From af8ff04917169805b151280155bf772d3ca9bec0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Sun, 20 Sep 2009 21:23:01 -0400
Subject: SELinux: reset the security_ops before flushing the avc cache

This patch resets the security_ops to the secondary_ops before it flushes
the avc.  It's still possible that a task on another processor could have
already passed the security_ops dereference and be executing an selinux hook
function which would add a new avc entry.  That entry would still not be
freed.  This should however help to reduce the number of needless avcs the
kernel has when selinux is disabled at run time.  There is no wasted
memory if selinux is disabled on the command line or not compiled.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index bb230d5d708..a985d0bc59b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5830,12 +5830,12 @@ int selinux_disable(void)
 	selinux_disabled = 1;
 	selinux_enabled = 0;
 
-	/* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
-	avc_disable();
-
 	/* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
 	security_ops = secondary_ops;
 
+	/* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
+	avc_disable();
+
 	/* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
 	selinux_nf_ip_exit();
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2


From c6d3aaa4e35c71a32a86ececacd4eea7ecfc316c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2009 13:37:50 -0400
Subject: selinux: dynamic class/perm discovery

Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values
upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery
logic from libselinux.  A mapping is created between kernel-private
class and permission indices used outside the security server and the
policy values used within the security server.

The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations;
similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers
is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC.  The
interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel
vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user
suffix.

The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy
values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes;
thus the kernel class index values are compressed.  The flask.h
definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from
refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers.  Going
forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and
classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer
tied to the policy values.  The next patch introduces a utility to
automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the
classmap.h definitions.

The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and
replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at
policy load to generate the mapping.  The old kernel class validation
logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic.

The handle unknown logic is reworked.  reject_unknown=1 is handled
when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old
handling by the class validation logic.  allow_unknown=1 is handled
when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able
to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is
automatically added to the allowed vector.  If the class was not able
to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions
are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1.

avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the
class and permission names from the kernel-private indices.

The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the
class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the
kernel.  It should be noted that this policy will not include any
userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel
classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match
the kernel-private indices).

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c                        | 151 ++-----
 security/selinux/avc.c                           |  76 +---
 security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h            |  34 --
 security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h     | 183 --------
 security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h        |  44 +-
 security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h                |  21 +-
 security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h       |  80 ----
 security/selinux/include/classmap.h              | 150 +++++++
 security/selinux/include/common_perm_to_string.h |  58 ---
 security/selinux/include/flask.h                 |  40 +-
 security/selinux/include/security.h              |  13 +-
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c                     |   4 +-
 security/selinux/ss/mls.c                        |   2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c                   |  47 +-
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.h                   |   7 +-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c                   | 540 ++++++++++++-----------
 16 files changed, 583 insertions(+), 867 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
 delete mode 100644 security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
 delete mode 100644 security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/classmap.h
 delete mode 100644 security/selinux/include/common_perm_to_string.h

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c b/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c
index b4ced856258..62b34ce1f50 100644
--- a/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c
+++ b/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c
@@ -29,86 +29,27 @@
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
-#include "flask.h"
-
 static void usage(char *name)
 {
 	printf("usage: %s [-m] policy_file context_file\n", name);
 	exit(1);
 }
 
-static void find_common_name(char *cname, char *dest, int len)
-{
-	char *start, *end;
-
-	start = strchr(cname, '_')+1;
-	end = strchr(start, '_');
-	if (!start || !end || start-cname > len || end-start > len) {
-		printf("Error with commons defines\n");
-		exit(1);
-	}
-	strncpy(dest, start, end-start);
-	dest[end-start] = '\0';
-}
-
-#define S_(x) x,
-static char *classlist[] = {
-#include "class_to_string.h"
-	NULL
+/* Class/perm mapping support */
+struct security_class_mapping {
+	const char *name;
+	const char *perms[sizeof(unsigned) * 8 + 1];
 };
-#undef S_
 
+#include "classmap.h"
 #include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
 
-#define TB_(x) char *x[] = {
-#define TE_(x) NULL };
-#define S_(x) x,
-#include "common_perm_to_string.h"
-#undef TB_
-#undef TE_
-#undef S_
-
-struct common {
-	char *cname;
-	char **perms;
-};
-struct common common[] = {
-#define TB_(x) { #x, x },
-#define S_(x)
-#define TE_(x)
-#include "common_perm_to_string.h"
-#undef TB_
-#undef TE_
-#undef S_
-};
-
-#define S_(x, y, z) {x, #y},
-struct av_inherit {
-	int class;
-	char *common;
-};
-struct av_inherit av_inherit[] = {
-#include "av_inherit.h"
-};
-#undef S_
-
-#include "av_permissions.h"
-#define S_(x, y, z) {x, y, z},
-struct av_perms {
-	int class;
-	int perm_i;
-	char *perm_s;
-};
-struct av_perms av_perms[] = {
-#include "av_perm_to_string.h"
-};
-#undef S_
-
 int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 {
 	int i, j, mls = 0;
+	int initial_sid_to_string_len;
 	char **arg, *polout, *ctxout;
-	int classlist_len, initial_sid_to_string_len;
+
 	FILE *fout;
 
 	if (argc < 3)
@@ -127,64 +68,25 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 		usage(argv[0]);
 	}
 
-	classlist_len = sizeof(classlist) / sizeof(char *);
 	/* print out the classes */
-	for (i=1; i < classlist_len; i++) {
-		if(classlist[i])
-			fprintf(fout, "class %s\n", classlist[i]);
-		else
-			fprintf(fout, "class user%d\n", i);
-	}
+	for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++)
+		fprintf(fout, "class %s\n", secclass_map[i].name);
 	fprintf(fout, "\n");
 
 	initial_sid_to_string_len = sizeof(initial_sid_to_string) / sizeof (char *);
 	/* print out the sids */
-	for (i=1; i < initial_sid_to_string_len; i++)
+	for (i = 1; i < initial_sid_to_string_len; i++)
 		fprintf(fout, "sid %s\n", initial_sid_to_string[i]);
 	fprintf(fout, "\n");
 
-	/* print out the commons */
-	for (i=0; i< sizeof(common)/sizeof(struct common); i++) {
-		char cname[101];
-		find_common_name(common[i].cname, cname, 100);
-		cname[100] = '\0';
-		fprintf(fout, "common %s\n{\n", cname);
-		for (j=0; common[i].perms[j]; j++)
-			fprintf(fout, "\t%s\n", common[i].perms[j]);
-		fprintf(fout, "}\n\n");
-	}
-	fprintf(fout, "\n");
-
 	/* print out the class permissions */
-	for (i=1; i < classlist_len; i++) {
-		if (classlist[i]) {
-			int firstperm = -1, numperms = 0;
-
-			fprintf(fout, "class %s\n", classlist[i]);
-			/* does it inherit from a common? */
-			for (j=0; j < sizeof(av_inherit)/sizeof(struct av_inherit); j++)
-				if (av_inherit[j].class == i)
-					fprintf(fout, "inherits %s\n", av_inherit[j].common);
-
-			for (j=0; j < sizeof(av_perms)/sizeof(struct av_perms); j++) {
-				if (av_perms[j].class == i) {
-					if (firstperm == -1)
-						firstperm = j;
-					numperms++;
-				}
-			}
-			if (!numperms) {
-				fprintf(fout, "\n");
-				continue;
-			}
-
-			fprintf(fout, "{\n");
-			/* print out the av_perms */
-			for (j=0; j < numperms; j++) {
-				fprintf(fout, "\t%s\n", av_perms[firstperm+j].perm_s);
-			}
-			fprintf(fout, "}\n\n");
-		}
+	for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++) {
+		struct security_class_mapping *map = &secclass_map[i];
+		fprintf(fout, "class %s\n", map->name);
+		fprintf(fout, "{\n");
+		for (j = 0; map->perms[j]; j++)
+			fprintf(fout, "\t%s\n", map->perms[j]);
+		fprintf(fout, "}\n\n");
 	}
 	fprintf(fout, "\n");
 
