From 2d3f6ccc4ea5c74d4b4af1b47c56b4cff4bbfcb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Simon Wunderlich Date: Wed, 4 Jul 2012 20:38:19 +0200 Subject: batman-adv: check incoming packet type for bla If the gateway functionality is used, some broadcast packets (DHCP requests) may be transmitted as unicast packets. As the bridge loop avoidance code now only considers the payload Ethernet destination, it may drop the DHCP request for clients which are claimed by other backbone gateways, because it falsely infers from the broadcast address that the right backbone gateway should havehandled the broadcast. Fix this by checking and delegating the batman-adv packet type used for transmission. Reported-by: Guido Iribarren Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich --- net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c | 15 +++++++++++---- net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.h | 5 +++-- net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c | 6 +++++- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c b/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c index 8bf97515a77..c5863f49913 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c @@ -1351,6 +1351,7 @@ void bla_free(struct bat_priv *bat_priv) * @bat_priv: the bat priv with all the soft interface information * @skb: the frame to be checked * @vid: the VLAN ID of the frame + * @is_bcast: the packet came in a broadcast packet type. * * bla_rx avoidance checks if: * * we have to race for a claim @@ -1361,7 +1362,8 @@ void bla_free(struct bat_priv *bat_priv) * process the skb. * */ -int bla_rx(struct bat_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb, short vid) +int bla_rx(struct bat_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb, short vid, + bool is_bcast) { struct ethhdr *ethhdr; struct claim search_claim, *claim = NULL; @@ -1380,7 +1382,7 @@ int bla_rx(struct bat_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb, short vid) if (unlikely(atomic_read(&bat_priv->bla_num_requests))) /* don't allow broadcasts while requests are in flight */ - if (is_multicast_ether_addr(ethhdr->h_dest)) + if (is_multicast_ether_addr(ethhdr->h_dest) && is_bcast) goto handled; memcpy(search_claim.addr, ethhdr->h_source, ETH_ALEN); @@ -1406,8 +1408,13 @@ int bla_rx(struct bat_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb, short vid) } /* if it is a broadcast ... */ - if (is_multicast_ether_addr(ethhdr->h_dest)) { - /* ... drop it. the responsible gateway is in charge. */ + if (is_multicast_ether_addr(ethhdr->h_dest) && is_bcast) { + /* ... drop it. the responsible gateway is in charge. + * + * We need to check is_bcast because with the gateway + * feature, broadcasts (like DHCP requests) may be sent + * using a unicast packet type. + */ goto handled; } else { /* seems the client considers us as its best gateway. diff --git a/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.h b/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.h index e39f93acc28..dc5227b398d 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.h +++ b/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.h @@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ #define _NET_BATMAN_ADV_BLA_H_ #ifdef CONFIG_BATMAN_ADV_BLA -int bla_rx(struct bat_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb, short vid); +int bla_rx(struct bat_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb, short vid, + bool is_bcast); int bla_tx(struct bat_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb, short vid); int bla_is_backbone_gw(struct sk_buff *skb, struct orig_node *orig_node, int hdr_size); @@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ void bla_free(struct bat_priv *bat_priv); #else /* ifdef CONFIG_BATMAN_ADV_BLA */ static inline int bla_rx(struct bat_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb, - short vid) + short vid, bool is_bcast) { return 0; } diff --git a/net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c b/net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c index 6e2530b0204..a0ec0e4ada4 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c @@ -256,7 +256,11 @@ void interface_rx(struct net_device *soft_iface, struct bat_priv *bat_priv = netdev_priv(soft_iface); struct ethhdr *ethhdr; struct vlan_ethhdr *vhdr; + struct batman_header *batadv_header = (struct batman_header *)skb->data; short vid __maybe_unused = -1; + bool is_bcast; + + is_bcast = (batadv_header->packet_type == BAT_BCAST); /* check if enough space is available for pulling, and pull */ if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, hdr_size)) @@ -302,7 +306,7 @@ void interface_rx(struct net_device *soft_iface, /* Let the bridge loop avoidance check the packet. If will * not handle it, we can safely push it up. */ - if (bla_rx(bat_priv, skb, vid)) + if (bla_rx(bat_priv, skb, vid, is_bcast)) goto out; netif_rx(skb); -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From 3da947b2693993d5f6138f005d2625e9387c9618 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sasha Levin Date: Mon, 2 Jul 2012 01:29:55 +0000 Subject: ieee802154: verify packet size before trying to allocate it Currently when sending data over datagram, the send function will attempt to allocate any size passed on from the userspace. We should make sure that this size is checked and limited. We'll limit it to the MTU of the device, which is checked later anyway. Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ieee802154/dgram.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ieee802154/dgram.c b/net/ieee802154/dgram.c index 6fbb2ad7bb6..16705611589 100644 --- a/net/ieee802154/dgram.c +++ b/net/ieee802154/dgram.c @@ -230,6 +230,12 @@ static int dgram_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, mtu = dev->mtu; pr_debug("name = %s, mtu = %u\n", dev->name, mtu); + if (size > mtu) { + pr_debug("size = %Zu, mtu = %u\n", size, mtu); + err = -EINVAL; + goto out_dev; + } + hlen = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev); tlen = dev->needed_tailroom; skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, hlen + tlen + size, @@ -258,12 +264,6 @@ static int dgram_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, if (err < 0) goto out_skb; - if (size > mtu) { - pr_debug("size = %Zu, mtu = %u\n", size, mtu); - err = -EINVAL; - goto out_skb; - } - skb->dev = dev; skb->sk = sk; skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IEEE802154); -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From 960fb66e520a405dde39ff883f17ff2669c13d85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 3 Jul 2012 20:55:21 +0000 Subject: netem: add limitation to reordered packets Fix two netem bugs : 1) When a frame was dropped by tfifo_enqueue(), drop counter was incremented twice. 2) When reordering is triggered, we enqueue a packet without checking queue limit. This can OOM pretty fast when this is repeated enough, since skbs are orphaned, no socket limit can help in this situation. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Mark Gordon Cc: Andreas Terzis Cc: Yuchung Cheng Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sched/sch_netem.c | 42 +++++++++++++++--------------------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/sch_netem.c b/net/sched/sch_netem.c index a2a95aabf9c..c412ad0d030 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_netem.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_netem.c @@ -331,29 +331,22 @@ static psched_time_t packet_len_2_sched_time(unsigned int len, struct netem_sche return PSCHED_NS2TICKS(ticks); } -static int tfifo_enqueue(struct sk_buff *nskb, struct Qdisc *sch) +static void tfifo_enqueue(struct sk_buff *nskb, struct Qdisc *sch) { struct sk_buff_head *list = &sch->q; psched_time_t tnext = netem_skb_cb(nskb)->time_to_send; - struct sk_buff *skb; - - if (likely(skb_queue_len(list) < sch->limit)) { - skb = skb_peek_tail(list); - /* Optimize for add at tail */ - if (likely(!skb || tnext >= netem_skb_cb(skb)->time_to_send)) - return qdisc_enqueue_tail(nskb, sch); + struct sk_buff *skb = skb_peek_tail(list); - skb_queue_reverse_walk(list, skb) { - if (tnext >= netem_skb_cb(skb)->time_to_send) - break; - } + /* Optimize for add at tail */ + if (likely(!skb || tnext >= netem_skb_cb(skb)->time_to_send)) + return __skb_queue_tail(list, nskb); - __skb_queue_after(list, skb, nskb); - sch->qstats.backlog += qdisc_pkt_len(nskb); - return NET_XMIT_SUCCESS; + skb_queue_reverse_walk(list, skb) { + if (tnext >= netem_skb_cb(skb)->time_to_send) + break; } - return qdisc_reshape_fail(nskb, sch); + __skb_queue_after(list, skb, nskb); } /* @@ -368,7 +361,6 @@ static int netem_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch) /* We don't fill cb now as skb_unshare() may invalidate it */ struct netem_skb_cb *cb; struct sk_buff *skb2; - int ret; int count = 1; /* Random duplication */ @@ -419,6 +411,11 @@ static int netem_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch) skb->data[net_random() % skb_headlen(skb)] ^= 1<<(net_random() % 8); } + if (unlikely(skb_queue_len(&sch->q) >= sch->limit)) + return qdisc_reshape_fail(skb, sch); + + sch->qstats.backlog += qdisc_pkt_len(skb); + cb = netem_skb_cb(skb); if (q->gap == 0 || /* not doing reordering */ q->counter < q->gap - 1 || /* inside last reordering gap */ @@ -450,7 +447,7 @@ static int netem_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch) cb->time_to_send = now + delay; ++q->counter; - ret = tfifo_enqueue(skb, sch); + tfifo_enqueue(skb, sch); } else { /* * Do re-ordering by putting one out of N packets at the front @@ -460,16 +457,7 @@ static int netem_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch) q->counter = 0; __skb_queue_head(&sch->q, skb); - sch->qstats.backlog += qdisc_pkt_len(skb); sch->qstats.requeues++; - ret = NET_XMIT_SUCCESS; - } - - if (ret != NET_XMIT_SUCCESS) { - if (net_xmit_drop_count(ret)) { - sch->qstats.drops++; - return ret; - } } return NET_XMIT_SUCCESS; -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From b761c9b1f4f69eb53fb6147547a1ab25237a93b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gao feng Date: Wed, 4 Jul 2012 23:28:40 +0000 Subject: cgroup: fix panic in netprio_cgroup we set max_prioidx to the first zero bit index of prioidx_map in function get_prioidx. So when we delete the low index netprio cgroup and adding a new netprio cgroup again,the max_prioidx will be set to the low index. when we set the high index cgroup's net_prio.ifpriomap,the function write_priomap will call update_netdev_tables to alloc memory which size is sizeof(struct netprio_map) + sizeof(u32) * (max_prioidx + 1), so the size of array that map->priomap point to is max_prioidx +1, which is low than what we actually need. fix this by adding check in get_prioidx,only set max_prioidx when max_prioidx low than the new prioidx. Signed-off-by: Gao feng Acked-by: Neil Horman Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/netprio_cgroup.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/netprio_cgroup.c b/net/core/netprio_cgroup.c index 5b8aa2fae48..aa907ed466e 100644 --- a/net/core/netprio_cgroup.c +++ b/net/core/netprio_cgroup.c @@ -49,8 +49,9 @@ static int get_prioidx(u32 *prio) return -ENOSPC; } set_bit(prioidx, prioidx_map); + if (atomic_read(&max_prioidx) < prioidx) + atomic_set(&max_prioidx, prioidx); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&prioidx_map_lock, flags); - atomic_set(&max_prioidx, prioidx); *prio = prioidx; return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From a73f89a61f92b364f0b4a3be412b5b70553afc23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jozsef Kadlecsik Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 09:42:28 +0000 Subject: netfilter: ipset: timeout fixing bug broke SET target special timeout value The patch "127f559 netfilter: ipset: fix timeout value overflow bug" broke the SET target when no timeout was specified. Reported-by: Jean-Philippe Menil Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/xt_set.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_set.c b/net/netfilter/xt_set.c index 035960ec5cb..c6f7db720d8 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_set.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_set.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include #include +#include MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_AUTHOR("Jozsef Kadlecsik "); @@ -310,7 +311,8 @@ set_target_v2(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) info->del_set.flags, 0, UINT_MAX); /* Normalize to fit into jiffies */ - if (add_opt.timeout > UINT_MAX/MSEC_PER_SEC) + if (add_opt.timeout != IPSET_NO_TIMEOUT && + add_opt.timeout > UINT_MAX/MSEC_PER_SEC) add_opt.timeout = UINT_MAX/MSEC_PER_SEC; if (info->add_set.index != IPSET_INVALID_ID) ip_set_add(info->add_set.index, skb, par, &add_opt); -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From 472dd35ccbd999a6cb2994c318ca16edf65c4359 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Huehn Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 06:26:27 -0700 Subject: mac80211: correct size the argument to kzalloc in minstrel_ht msp has type struct minstrel_ht_sta_priv not struct minstrel_ht_sta. (This incorporates the fixup originally posted as "mac80211: fix kzalloc memory corruption introduced in minstrel_ht". -- JWL) Reported-by: Fengguang Wu Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Thomas Huehn Acked-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: John W. Linville --- net/mac80211/rc80211_minstrel_ht.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/rc80211_minstrel_ht.c b/net/mac80211/rc80211_minstrel_ht.c index 2d1acc6c544..f9e51ef8dfa 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rc80211_minstrel_ht.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rc80211_minstrel_ht.c @@ -809,7 +809,7 @@ minstrel_ht_alloc_sta(void *priv, struct ieee80211_sta *sta, gfp_t gfp) max_rates = sband->n_bitrates; } - msp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct minstrel_ht_sta), gfp); + msp = kzalloc(sizeof(*msp), gfp); if (!msp) return NULL; -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From 147f20e316f3949f3f5ffe6c8658e9fe1c6ceb23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sasha Levin Date: Sat, 30 Jun 2012 11:56:47 +0200 Subject: NFC: Prevent NULL deref when getting socket name llcp_sock_getname can be called without a device attached to the nfc_llcp_sock. This would lead to the following BUG: [ 362.341807] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 