013 11:19:25 +0000 Subject: net: add option to enable error queue packets waking select Currently, when a socket receives something on the error queue it only wakes up the socket on select if it is in the "read" list, that is the socket has something to read. It is useful also to wake the socket if it is in the error list, which would enable software to wait on error queue packets without waking up for regular data on the socket. The main use case is for receiving timestamped transmit packets which return the timestamp to the socket via the error queue. This enables an application to select on the socket for the error queue only instead of for the regular traffic. -v2- * Added the SO_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE socket option to every architechture specific file * Modified every socket poll function that checks error queue Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller Cc: Jeffrey Kirsher Cc: Richard Cochran Cc: Matthew Vick Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/unix/af_unix.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/unix/af_unix.c') diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c index 971282b6f6a..fb7a63ff71a 100644 --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c @@ -2196,7 +2196,9 @@ static unsigned int unix_dgram_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, /* exceptional events? */ if (sk->sk_err || !skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_error_queue)) - mask |= POLLERR; + mask |= POLLERR | + sock_flag(sk, SOCK_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE) ? POLLPRI : 0; + if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) mask |= POLLRDHUP | POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; if (sk->sk_shutdown == SHUTDOWN_MASK) -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From 8facd5fb73c6e960555e5913743dfbb6c3d984a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jacob Keller Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2013 13:55:40 -0700 Subject: net: fix smatch warnings inside datagram_poll Commit 7d4c04fc170087119727119074e72445f2bb192b ("net: add option to enable error queue packets waking select") has an issue due to operator precedence causing the bit-wise OR to bind to the sock_flags call instead of the result of the terniary conditional. This fixes the *_poll functions to work properly. The old code results in "mask |= POLLPRI" instead of what was intended, which is to only include POLLPRI when the socket option is enabled. Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c | 2 +- net/core/datagram.c | 2 +- net/iucv/af_iucv.c | 2 +- net/nfc/llcp/sock.c | 2 +- net/unix/af_unix.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/unix/af_unix.c') diff --git a/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c b/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c index 409902f892f..fea778e1dc2 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c @@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ unsigned int bt_sock_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, if (sk->sk_err || !skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_error_queue)) mask |= POLLERR | - sock_flag(sk, SOCK_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE) ? POLLPRI : 0; + (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE) ? POLLPRI : 0); if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) mask |= POLLRDHUP | POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; diff --git a/net/core/datagram.c b/net/core/datagram.c index 36da5b66351..ebba65d7e0d 100644 --- a/net/core/datagram.c +++ b/net/core/datagram.c @@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ unsigned int datagram_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, /* exceptional events? */ if (sk->sk_err || !skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_error_queue)) mask |= POLLERR | - sock_flag(sk, SOCK_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE) ? POLLPRI : 0; + (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE) ? POLLPRI : 0); if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) mask |= POLLRDHUP | POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; diff --git a/net/iucv/af_iucv.c b/net/iucv/af_iucv.c index f0550a38f29..7dfb9ed9369 100644 --- a/net/iucv/af_iucv.c +++ b/net/iucv/af_iucv.c @@ -1462,7 +1462,7 @@ unsigned int iucv_sock_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, if (sk->sk_err || !skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_error_queue)) mask |= POLLERR | - sock_flag(sk, SOCK_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE) ? POLLPRI : 0; + (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE) ? POLLPRI : 0); if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) mask |= POLLRDHUP; diff --git a/net/nfc/llcp/sock.c b/net/nfc/llcp/sock.c index 2d55e8a4595..6b3254452b3 100644 --- a/net/nfc/llcp/sock.c +++ b/net/nfc/llcp/sock.c @@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ static unsigned int llcp_sock_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, if (sk->sk_err || !skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_error_queue)) mask |= POLLERR | - sock_flag(sk, SOCK_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE) ? POLLPRI : 0; + (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE) ? POLLPRI : 0); if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c index fb7a63ff71a..2e4d90044a5 100644 --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c @@ -2197,7 +2197,7 @@ static unsigned int unix_dgram_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, /* exceptional events? */ if (sk->sk_err || !skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_error_queue)) mask |= POLLERR | - sock_flag(sk, SOCK_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE) ? POLLPRI : 0; + (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE) ? POLLPRI : 0); if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) mask |= POLLRDHUP | POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From 6b0ee8c036ecb3ac92e18e6ca0dca7bff88beaf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Eric W. Biederman" Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2013 17:28:16 +0000 Subject: scm: Stop passing struct cred Now that uids and gids are completely encapsulated in kuid_t and kgid_t we no longer need to pass struct cred which allowed us to test both the uid and the user namespace for equality. Passing struct cred potentially allows us to pass the entire group list as BSD does but I don't believe the cost of cache line misses justifies retaining code for a future potential application. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/net/af_unix.h | 3 ++- include/net/scm.h | 16 ++++++---------- net/core/scm.c | 16 ---------------- net/unix/af_unix.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/unix/af_unix.c') diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h index 0a996a3517e..a8836e8445c 100644 --- a/include/net/af_unix.h +++ b/include/net/af_unix.h @@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ struct unix_address { struct unix_skb_parms { struct pid *pid; /* Skb credentials */ - const struct cred *cred; + kuid_t uid; + kgid_t gid; struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK u32 secid; /* Security ID */ diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h index 975cca01048..5a4c6a9eb12 100644 --- a/include/net/scm.h +++ b/include/net/scm.h @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ struct scm_fp_list { struct scm_cookie { struct pid *pid; /* Skb credentials */ - const struct cred *cred; struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */ struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK @@ -51,23 +50,18 @@ static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_co #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ static __inline__ void scm_set_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm, - struct pid *pid, const struct cred *cred) + struct pid *pid, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) { scm->pid = get_pid(pid); - scm->cred = cred ? get_cred(cred) : NULL; scm->creds.pid = pid_vnr(pid); - scm->creds.uid = cred ? cred->euid : INVALID_UID; - scm->creds.gid = cred ? cred->egid : INVALID_GID; + scm->creds.uid = uid; + scm->creds.gid = gid; } static __inline__ void scm_destroy_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm) { put_pid(scm->pid); scm->pid = NULL; - - if (scm->cred) - put_cred(scm->cred); - scm->cred = NULL; } static __inline__ void scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm) @@ -81,8 +75,10 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, bool forcecreds) { memset(scm, 0, sizeof(*scm)); + scm->creds.uid = INVALID_UID; + scm->creds.gid = INVALID_GID; if (forcecreds) - scm_set_cred(scm, task_tgid(current), current_cred()); + scm_set_cred(scm, task_tgid(current), current_euid(), current_egid()); unix_get_peersec_dgram(sock, scm); if (msg->msg_controllen <= 0) return 0; diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c index 2dc6cdaaae8..83b2b383c86 100644 --- a/net/core/scm.c +++ b/net/core/scm.c @@ -187,22 +187,6 @@ int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *p) p->creds.uid = uid; p->creds.gid = gid; - - if (!p->cred || - !uid_eq(p->cred->euid, uid) || - !gid_eq(p->cred->egid, gid)) { - struct cred *cred; - err = -ENOMEM; - cred = prepare_creds(); - if (!cred) - goto error; - - cred->uid = cred->euid = uid; - cred->gid = cred->egid = gid; - if (p->cred) - put_cred(p->cred); - p->cred = cred; - } break; } default: diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c index 824eaf2c3af..5ca1631de7e 100644 --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c @@ -1340,7 +1340,6 @@ static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb) struct