@@ -197,31 +99,34 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	/* types, roles, and allows */
 	fprintf(fout, "type base_t;\n");
 	fprintf(fout, "role base_r types { base_t };\n");
-	for (i=1; i < classlist_len; i++) {
-		if (classlist[i])
-			fprintf(fout, "allow base_t base_t:%s *;\n", classlist[i]);
-		else
-			fprintf(fout, "allow base_t base_t:user%d *;\n", i);
-	}
+	for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++)
+		fprintf(fout, "allow base_t base_t:%s *;\n",
+			secclass_map[i].name);
 	fprintf(fout, "user user_u roles { base_r };\n");
 	fprintf(fout, "\n");
 
 	/* default sids */
-	for (i=1; i < initial_sid_to_string_len; i++)
+	for (i = 1; i < initial_sid_to_string_len; i++)
 		fprintf(fout, "sid %s user_u:base_r:base_t\n", initial_sid_to_string[i]);
 	fprintf(fout, "\n");
 
-
 	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr ext2 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
 	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr ext3 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr ext4 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
 	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr jfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
 	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr xfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
 	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr reiserfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr jffs2 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr gfs2 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr lustre user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
 
+	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_task eventpollfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
 	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_task pipefs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
 	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_task sockfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
 
+	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans mqueue user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
 	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans devpts user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans hugetlbfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
 	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans tmpfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
 	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans shm user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index b4b5da1c0a4..18f4103e02b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -31,43 +31,7 @@
 #include <net/ipv6.h>
 #include "avc.h"
 #include "avc_ss.h"
-
-static const struct av_perm_to_string av_perm_to_string[] = {
-#define S_(c, v, s) { c, v, s },
-#include "av_perm_to_string.h"
-#undef S_
-};
-
-static const char *class_to_string[] = {
-#define S_(s) s,
-#include "class_to_string.h"
-#undef S_
-};
-
-#define TB_(s) static const char *s[] = {
-#define TE_(s) };
-#define S_(s) s,
-#include "common_perm_to_string.h"
-#undef TB_
-#undef TE_
-#undef S_
-
-static const struct av_inherit av_inherit[] = {
-#define S_(c, i, b) {	.tclass = c,\
-			.common_pts = common_##i##_perm_to_string,\
-			.common_base =  b },
-#include "av_inherit.h"
-#undef S_
-};
-
-const struct selinux_class_perm selinux_class_perm = {
-	.av_perm_to_string = av_perm_to_string,
-	.av_pts_len = ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string),
-	.class_to_string = class_to_string,
-	.cts_len = ARRAY_SIZE(class_to_string),
-	.av_inherit = av_inherit,
-	.av_inherit_len = ARRAY_SIZE(av_inherit)
-};
+#include "classmap.h"
 
 #define AVC_CACHE_SLOTS			512
 #define AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD		512
@@ -139,52 +103,28 @@ static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
  */
 static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
 {
-	const char **common_pts = NULL;
-	u32 common_base = 0;
-	int i, i2, perm;
+	const char **perms;
+	int i, perm;
 
 	if (av == 0) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " null");
 		return;
 	}
 
-	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(av_inherit); i++) {
-		if (av_inherit[i].tclass == tclass) {
-			common_pts = av_inherit[i].common_pts;
-			common_base = av_inherit[i].common_base;
-			break;
-		}
-	}
+	perms = secclass_map[tclass-1].perms;
 
 	audit_log_format(ab, " {");
 	i = 0;
 	perm = 1;
-	while (perm < common_base) {
+	while (i < (sizeof(av) * 8)) {
 		if (perm & av) {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " %s", common_pts[i]);
+			audit_log_format(ab, " %s", perms[i]);
 			av &= ~perm;
 		}
 		i++;
 		perm <<= 1;
 	}
 
-	while (i < sizeof(av) * 8) {
-		if (perm & av) {
-			for (i2 = 0; i2 < ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string); i2++) {
-				if ((av_perm_to_string[i2].tclass == tclass) &&
-				    (av_perm_to_string[i2].value == perm))
-					break;
-			}
-			if (i2 < ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string)) {
-				audit_log_format(ab, " %s",
-						 av_perm_to_string[i2].name);
-				av &= ~perm;
-			}
-		}
-		i++;
-		perm <<= 1;
-	}
-
 	if (av)
 		audit_log_format(ab, " 0x%x", av);
 
@@ -219,8 +159,8 @@ static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tcla
 		kfree(scontext);
 	}
 