362.341815] IP: [] llcp_sock_getname+0x75/0xc0 [ 362.341818] PGD 31b35067 PUD 30631067 PMD 0 [ 362.341821] Oops: 0000 [#627] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC [ 362.341826] CPU 3 [ 362.341827] Pid: 7816, comm: trinity-child55 Tainted: G D W 3.5.0-rc4-next-20120628-sasha-00005-g9f23eb7 #479 [ 362.341831] RIP: 0010:[] [] llcp_sock_getname+0x75/0xc0 [ 362.341832] RSP: 0018:ffff8800304fde88 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 362.341834] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880033cb8000 RCX: 0000000000000001 [ 362.341835] RDX: ffff8800304fdec4 RSI: ffff8800304fdec8 RDI: ffff8800304fdeda [ 362.341836] RBP: ffff8800304fdea8 R08: 7ebcebcb772b7ffb R09: 5fbfcb9c35bdfd53 [ 362.341838] R10: 4220020c54326244 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffff8800304fdec8 [ 362.341839] R13: ffff8800304fdec4 R14: ffff8800304fdec8 R15: 0000000000000044 [ 362.341841] FS: 00007effa376e700(0000) GS:ffff880035a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 362.341843] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 362.341844] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000030438000 CR4: 00000000000406e0 [ 362.341851] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 362.341856] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 362.341858] Process trinity-child55 (pid: 7816, threadinfo ffff8800304fc000, task ffff880031270000) [ 362.341858] Stack: [ 362.341862] ffff8800304fdea8 ffff880035156780 0000000000000000 0000000000001000 [ 362.341865] ffff8800304fdf78 ffffffff83183b40 00000000304fdec8 0000006000000000 [ 362.341868] ffff8800304f0027 ffffffff83729649 ffff8800304fdee8 ffff8800304fdf48 [ 362.341869] Call Trace: [ 362.341874] [] sys_getpeername+0xa0/0x110 [ 362.341877] [] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x59/0x80 [ 362.341882] [] ? do_setitimer+0x23b/0x290 [ 362.341886] [] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [ 362.341889] [] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 362.341921] Code: 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 b3 ff ff ff 48 85 db 74 54 66 41 c7 04 24 27 00 49 8d 7c 24 12 41 c7 45 00 60 00 00 00 48 8b 83 28 05 00 00 <8b> 00 41 89 44 24 04 0f b6 83 41 05 00 00 41 88 44 24 10 0f b6 [ 362.341924] RIP [] llcp_sock_getname+0x75/0xc0 [ 362.341925] RSP [ 362.341926] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 362.341928] ---[ end trace 6d450e935ee18bf3 ]--- Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: John W. Linville --- net/nfc/llcp/sock.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/nfc/llcp/sock.c b/net/nfc/llcp/sock.c index 17a707db40e..e06d458fc71 100644 --- a/net/nfc/llcp/sock.c +++ b/net/nfc/llcp/sock.c @@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ static int llcp_sock_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, pr_debug("%p\n", sk); - if (llcp_sock == NULL) + if (llcp_sock == NULL || llcp_sock->dev == NULL) return -EBADFD; addr->sa_family = AF_NFC; -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From 10a9109f2705fdc3caa94d768b2559587a9a050c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eliad Peller Date: Mon, 2 Jul 2012 14:42:03 +0300 Subject: mac80211: destroy assoc_data correctly if assoc fails If association failed due to internal error (e.g. no supported rates IE), we call ieee80211_destroy_assoc_data() with assoc=true, while we actually reject the association. This results in the BSSID not being zeroed out. After passing assoc=false, we no longer have to call sta_info_destroy_addr() explicitly. While on it, move the "associated" message after the assoc_success check. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [3.4+] Signed-off-by: Eliad Peller Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: John W. Linville --- net/mac80211/mlme.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/mlme.c b/net/mac80211/mlme.c index a4bb856de08..0db5d34a06b 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/mlme.c +++ b/net/mac80211/mlme.c @@ -2174,15 +2174,13 @@ ieee80211_rx_mgmt_assoc_resp(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, sdata->name, mgmt->sa, status_code); ieee80211_destroy_assoc_data(sdata, false); } else { - printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: associated\n", sdata->name); - if (!ieee80211_assoc_success(sdata, *bss, mgmt, len)) { /* oops -- internal error -- send timeout for now */ - ieee80211_destroy_assoc_data(sdata, true); - sta_info_destroy_addr(sdata, mgmt->bssid); + ieee80211_destroy_assoc_data(sdata, false); cfg80211_put_bss(*bss); return RX_MGMT_CFG80211_ASSOC_TIMEOUT; } + printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: associated\n", sdata->name); /* * destroy assoc_data afterwards, as otherwise an idle -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From 91c68ce2b26319248a32d7baa1226f819d283758 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Sun, 8 Jul 2012 21:45:10 +0000 Subject: net: cgroup: fix out of bounds accesses dev->priomap is allocated by extend_netdev_table() called from update_netdev_tables(). And this is only called if write_priomap() is called. But if write_priomap() is not called, it seems we can have out of bounds accesses in cgrp_destroy(), read_priomap() & skb_update_prio() With help from Gao Feng Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Neil Horman Cc: Gao feng Acked-by: Gao feng Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/dev.c | 8 ++++++-- net/core/netprio_cgroup.