scm_cookie scm; memset(&scm, 0, sizeof(scm)); scm.pid = UNIXCB(skb).pid; - scm.cred = UNIXCB(skb).cred; if (UNIXCB(skb).fp) unix_detach_fds(&scm, skb); @@ -1391,8 +1390,8 @@ static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool sen int err = 0; UNIXCB(skb).pid = get_pid(scm->pid); - if (scm->cred) - UNIXCB(skb).cred = get_cred(scm->cred); + UNIXCB(skb).uid = scm->creds.uid; + UNIXCB(skb).gid = scm->creds.gid; UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL; if (scm->fp && send_fds) err = unix_attach_fds(scm, skb); @@ -1409,13 +1408,13 @@ static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool sen static void maybe_add_creds(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct socket *sock, const struct sock *other) { - if (UNIXCB(skb).cred) + if (UNIXCB(skb).pid) return; if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) || !other->sk_socket || test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &other->sk_socket->flags)) { UNIXCB(skb).pid = get_pid(task_tgid(current)); - UNIXCB(skb).cred = get_current_cred(); + current_euid_egid(&UNIXCB(skb).uid, &UNIXCB(skb).gid); } } @@ -1819,7 +1818,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, siocb->scm = &tmp_scm; memset(&tmp_scm, 0, sizeof(tmp_scm)); } - scm_set_cred(siocb->scm, UNIXCB(skb).pid, UNIXCB(skb).cred); + scm_set_cred(siocb->scm, UNIXCB(skb).pid, UNIXCB(skb).uid, UNIXCB(skb).gid); unix_set_secdata(siocb->scm, skb); if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) { @@ -1991,11 +1990,12 @@ again: if (check_creds) { /* Never glue messages from different writers */ if ((UNIXCB(skb).pid != siocb->scm->pid) || - (UNIXCB(skb).cred != siocb->scm->cred)) + !uid_eq(UNIXCB(skb).uid, siocb->scm->creds.uid) || + !gid_eq(UNIXCB(skb).gid, siocb->scm->creds.gid)) break; } else if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags)) { /* Copy credentials */ - scm_set_cred(siocb->scm, UNIXCB(skb).pid, UNIXCB(skb).cred); + scm_set_cred(siocb->scm, UNIXCB(skb).pid, UNIXCB(skb).uid, UNIXCB(skb).gid); check_creds = 1; } -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From 79f632c71bea0d0864d84d6a4ce78da5a9430f5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Benjamin Poirier Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:42:14 +0000 Subject: unix/stream: fix peeking with an offset larger than data in queue Currently, peeking on a unix stream socket with an offset larger than len of the data in the sk receive queue returns immediately with bogus data. This patch fixes this so that the behavior is the same as peeking with no offset on an empty queue: the caller blocks. Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier Acked-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/unix/af_unix.c | 25 ++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/unix/af_unix.c') diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c index 2db702d82e7..1a02af0e304 100644 --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c @@ -1859,10 +1859,10 @@ out: } /* - * Sleep until data has arrive. But check for races.. + * Sleep until more data has arrived. But check for races.. */ - -static long unix_stream_data_wait(struct sock *sk, long timeo) +static long unix_stream_data_wait(struct sock *sk, long timeo, + struct sk_buff *last) { DEFINE_WAIT(wait); @@ -1871,7 +1871,7 @@ static long unix_stream_data_wait(struct sock *sk, long timeo) for (;;) { prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); - if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue) || + if (skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue) != last || sk->sk_err || (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) || signal_pending(current) || @@ -1890,8 +1890,6 @@ static long unix_stream_data_wait(struct sock *sk, long timeo) return timeo; } - - static int unix_stream_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags) @@ -1936,14 +1934,12 @@ static int unix_stream_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, goto out; } - skip = sk_peek_offset(sk, flags); - do { int chunk; - struct sk_buff *skb; + struct sk_buff *skb, *last; unix_state_lock(sk); - skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue); + last = skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue); again: if (skb == NULL) { unix_sk(sk)->recursion_level = 0; @@ -1966,7 +1962,7 @@ again: break; mutex_unlock(&u->readlock); - timeo = unix_stream_data_wait(sk, timeo); + timeo = unix_stream_data_wait(sk, timeo, last); if (signal_pending(current) || mutex_lock_interruptible(&u->readlock)) { @@ -1980,10 +1976,13 @@ again: break; } - if (skip >= skb->len) { + skip = sk_peek_offset(sk, flags); + while (skip >= skb->len) { skip -= skb->len; + last = skb; skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue); - goto again; + if (!skb) + goto again; } unix_state_unlock(sk); -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2