-	BUG_ON(tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(class_to_string) || !class_to_string[tclass]);
-	audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", class_to_string[tclass]);
+	BUG_ON(tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map));
+	audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", secclass_map[tclass-1].name);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h b/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
deleted file mode 100644
index abedcd704da..00000000000
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-/* This file is automatically generated.  Do not edit. */
-   S_(SECCLASS_DIR, file, 0x00020000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_LNK_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_BLK_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_IPC, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_SEM, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_MSGQ, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_SHM, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 2b683ad83d2..00000000000
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,183 +0,0 @@
-/* This file is automatically generated.  Do not edit. */
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, "mount")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, "remount")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, "unmount")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, "getattr")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, "relabelfrom")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, "relabelto")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__TRANSITION, "transition")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, "associate")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, "quotamod")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, "quotaget")
-   S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__ADD_NAME, "add_name")
-   S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__REMOVE_NAME, "remove_name")
-   S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__REPARENT, "reparent")
-   S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, "search")
-   S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__RMDIR, "rmdir")
-   S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__OPEN, "open")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, "execute_no_trans")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, "entrypoint")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__OPEN, "open")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, "execute_no_trans")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__ENTRYPOINT, "entrypoint")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__OPEN, "open")
-   S_(SECCLASS_BLK_FILE, BLK_FILE__OPEN, "open")
-   S_(SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE, SOCK_FILE__OPEN, "open")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE, FIFO_FILE__OPEN, "open")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, "use")
-   S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, "connectto")
-   S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__NEWCONN, "newconn")
-   S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__ACCEPTFROM, "acceptfrom")
-   S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND, "node_bind")
-   S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, "name_connect")
-   S_(SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET, UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND, "node_bind")
-   S_(SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET, RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND, "node_bind")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__TCP_RECV, "tcp_recv")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__TCP_SEND, "tcp_send")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__UDP_RECV, "udp_recv")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__UDP_SEND, "udp_send")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RAWIP_RECV, "rawip_recv")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RAWIP_SEND, "rawip_send")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__ENFORCE_DEST, "enforce_dest")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__DCCP_RECV, "dccp_recv")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__DCCP_SEND, "dccp_send")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, "recvfrom")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, "sendto")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__TCP_RECV, "tcp_recv")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__TCP_SEND, "tcp_send")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__UDP_RECV, "udp_recv")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__UDP_SEND, "udp_send")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__RAWIP_RECV, "rawip_recv")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__RAWIP_SEND, "rawip_send")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__DCCP_RECV, "dccp_recv")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__DCCP_SEND, "dccp_send")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, "ingress")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, "egress")
-   S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, "connectto")
-   S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__NEWCONN, "newconn")
-   S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__ACCEPTFROM, "acceptfrom")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, "fork")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, "transition")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGCHLD, "sigchld")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGKILL, "sigkill")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGSTOP, "sigstop")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGNULL, "signull")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGNAL, "signal")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, "ptrace")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETSCHED, "getsched")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, "setsched")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETSESSION, "getsession")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETPGID, "getpgid")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETPGID, "setpgid")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETCAP, "getcap")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETCAP, "setcap")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE, "share")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, "getattr")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETEXEC, "setexec")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, "setfscreate")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE, "noatsecure")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, "siginh")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, "setrlimit")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__RLIMITINH, "rlimitinh")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, "dyntransition")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETCURRENT, "setcurrent")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECMEM, "execmem")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECSTACK, "execstack")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECHEAP, "execheap")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, "setkeycreate")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, "setsockcreate")
-   S_(SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, "enqueue")
-   S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, "send")
-   S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, "receive")
-   S_(SECCLASS_SHM, SHM__LOCK, "lock")
-   S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_AV, "compute_av")
-   S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE, "compute_create")
-   S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_MEMBER, "compute_member")
-   S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__CHECK_CONTEXT, "check_context")
-   S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY, "load_policy")
-   S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_RELABEL, "compute_relabel")
-   S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER, "compute_user")
-   S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETENFORCE, "setenforce")
-   S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETBOOL, "setbool")
-   S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETSECPARAM, "setsecparam")
-   S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETCHECKREQPROT, "setcheckreqprot")
-   S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, "ipc_info")
-   S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, "syslog_read")
-   S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, "syslog_mod")
-   S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE, "syslog_console")
-   S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, "module_request")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__CHOWN, "chown")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__DAC_OVERRIDE, "dac_override")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__DAC_READ_SEARCH, "dac_read_search")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__FOWNER, "fowner")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__FSETID, "fsetid")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__KILL, "kill")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SETGID, "setgid")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SETUID, "setuid")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SETPCAP, "setpcap")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__LINUX_IMMUTABLE, "linux_immutable")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__NET_BIND_SERVICE, "net_bind_service")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__NET_BROADCAST, "net_broadcast")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__NET_ADMIN, "net_admin")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__NET_RAW, "net_raw")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__IPC_LOCK, "ipc_lock")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__IPC_OWNER, "ipc_owner")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_MODULE, "sys_module")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_RAWIO, "sys_rawio")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_CHROOT, "sys_chroot")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_PTRACE, "sys_ptrace")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_PACCT, "sys_pacct")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_ADMIN, "sys_admin")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_BOOT, "sys_boot")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_NICE, "sys_nice")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_RESOURCE, "sys_resource")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_TIME, "sys_time")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SYS_TTY_CONFIG, "sys_tty_config")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__MKNOD, "mknod")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__LEASE, "lease")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__AUDIT_WRITE, "audit_write")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__AUDIT_CONTROL, "audit_control")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__SETFCAP, "setfcap")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2, CAPABILITY2__MAC_OVERRIDE, "mac_override")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2, CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN, "mac_admin")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET, NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET, NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY, "nlmsg_relay")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV, "nlmsg_readpriv")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT, "nlmsg_tty_audit")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET, NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read")
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET, NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write")
-   S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, "sendto")
-   S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, "recvfrom")
-   S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, "setcontext")
-   S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, "polmatch")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, "send")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV, "recv")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, "relabelto")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FLOW_IN, "flow_in")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FLOW_OUT, "flow_out")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, "forward_in")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_OUT, "forward_out")
-   S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, "view")
-   S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__READ, "read")
-   S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__WRITE, "write")
-   S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__SEARCH, "search")
-   S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__LINK, "link")
-   S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__SETATTR, "setattr")
-   S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, "create")
-   S_(SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET, DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND, "node_bind")
-   S_(SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET, DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, "name_connect")
-   S_(SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, "mmap_zero")
-   S_(SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, "recv")
-   S_(SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE, "use_as_override")
-   S_(SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS, "create_files_as")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index 0546d616cca..fef2582b734 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -423,28 +423,6 @@
 #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RECV_MSG               0x00080000UL
 #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SEND_MSG               0x00100000UL
 #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__NAME_BIND              0x00200000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__IOCTL                         0x00000001UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__READ                          0x00000002UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__WRITE                         0x00000004UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__CREATE                        0x00000008UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__GETATTR                       0x00000010UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__SETATTR                       0x00000020UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__LOCK                          0x00000040UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM                   0x00000080UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO                     0x00000100UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__APPEND                        0x00000200UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__BIND                          0x00000400UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__CONNECT                       0x00000800UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__LISTEN                        0x00001000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__ACCEPT                        0x00002000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__GETOPT                        0x00004000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__SETOPT                        0x00008000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                      0x00010000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__RECVFROM                      0x00020000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__SENDTO                        0x00040000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                      0x00080000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                      0x00100000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                     0x00200000UL
 #define PROCESS__FORK                             0x00000001UL
 #define PROCESS__TRANSITION                       0x00000002UL
 #define PROCESS__SIGCHLD                          0x00000004UL
@@ -868,3 +846,25 @@
 #define PEER__RECV                                0x00000001UL
 #define KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE           0x00000001UL
 #define KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS           0x00000002UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__IOCTL                         0x00000001UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__READ                          0x00000002UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__WRITE                         0x00000004UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__CREATE                        0x00000008UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__GETATTR                       0x00000010UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SETATTR                       0x00000020UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__LOCK                          0x00000040UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM                   0x00000080UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO                     0x00000100UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__APPEND                        0x00000200UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__BIND                          0x00000400UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__CONNECT                       0x00000800UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__LISTEN                        0x00001000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__ACCEPT                        0x00002000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__GETOPT                        0x00004000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SETOPT                        0x00008000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                      0x00010000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RECVFROM                      0x00020000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SENDTO                        0x00040000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                      0x00080000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                      0x00100000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                     0x00200000UL
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
index bb1ec801bdf..4677aa519b0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
@@ -10,26 +10,13 @@
 
 int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno);
 
-struct av_perm_to_string {
-	u16 tclass;
-	u32 value;
+/* Class/perm mapping support */
+struct security_class_mapping {
 	const char *name;
+	const char *perms[sizeof(u32) * 8 + 1];
 };
 
-struct av_inherit {
-	const char **common_pts;
-	u32 common_base;
-	u16 tclass;
-};
-
-struct selinux_class_perm {
-	const struct av_perm_to_string *av_perm_to_string;
-	u32 av_pts_len;
-	u32 cts_len;
-	const char **class_to_string;
-	const struct av_inherit *av_inherit;
-	u32 av_inherit_len;
-};
+extern struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[];
 
