From 1e93d0052d9a6b3d0b382eedceb18b519d603baf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mimi Zohar Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2010 17:02:41 -0500 Subject: ima: rename PATH_CHECK to FILE_CHECK With the movement of the ima hooks functions were renamed from *path* to *file* since they always deal with struct file. This patch renames some of the ima internal flags to make them consistent with the rest of the code. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 9 ++++++--- 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/integrity/ima') diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index aa25a7eb2d0..47fb65d1fcb 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ void iint_free(struct kref *kref); void iint_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu); /* IMA policy related functions */ -enum ima_hooks { PATH_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK }; +enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK }; int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask); void ima_init_policy(void); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 3cd58b60afd..2a5e0bcf388 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -95,12 +95,12 @@ err_out: * ima_must_measure - measure decision based on policy. * @inode: pointer to inode to measure * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE) - * @function: calling function (PATH_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP) + * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP) * * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs: * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. - * func: PATH_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP + * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value * diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index b76e1f03ea2..294b005d652 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ void ima_counts_get(struct file *file) if (!iint) return; mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); - rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, PATH_CHECK); + rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK); if (rc < 0) goto out; @@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC), - PATH_CHECK); + FILE_CHECK); return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index e1278399b34..4759d0f9933 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = { .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, - {.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0, + {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}, }; @@ -282,8 +282,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) break; case Opt_func: audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from); - if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0) - entry->func = PATH_CHECK; + if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0) + entry->func = FILE_CHECK; + /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */ + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0) + entry->func = FILE_CHECK; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0) entry->func = FILE_MMAP; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0) -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2