From 69f594a38967f4540ce7a29b3fd214e68a8330bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 12:25:15 -0500 Subject: ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat Reading /proc/pid/stat of another process checks if one has ptrace permissions on that process. If one does have permissions it outputs some data about the process which might have security and attack implications. If the current task does not have ptrace permissions the read still works, but those fields are filled with inocuous (0) values. Since this check and a subsequent denial is not a violation of the security policy we should not audit such denials. This can be quite useful to removing ptrace broadly across a system without flooding the logs when ps is run or something which harmlessly walks proc. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security/selinux') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index c9605c4a2e0..14f94cd29c8 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -1809,7 +1809,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, if (rc) return rc; - if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) { + if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) { u32 sid = current_sid(); u32 csid = task_sid(child); return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL); -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2