 #endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_ */
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 7ab9299bfb6..00000000000
--- a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-/* This file is automatically generated.  Do not edit. */
-/*
- * Security object class definitions
- */
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_("security")
-    S_("process")
-    S_("system")
-    S_("capability")
-    S_("filesystem")
-    S_("file")
-    S_("dir")
-    S_("fd")
-    S_("lnk_file")
-    S_("chr_file")
-    S_("blk_file")
-    S_("sock_file")
-    S_("fifo_file")
-    S_("socket")
-    S_("tcp_socket")
-    S_("udp_socket")
-    S_("rawip_socket")
-    S_("node")
-    S_("netif")
-    S_("netlink_socket")
-    S_("packet_socket")
-    S_("key_socket")
-    S_("unix_stream_socket")
-    S_("unix_dgram_socket")
-    S_("sem")
-    S_("msg")
-    S_("msgq")
-    S_("shm")
-    S_("ipc")
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_("netlink_route_socket")
-    S_("netlink_firewall_socket")
-    S_("netlink_tcpdiag_socket")
-    S_("netlink_nflog_socket")
-    S_("netlink_xfrm_socket")
-    S_("netlink_selinux_socket")
-    S_("netlink_audit_socket")
-    S_("netlink_ip6fw_socket")
-    S_("netlink_dnrt_socket")
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_("association")
-    S_("netlink_kobject_uevent_socket")
-    S_("appletalk_socket")
-    S_("packet")
-    S_("key")
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_("dccp_socket")
-    S_("memprotect")
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_("peer")
-    S_("capability2")
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_(NULL)
-    S_("kernel_service")
-    S_("tun_socket")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..8b32e959bb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+#define COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS "ioctl", "read", "write", "create", \
+    "getattr", "setattr", "lock", "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "append"
+
+#define COMMON_FILE_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "unlink", "link", \
+    "rename", "execute", "swapon", "quotaon", "mounton"
+
+#define COMMON_SOCK_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "bind", "connect", \
+    "listen", "accept", "getopt", "setopt", "shutdown", "recvfrom",  \
+    "sendto", "recv_msg", "send_msg", "name_bind"
+
+#define COMMON_IPC_PERMS "create", "destroy", "getattr", "setattr", "read", \
+	    "write", "associate", "unix_read", "unix_write"
+
+struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
+	{ "security",
+	  { "compute_av", "compute_create", "compute_member",
+	    "check_context", "load_policy", "compute_relabel",
+	    "compute_user", "setenforce", "setbool", "setsecparam",
+	    "setcheckreqprot", NULL } },
+	{ "process",
+	  { "fork", "transition", "sigchld", "sigkill",
+	    "sigstop", "signull", "signal", "ptrace", "getsched", "setsched",
+	    "getsession", "getpgid", "setpgid", "getcap", "setcap", "share",
+	    "getattr", "setexec", "setfscreate", "noatsecure", "siginh",
+	    "setrlimit", "rlimitinh", "dyntransition", "setcurrent",
+	    "execmem", "execstack", "execheap", "setkeycreate",
+	    "setsockcreate", NULL } },
+	{ "system",
+	  { "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod",
+	    "syslog_console", "module_request", NULL } },
+	{ "capability",
+	  { "chown", "dac_override", "dac_read_search",
+	    "fowner", "fsetid", "kill", "setgid", "setuid", "setpcap",
+	    "linux_immutable", "net_bind_service", "net_broadcast",
+	    "net_admin", "net_raw", "ipc_lock", "ipc_owner", "sys_module",
+	    "sys_rawio", "sys_chroot", "sys_ptrace", "sys_pacct", "sys_admin",
+	    "sys_boot", "sys_nice", "sys_resource", "sys_time",
+	    "sys_tty_config", "mknod", "lease", "audit_write",
+	    "audit_control", "setfcap", NULL } },
+	{ "filesystem",
+	  { "mount", "remount", "unmount", "getattr",
+	    "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "transition", "associate", "quotamod",
+	    "quotaget", NULL } },
+	{ "file",
+	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS,
+	    "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", "execmod", "open", NULL } },
+	{ "dir",
+	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "add_name", "remove_name",
+	    "reparent", "search", "rmdir", "open", NULL } },
+	{ "fd", { "use", NULL } },
+	{ "lnk_file",
+	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "chr_file",
+	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS,
+	    "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", "execmod", "open", NULL } },
+	{ "blk_file",
+	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "open", NULL } },
+	{ "sock_file",
+	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "open", NULL } },
+	{ "fifo_file",
+	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "open", NULL } },
+	{ "socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "tcp_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+	    "connectto", "newconn", "acceptfrom", "node_bind", "name_connect",
+	    NULL } },
+	{ "udp_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+	    "node_bind", NULL } },
+	{ "rawip_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+	    "node_bind", NULL } },
+	{ "node",
+	  { "tcp_recv", "tcp_send", "udp_recv", "udp_send",
+	    "rawip_recv", "rawip_send", "enforce_dest",
+	    "dccp_recv", "dccp_send", "recvfrom", "sendto", NULL } },
+	{ "netif",
+	  {  "tcp_recv", "tcp_send", "udp_recv", "udp_send",
+	     "rawip_recv", "rawip_send", "dccp_recv", "dccp_send",
+	     "ingress", "egress", NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "packet_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "key_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "unix_stream_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "connectto", "newconn", "acceptfrom", NULL
+	  } },
+	{ "unix_dgram_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL
+	  } },
+	{ "sem",
+	  { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "msg", { "send", "receive", NULL } },
+	{ "msgq",
+	  { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, "enqueue", NULL } },
+	{ "shm",
+	  { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, "lock", NULL } },
+	{ "ipc",
+	  { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_route_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+	    "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_firewall_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+	    "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_tcpdiag_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+	    "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_nflog_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_xfrm_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+	    "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_selinux_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_audit_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+	    "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", "nlmsg_relay", "nlmsg_readpriv",
+	    "nlmsg_tty_audit", NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_ip6fw_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+	    "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_dnrt_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "association",
+	  { "sendto", "recvfrom", "setcontext", "polmatch", NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_kobject_uevent_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "appletalk_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "packet",
+	  { "send", "recv", "relabelto", "flow_in", "flow_out",
+	    "forward_in", "forward_out", NULL } },
+	{ "key",
+	  { "view", "read", "write", "search", "link", "setattr", "create",
+	    NULL } },
+	{ "dccp_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+	    "node_bind", "name_connect", NULL } },
+	{ "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } },
+	{ "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
+	{ "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", NULL } },
+	{ "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
+	{ "tun_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ NULL }
+  };
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/common_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/common_perm_to_string.h
deleted file mode 100644
index ce5b6e2fe9d..00000000000
--- a/security/selinux/include/common_perm_to_string.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-/* This file is automatically generated.  Do not edit. */
-TB_(common_file_perm_to_string)
-    S_("ioctl")
-    S_("read")
-    S_("write")
-    S_("create")
-    S_("getattr")
-    S_("setattr")
-    S_("lock")
-    S_("relabelfrom")
-    S_("relabelto")
-    S_("append")
-    S_("unlink")
-    S_("link")
-    S_("rename")
-    S_("execute")
-    S_("swapon")
-    S_("quotaon")
-    S_("mounton")
-TE_(common_file_perm_to_string)
-
-TB_(common_socket_perm_to_string)
-    S_("ioctl")
-    S_("read")
-    S_("write")
-    S_("create")
-    S_("getattr")
-    S_("setattr")
-    S_("lock")
-    S_("relabelfrom")
-    S_("relabelto")
-    S_("append")
-    S_("bind")
-    S_("connect")
-    S_("listen")
-    S_("accept")
-    S_("getopt")
-    S_("setopt")
-    S_("shutdown")
-    S_("recvfrom")
-    S_("sendto")
-    S_("recv_msg")
-    S_("send_msg")
-    S_("name_bind")
-TE_(common_socket_perm_to_string)
-
-TB_(common_ipc_perm_to_string)
-    S_("create")
-    S_("destroy")
-    S_("getattr")
-    S_("setattr")
-    S_("read")
-    S_("write")
-    S_("associate")
-    S_("unix_read")
-    S_("unix_write")
-TE_(common_ipc_perm_to_string)
-
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/flask.h b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
index f248500a1e3..5359ca2abf2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/flask.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
@@ -34,26 +34,26 @@
 #define SECCLASS_MSGQ                                    27
 #define SECCLASS_SHM                                     28
 #define SECCLASS_IPC                                     29
-#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET                    43
-#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET                 44
-#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET                  45
-#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET                    46
-#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET                     47
-#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET                  48
-#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET                    49
-#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET                    50
-#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET                     51
-#define SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION                             54
-#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET           55
-#define SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET                        56
-#define SECCLASS_PACKET                                  57
-#define SECCLASS_KEY                                     58
-#define SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET                             60
-#define SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT                              61
-#define SECCLASS_PEER                                    68
-#define SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2                             69
-#define SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE                          74
-#define SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET                              75
+#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET                    30
+#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET                 31
+#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET                  32
+#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET                    33
+#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET                     34
+#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET                  35
+#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET                    36
+#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET                    37
+#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET                     38
+#define SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION                             39
+#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET           40
+#define SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET                        41
+#define SECCLASS_PACKET                                  42
+#define SECCLASS_KEY                                     43
+#define SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET                             44
+#define SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT                              45
+#define SECCLASS_PEER                                    46
+#define SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2                             47
+#define SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE                          48
+#define SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET                              49
 