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c index 84f01ba81a3..0f28a9e0b8a 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c @@ -2444,8 +2444,12 @@ static void skb_update_prio(struct sk_buff *skb) { struct netprio_map *map = rcu_dereference_bh(skb->dev->priomap); - if ((!skb->priority) && (skb->sk) && map) - skb->priority = map->priomap[skb->sk->sk_cgrp_prioidx]; + if (!skb->priority && skb->sk && map) { + unsigned int prioidx = skb->sk->sk_cgrp_prioidx; + + if (prioidx < map->priomap_len) + skb->priority = map->priomap[prioidx]; + } } #else #define skb_update_prio(skb) diff --git a/net/core/netprio_cgroup.c b/net/core/netprio_cgroup.c index aa907ed466e..3e953eaddbf 100644 --- a/net/core/netprio_cgroup.c +++ b/net/core/netprio_cgroup.c @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ static void cgrp_destroy(struct cgroup *cgrp) rtnl_lock(); for_each_netdev(&init_net, dev) { map = rtnl_dereference(dev->priomap); - if (map) + if (map && cs->prioidx < map->priomap_len) map->priomap[cs->prioidx] = 0; } rtnl_unlock(); @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ static int read_priomap(struct cgroup *cont, struct cftype *cft, rcu_read_lock(); for_each_netdev_rcu(&init_net, dev) { map = rcu_dereference(dev->priomap); - priority = map ? map->priomap[prioidx] : 0; + priority = (map && prioidx < map->priomap_len) ? map->priomap[prioidx] : 0; cb->fill(cb, dev->name, priority); } rcu_read_unlock(); -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From cae296c42c94a27e0abdea96eb762752d1ba4908 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julia Lawall Date: Sun, 8 Jul 2012 01:37:39 +0000 Subject: net/rxrpc/ar-peer.c: remove invalid reference to list iterator variable If list_for_each_entry, etc complete a traversal of the list, the iterator variable ends up pointing to an address at an offset from the list head, and not a meaningful structure. Thus this value should not be used after the end of the iterator. This seems to be a copy-paste bug from a previous debugging message, and so the meaningless value is just deleted. This problem was found using Coccinelle (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/). Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/rxrpc/ar-peer.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-peer.c b/net/rxrpc/ar-peer.c index 2754f098d43..bebaa43484b 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/ar-peer.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-peer.c @@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ found_UDP_peer: return peer; new_UDP_peer: - _net("Rx UDP DGRAM from NEW peer %d", peer->debug_id); + _net("Rx UDP DGRAM from NEW peer"); read_unlock_bh(&rxrpc_peer_lock); _leave(" = -EBUSY [new]"); return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY); -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From efc73f4bbc238d4f579fb612c04c8e1dd8a82979 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Amir Hanania Date: Mon, 9 Jul 2012 20:47:19 +0000 Subject: net: Fix memory leak - vlan_info struct In driver reload test there is a memory leak. The structure vlan_info was not freed when the driver was removed. It was not released since the nr_vids var is one after last vlan was removed. The nr_vids is one, since vlan zero is added to the interface when the interface is being set, but the vlan zero is not deleted at unregister. Fix - delete vlan zero when we unregister the device. Signed-off-by: Amir Hanania Acked-by: John Fastabend Tested-by: Aaron Brown Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/8021q/vlan.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/8021q/vlan.c b/net/8021q/vlan.c index 6089f0cf23b..9096bcb0813 100644 --- a/net/8021q/vlan.c +++ b/net/8021q/vlan.c @@ -403,6 +403,9 @@ static int vlan_device_event(struct notifier_block *unused, unsigned long event, break; case NETDEV_DOWN: + if (dev->features & NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_FILTER) + vlan_vid_del(dev, 0); + /* Put all VLANs for this dev in the down state too. */ for (i = 0; i < VLAN_N_VID; i++) { vlandev = vlan_group_get_device(grp, i); -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2