 /*
  * Security identifier indices for initial entities
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index ca835795a8b..2553266ad79 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -97,11 +97,18 @@ struct av_decision {
 #define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE	0x0001
 
 int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-	u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-	struct av_decision *avd);
+			u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			struct av_decision *avd);
+
+int security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			     u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			     struct av_decision *avd);
 
 int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-	u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
+			    u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+				 u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
 
 int security_member_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index b4fc506e7a8..fab36fdf276 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (length < 0)
 		goto out2;
 
-	length = security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, req, &avd);
+	length = security_compute_av_user(ssid, tsid, tclass, req, &avd);
 	if (length < 0)
 		goto out2;
 
@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (length < 0)
 		goto out2;
 
-	length = security_transition_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
+	length = security_transition_sid_user(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
 	if (length < 0)
 		goto out2;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index b5407f16c2a..3f2b2706b5b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
 		}
 		/* Fallthrough */
 	case AVTAB_CHANGE:
-		if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS)
+		if (tclass == policydb.process_class)
 			/* Use the process MLS attributes. */
 			return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
 		else
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 72e4a54973a..f03667213ea 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -713,7 +713,6 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 			ebitmap_destroy(&p->type_attr_map[i]);
 	}
 	kfree(p->type_attr_map);
-	kfree(p->undefined_perms);
 	ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps);
 	ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map);
 
@@ -1640,6 +1639,40 @@ static int policydb_bounds_sanity_check(struct policydb *p)
 
 extern int ss_initialized;
 
+u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name)
+{
+	struct class_datum *cladatum;
+
+	cladatum = hashtab_search(p->p_classes.table, name);
+	if (!cladatum)
+		return 0;
+
+	return cladatum->value;
+}
+
+u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name)
+{
+	struct class_datum *cladatum;
+	struct perm_datum *perdatum = NULL;
+	struct common_datum *comdatum;
+
+	if (!tclass || tclass > p->p_classes.nprim)
+		return 0;
+
+	cladatum = p->class_val_to_struct[tclass-1];
+	comdatum = cladatum->comdatum;
+	if (comdatum)
+		perdatum = hashtab_search(comdatum->permissions.table,
+					  name);
+	if (!perdatum)
+		perdatum = hashtab_search(cladatum->permissions.table,
+					  name);
+	if (!perdatum)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1U << (perdatum->value-1);
+}
+
 /*
  * Read the configuration data from a policy database binary
  * representation file into a policy database structure.
@@ -1861,6 +1894,16 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
 
+	p->process_class = string_to_security_class(p, "process");
+	if (!p->process_class)
+		goto bad;
+	p->process_trans_perms = string_to_av_perm(p, p->process_class,
+						   "transition");
+	p->process_trans_perms |= string_to_av_perm(p, p->process_class,
+						    "dyntransition");
+	if (!p->process_trans_perms)
+		goto bad;
+
 	for (i = 0; i < info->ocon_num; i++) {
 		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
 		if (rc < 0)
@@ -2101,7 +2144,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 					goto bad;
 				rt->target_class = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 			} else
-				rt->target_class = SECCLASS_PROCESS;
+				rt->target_class = p->process_class;
 			if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->source_type) ||
 			    !policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->target_type) ||
 			    !policydb_class_isvalid(p, rt->target_class)) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index 55152d498b5..cdcc5700946 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -254,7 +254,9 @@ struct policydb {
 
 	unsigned int reject_unknown : 1;
 	unsigned int allow_unknown : 1;
-	u32 *undefined_perms;
+
+	u16 process_class;
+	u32 process_trans_perms;
 };
 
 extern void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p);
@@ -295,5 +297,8 @@ static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+extern u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name);
+extern u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name);
+
 #endif	/* _SS_POLICYDB_H_ */
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index ff17820d35e..e19baa81fde 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -70,11 +70,6 @@ unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
 int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
 int selinux_policycap_openperm;
 
-/*
- * This is declared in avc.c
- */
-extern const struct selinux_class_perm selinux_class_perm;
-
 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
 
 static struct sidtab sidtab;
@@ -98,6 +93,158 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 				     u16 tclass,
 				     u32 requested,
 				     struct av_decision *avd);
+
+struct selinux_mapping {
+	u16 value; /* policy value */
+	unsigned num_perms;
+	u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8];
+};
+
+static struct selinux_mapping *current_mapping;
+static u16 current_mapping_size;
+
+static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
+			       struct security_class_mapping *map,
+			       struct selinux_mapping **out_map_p,
+			       u16 *out_map_size)
+{
+	struct selinux_mapping *out_map = NULL;
+	size_t size = sizeof(struct selinux_mapping);
+	u16 i, j;
+	unsigned k;
+	bool print_unknown_handle = false;
+
+	/* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
+	if (!map)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	i = 0;
+	while (map[i].name)
+		i++;
+
+	/* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
+	out_map = kcalloc(++i, size, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!out_map)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* Store the raw class and permission values */
+	j = 0;
+	while (map[j].name) {
+		struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
+		struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map + j;
+
+		/* An empty class string skips ahead */
+		if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
+			p_out->num_perms = 0;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name);
+		if (!p_out->value) {
+			printk(KERN_INFO
+			       "SELinux:  Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
+			       p_in->name);
+			if (pol->reject_unknown)
+				goto err;
+			p_out->num_perms = 0;
+			print_unknown_handle = true;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		k = 0;
+		while (p_in->perms && p_in->perms[k]) {
+			/* An empty permission string skips ahead */
+			if (!*p_in->perms[k]) {
+				k++;
+				continue;
+			}
+			p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value,
+							    p_in->perms[k]);
+			if (!p_out->perms[k]) {
+				printk(KERN_INFO
+				       "SELinux:  Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
+				       p_in->perms[k], p_in->name);
+				if (pol->reject_unknown)
+					goto err;
+				print_unknown_handle = true;
+			}
+
+			k++;
+		}
+		p_out->num_perms = k;
+	}
+
+	if (print_unknown_handle)
+		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
+		       pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
+
+	*out_map_p = out_map;
+	*out_map_size = i;
+	return 0;
+err:
+	kfree(out_map);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get real, policy values from mapped values
+ */
+
+static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass)
+{
+	if (tclass < current_mapping_size)
+		return current_mapping[tclass].value;
+
+	return tclass;
+}
+
+static u32 unmap_perm(u16 tclass, u32 tperm)
+{
+	if (tclass < current_mapping_size) {
+		unsigned i;
+		u32 kperm = 0;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < current_mapping[tclass].num_perms; i++)
+			if (tperm & (1<<i)) {
+				kperm |= current_mapping[tclass].perms[i];
+				tperm &= ~(1<<i);
+			}
+		return kperm;
+	}
+
+	return tperm;
+}
+
+static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+			 int allow_unknown)
+{
+	if (tclass < current_mapping_size) {
+		unsigned i, n = current_mapping[tclass].num_perms;
+		u32 result;
+
+		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
+			if (avd->allowed & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+				result |= 1<<i;
+			if (allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+				result |= 1<<i;
+		}
+		avd->allowed = result;
+
+		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
+			if (avd->auditallow & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+				result |= 1<<i;
+		avd->auditallow = result;
+
+		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
+			if (avd->auditdeny & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+				result |= 1<<i;
+			if (!allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+				result |= 1<<i;
+		}
+		avd->auditdeny = result;
+	}
+}
+
+
 /*
  * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
  * when it is applied to the specified source and target
@@ -467,7 +614,6 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 	struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
 	struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
 	struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
-	const struct selinux_class_perm *kdefs = &selinux_class_perm;
 	unsigned int i, j;
 
 	/*
@@ -477,9 +623,9 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 	 * to remain in the correct class.
 	 */
 	if (policydb_loaded_version < POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
-		if (tclass >= SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET &&
-		    tclass <= SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET)
-			tclass = SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
+		if (tclass >= unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET) &&
+		    tclass <= unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET))
+			tclass = unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET);
 
 	/*
 	 * Initialize the access vectors to the default values.
@@ -490,33 +636,11 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 	avd->seqno = latest_granting;
 	avd->flags = 0;
 
-	/*
-	 * Check for all the invalid cases.
-	 * - tclass 0
-	 * - tclass > policy and > kernel
-	 * - tclass > policy but is a userspace class
-	 * - tclass > policy but we do not allow unknowns
-	 */
-	if (unlikely(!tclass))
-		goto inval_class;
-	if (unlikely(tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim))
-		if (tclass > kdefs->cts_len ||
-		    !kdefs->class_to_string[tclass] ||
-		    !policydb.allow_unknown)
-			goto inval_class;
-
-	/*
-	 * Kernel class and we allow unknown so pad the allow decision
-	 * the pad will be all 1 for unknown classes.
-	 */
-	if (tclass <= kdefs->cts_len && policydb.allow_unknown)
-		avd->allowed = policydb.undefined_perms[tclass - 1];
-
-	/*
-	 * Not in policy. Since decision is completed (all 1 or all 0) return.
-	 */
-	if (unlikely(tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim))
-		return 0;
+	if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
+		if (printk_ratelimit())
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
 
@@ -568,8 +692,8 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 	 * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
 	 * pair.
 	 */
-	if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS &&
-	    (avd->allowed & (PROCESS__TRANSITION | PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION)) &&
+	if (tclass == policydb.process_class &&
+	    (avd->allowed & policydb.process_trans_perms) &&
 	    scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
 		for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
 			if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
@@ -577,8 +701,7 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 				break;
 		}
 		if (!ra)
-			avd->allowed &= ~(PROCESS__TRANSITION |
-					  PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION);
+			avd->allowed &= ~policydb.process_trans_perms;
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -590,21 +713,6 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 				 tclass, requested, avd);
 
 	return 0;
-
-inval_class:
-	if (!tclass || tclass > kdefs->cts_len ||
-	    !kdefs->class_to_string[tclass]) {
-		if (printk_ratelimit())
-			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized class %d\n",
-			       __func__, tclass);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Known to the kernel, but not to the policy.
-	 * Handle as a denial (allowed is 0).
-	 */
-	return 0;
 }
 
 static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
@@ -636,13 +744,14 @@ out:
 }
 
 int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
-				 u16 tclass)
+				 u16 orig_tclass)
 {
 	struct context *ocontext;
 	struct context *ncontext;
 	struct context *tcontext;
 	struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
 	struct constraint_node *constraint;
+	u16 tclass;
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	if (!ss_initialized)
@@ -650,6 +759,8 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 
 	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
+	tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+
 	/*
 	 * Remap extended Netlink classes for old policy versions.
 	 * Do this here rather than socket_type_to_security_class()
@@ -657,9 +768,9 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 	 * to remain in the correct class.
 	 */
 	if (policydb_loaded_version < POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
-		if (tclass >= SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET &&
-		    tclass <= SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET)
-			tclass = SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
+		if (tclass >= unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET) &&
+		    tclass <= unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET))
+			tclass = unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET);
 
 	if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized class %d\n",
@@ -792,6 +903,38 @@ out:
 }
 
 
+static int security_compute_av_core(u32 ssid,
+				    u32 tsid,
+				    u16 tclass,
+				    u32 requested,
+				    struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+	if (!scontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, ssid);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+	if (!tcontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       __func__, tsid);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	rc = context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass,
+				       requested, avd);
+
+	/* permissive domain? */
+	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
+		avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
 /**
  * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
  * @ssid: source security identifier
@@ -807,12 +950,45 @@ out:
  */
 int security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
 			u32 tsid,
-			u16 tclass,
-			u32 requested,
+			u16 orig_tclass,
+			u32 orig_requested,
 			struct av_decision *avd)
 {
-	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
-	int rc = 0;
+	u16 tclass;
+	u32 requested;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized)
+		goto allow;
+
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	requested = unmap_perm(orig_tclass, orig_requested);
+	tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+	if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
+		if (policydb.allow_unknown)
+			goto allow;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	rc = security_compute_av_core(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd);
+	map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
+	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	return rc;
+allow:
+	avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
+	avd->auditallow = 0;
+	avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+	avd->seqno = latest_granting;
+	avd->flags = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
+			     u32 tsid,
+			     u16 tclass,
+			     u32 requested,
+			     struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	int rc;
 
 	if (!ss_initialized) {
 		avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
@@ -823,29 +999,7 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
 	}
 
 	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-
-	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
-	if (!scontext) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
-		       __func__, ssid);
-		rc = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
-	if (!tcontext) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
-		       __func__, tsid);
-		rc = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	rc = context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass,
-				       requested, avd);
-
-	/* permissive domain? */
-	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
-	    avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
-out:
+	rc = security_compute_av_core(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd);
 	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -1204,20 +1358,22 @@ out:
 
 static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 				u32 tsid,
-				u16 tclass,
+				u16 orig_tclass,
 				u32 specified,
-				u32 *out_sid)
+				u32 *out_sid,
+				bool kern)
 {
 	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
 	struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
 	struct avtab_key avkey;
 	struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
 	struct avtab_node *node;
+	u16 tclass;
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	if (!ss_initialized) {
-		switch (tclass) {
-		case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
+		switch (orig_tclass) {
+		case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
 			*out_sid = ssid;
 			break;
 		default:
@@ -1231,6 +1387,11 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 
 	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
+	if (kern)
+		tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+	else
+		tclass = orig_tclass;
+
 	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
 	if (!scontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
@@ -1260,13 +1421,11 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 	}
 
 	/* Set the role and type to default values. */
-	switch (tclass) {
-	case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
+	if (tclass == policydb.process_class) {
 		/* Use the current role and type of process. */
 		newcontext.role = scontext->role;
 		newcontext.type = scontext->type;
-		break;
-	default:
+	} else {
 		/* Use the well-defined object role. */
 		newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
 		/* Use the type of the related object. */
@@ -1297,8 +1456,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 	}
 
 	/* Check for class-specific changes. */
-	switch (tclass) {
-	case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
+	if  (tclass == policydb.process_class) {
 		if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
 			/* Look for a role transition rule. */
 			for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr;
@@ -1311,9 +1469,6 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 				}
 			}
 		}
-		break;
-	default:
-		break;
 	}
 
 	/* Set the MLS attributes.
@@ -1358,7 +1513,17 @@ int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid,
 			    u16 tclass,
 			    u32 *out_sid)
 {
-	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION, out_sid);
+	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+				    out_sid, true);
+}
+
+int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid,
+				 u32 tsid,
+				 u16 tclass,
+				 u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+				    out_sid, false);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1379,7 +1544,8 @@ int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
 			u16 tclass,
 			u32 *out_sid)
 {
-	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, out_sid);
+	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, out_sid,
+				    false);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1400,144 +1566,8 @@ int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
 			u16 tclass,
 			u32 *out_sid)
 {
-	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, out_sid);
-}
-
-/*
- * Verify that each kernel class that is defined in the
- * policy is correct
- */
-static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p)
-{
-	int i, j;
-	struct class_datum *cladatum;
-	struct perm_datum *perdatum;
-	u32 nprim, tmp, common_pts_len, perm_val, pol_val;
-	u16 class_val;
-	const struct selinux_class_perm *kdefs = &selinux_class_perm;
-	const char *def_class, *def_perm, *pol_class;
-	struct symtab *perms;
-	bool print_unknown_handle = 0;
-
-	if (p->allow_unknown) {
-		u32 num_classes = kdefs->cts_len;
-		p->undefined_perms = kcalloc(num_classes, sizeof(u32), GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!p->undefined_perms)
-			return -ENOMEM;
-	}
-
-	for (i = 1; i < kdefs->cts_len; i++) {
-		def_class = kdefs->class_to_string[i];
-		if (!def_class)
-			continue;
-		if (i > p->p_classes.nprim) {
-			printk(KERN_INFO
-			       "SELinux:  class %s not defined in policy\n",
-			       def_class);
-			if (p->reject_unknown)
-				return -EINVAL;
-			if (p->allow_unknown)
-				p->undefined_perms[i-1] = ~0U;
-			print_unknown_handle = 1;
-			continue;
-		}
-		pol_class = p->p_class_val_to_name[i-1];
-		if (strcmp(pol_class, def_class)) {
-			printk(KERN_ERR
-			       "SELinux:  class %d is incorrect, found %s but should be %s\n",
-			       i, pol_class, def_class);
-			return -EINVAL;
-		}
-	}
-	for (i = 0; i < kdefs->av_pts_len; i++) {
-		class_val = kdefs->av_perm_to_string[i].tclass;
-		perm_val = kdefs->av_perm_to_string[i].value;
-		def_perm = kdefs->av_perm_to_string[i].name;
-		if (class_val > p->p_classes.nprim)
-			continue;
-		pol_class = p->p_class_val_to_name[class_val-1];
-		cladatum = hashtab_search(p->p_classes.table, pol_class);
-		BUG_ON(!cladatum);
-		perms = &cladatum->permissions;
-		nprim = 1 << (perms->nprim - 1);
-		if (perm_val > nprim) {
-			printk(KERN_INFO
-			       "SELinux:  permission %s in class %s not defined in policy\n",
-			       def_perm, pol_class);
-			if (p->reject_unknown)
-				return -EINVAL;
-			if (p->allow_unknown)
-				p->undefined_perms[class_val-1] |= perm_val;
-			print_unknown_handle = 1;
-			continue;
-		}
-		perdatum = hashtab_search(perms->table, def_perm);
-		if (perdatum == NULL) {
-			printk(KERN_ERR
-			       "SELinux:  permission %s in class %s not found in policy, bad policy\n",
-			       def_perm, pol_class);
-			return -EINVAL;
-		}
-		pol_val = 1 << (perdatum->value - 1);
-		if (pol_val != perm_val) {
-			printk(KERN_ERR
-			       "SELinux:  permission %s in class %s has incorrect value\n",
-			       def_perm, pol_class);
-			return -EINVAL;
-		}
-	}
-	for (i = 0; i < kdefs->av_inherit_len; i++) {
-		class_val = kdefs->av_inherit[i].tclass;
-		if (class_val > p->p_classes.nprim)
-			continue;
-		pol_class = p->p_class_val_to_name[class_val-1];
-		cladatum = hashtab_search(p->p_classes.table, pol_class);
-		BUG_ON(!cladatum);
-		if (!cladatum->comdatum) {
-			printk(KERN_ERR
-			       "SELinux:  class %s should have an inherits clause but does not\n",
-			       pol_class);
-			return -EINVAL;
-		}
-		tmp = kdefs->av_inherit[i].common_base;
-		common_pts_len = 0;
-		while (!(tmp & 0x01)) {
-			common_pts_len++;
-			tmp >>= 1;
-		}
-		perms = &cladatum->comdatum->permissions;
-		for (j = 0; j < common_pts_len; j++) {
-			def_perm = kdefs->av_inherit[i].common_pts[j];
-			if (j >= perms->nprim) {
-				printk(KERN_INFO
-				       "SELinux:  permission %s in class %s not defined in policy\n",
-				       def_perm, pol_class);
-				if (p->reject_unknown)
-					return -EINVAL;
-				if (p->allow_unknown)
-					p->undefined_perms[class_val-1] |= (1 << j);
-				print_unknown_handle = 1;
-				continue;
-			}
-			perdatum = hashtab_search(perms->table, def_perm);
-			if (perdatum == NULL) {
-				printk(KERN_ERR
-				       "SELinux:  permission %s in class %s not found in policy, bad policy\n",
-				       def_perm, pol_class);
-				return -EINVAL;
-			}
-			if (perdatum->value != j + 1) {
-				printk(KERN_ERR
-				       "SELinux:  permission %s in class %s has incorrect value\n",
-				       def_perm, pol_class);
-				return -EINVAL;
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	if (print_unknown_handle)
-		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
-			(security_get_allow_unknown() ? "allowed" : "denied"));
-	return 0;
+	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, out_sid,
+				    false);
 }
 
 /* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
@@ -1710,8 +1740,10 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 {
 	struct policydb oldpolicydb, newpolicydb;
 	struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
+	struct selinux_mapping *oldmap, *map = NULL;
 	struct convert_context_args args;
 	u32 seqno;
+	u16 map_size;
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
 
@@ -1721,16 +1753,14 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 			avtab_cache_destroy();
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
-		if (policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab)) {
+		if (selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
+					&current_mapping,
+					&current_mapping_size)) {
 			policydb_destroy(&policydb);
 			avtab_cache_destroy();
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
-		/* Verify that the kernel defined classes are correct. */
-		if (validate_classes(&policydb)) {
-			printk(KERN_ERR
-			       "SELinux:  the definition of a class is incorrect\n");
-			sidtab_destroy(&sidtab);
+		if (policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab)) {
 			policydb_destroy(&policydb);
 			avtab_cache_destroy();
 			return -EINVAL;
@@ -1759,13 +1789,9 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	/* Verify that the kernel defined classes are correct. */
-	if (validate_classes(&newpolicydb)) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR
-		       "SELinux:  the definition of a class is incorrect\n");
-		rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (selinux_set_mapping(&newpolicydb, secclass_map,
+				&map, &map_size))
 		goto err;
-	}
 
 	rc = security_preserve_bools(&newpolicydb);
 	if (rc) {
@@ -1799,6 +1825,9 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 	memcpy(&policydb, &newpolicydb, sizeof policydb);
 	sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
 	security_load_policycaps();
+	oldmap = current_mapping;
+	current_mapping = map;
+	current_mapping_size = map_size;
 	seqno = ++latest_granting;
 	policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
 	write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
@@ -1806,6 +1835,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 	/* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
 	policydb_destroy(&oldpolicydb);
 	sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
+	kfree(oldmap);
 
 	avc_ss_reset(seqno);
 	selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
@@ -1815,6 +1845,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 	return 0;
 
 err:
+	kfree(map);
 	sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
 	policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
 	return rc;
@@ -2091,7 +2122,7 @@ out_unlock:
 	}
 	for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
 		rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i],
-					  SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+					  SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
 					  PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
 					  NULL);
 		if (!rc)
@@ -2119,10 +2150,11 @@ out:
  */
 int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
 		       char *path,
-		       u16 sclass,
+		       u16 orig_sclass,
 		       u32 *sid)
 {
 	int len;
+	u16 sclass;
 	struct genfs *genfs;
 	struct ocontext *c;
 	int rc = 0, cmp = 0;
@@ -2132,6 +2164,8 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
 
 	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
+	sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
+
 	for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
 		cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
 		if (cmp <= 0)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2


From 8753f6bec352392b52ed9b5e290afb34379f4612 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2009 13:41:02 -0400
Subject: selinux: generate flask headers during kernel build

Add a simple utility (scripts/selinux/genheaders) and invoke it to
generate the kernel-private class and permission indices in flask.h
and av_permissions.h automatically during the kernel build from the
security class mapping definitions in classmap.h.  Adding new kernel
classes and permissions can then be done just by adding them to classmap.h.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 scripts/selinux/Makefile                  |   4 +-
 scripts/selinux/genheaders/Makefile       |   5 +
 scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c   | 118 ++++
 security/selinux/Makefile                 |  10 +-
 security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h | 870 ------------------------------
 security/selinux/include/flask.h          |  91 ----
 security/selinux/ss/Makefile              |   2 +-
 7 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 965 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 scripts/selinux/genheaders/Makefile
 create mode 100644 scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c
 delete mode 100644 security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
 delete mode 100644 security/selinux/include/flask.h

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/scripts/selinux/Makefile b/scripts/selinux/Makefile
index ca4b1ec0182..e8049da1831 100644
--- a/scripts/selinux/Makefile
+++ b/scripts/selinux/Makefile
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-subdir-y := mdp
-subdir-	+= mdp
+subdir-y := mdp genheaders
+subdir-	+= mdp genheaders
diff --git a/scripts/selinux/genheaders/Makefile b/scripts/selinux/genheaders/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..417b165008e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/selinux/genheaders/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+hostprogs-y	:= genheaders
+HOST_EXTRACFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux/include
+
+always		:= $(hostprogs-y)
+clean-files	:= $(hostprogs-y)
diff --git a/scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c b/scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..3b16145dabe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+struct security_class_mapping {
+	const char *name;
+	const char *perms[sizeof(unsigned) * 8 + 1];
+};
+
+#include "classmap.h"
+#include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
+
+#define max(x, y) ((x > y) ? x : y)
+
+const char *progname;
+
+void usage(void)
+{
+	printf("usage: %s flask.h av_permissions.h\n", progname);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+char *stoupperx(const char *s)
+{
+	char *s2 = strdup(s);
+	char *p;
+
+	if (!s2) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s:  out of memory\n", progname);
+		exit(3);
+	}
+
+	for (p = s2; *p; p++)
+		*p = toupper(*p);
+	return s2;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	int i, j, k;
+	int isids_len;
+	FILE *fout;
+
+	progname = argv[0];
+
+	if (argc < 3)
+		usage();
+
+	fout = fopen(argv[1], "w");
+	if (!fout) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Could not open %s for writing:  %s\n",
+			argv[1], strerror(errno));
+		exit(2);
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++) {
+		struct security_class_mapping *map = &secclass_map[i];
+		map->name = stoupperx(map->name);
+		for (j = 0; map->perms[j]; j++)
+			map->perms[j] = stoupperx(map->perms[j]);
+	}
+
+	isids_len = sizeof(initial_sid_to_string) / sizeof (char *);
+	for (i = 1; i < isids_len; i++)
+		initial_sid_to_string[i] = stoupperx(initial_sid_to_string[i]);
+
+	fprintf(fout, "/* This file is automatically generated.  Do not edit. */\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "#ifndef _SELINUX_FLASK_H_\n#define _SELINUX_FLASK_H_\n\n");
+
+	for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++) {
+		struct security_class_mapping *map = &secclass_map[i];
+		fprintf(fout, "#define SECCLASS_%s", map->name);
+		for (j = 0; j < max(1, 40 - strlen(map->name)); j++)
+			fprintf(fout, " ");
+		fprintf(fout, "%2d\n", i+1);
+	}
+
+	fprintf(fout, "\n");
+
+	for (i = 1; i < isids_len; i++) {
+		char *s = initial_sid_to_string[i];
+		fprintf(fout, "#define SECINITSID_%s", s);
+		for (j = 0; j < max(1, 40 - strlen(s)); j++)
+			fprintf(fout, " ");
+		fprintf(fout, "%2d\n", i);
+	}
+	fprintf(fout, "\n#define SECINITSID_NUM %d\n", i-1);
+	fprintf(fout, "\n#endif\n");
+	fclose(fout);
+
+	fout = fopen(argv[2], "w");
+	if (!fout) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Could not open %s for writing:  %s\n",
+			argv[2], strerror(errno));
+		exit(4);
+	}
+
+	fprintf(fout, "/* This file is automatically generated.  Do not edit. */\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "#ifndef _SELINUX_AV_PERMISSIONS_H_\n#define _SELINUX_AV_PERMISSIONS_H_\n\n");
+
+	for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++) {
+		struct security_class_mapping *map = &secclass_map[i];
+		for (j = 0; map->perms[j]; j++) {
+			fprintf(fout, "#define %s__%s", map->name,
+				map->perms[j]);
+			for (k = 0; k < max(1, 40 - strlen(map->name) - strlen(map->perms[j])); k++)
+				fprintf(fout, " ");
+			fprintf(fout, "0x%08xUL\n", (1<<j));
+		}
+	}
+
+	fprintf(fout, "\n#endif\n");
+	fclose(fout);
+	exit(0);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
index d47fc5e545e..f013982df41 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Makefile
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -18,5 +18,13 @@ selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM) += xfrm.o
 
 selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o
 
-EXTRA_CFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux/include
+EXTRA_CFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux -Isecurity/selinux/include
 
+$(obj)/avc.o: $(obj)/flask.h
+
+quiet_cmd_flask = GEN     $(obj)/flask.h $(obj)/av_permissions.h
+      cmd_flask = scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders $(obj)/flask.h $(obj)/av_permissions.h
+
+targets += flask.h
+$(obj)/flask.h: $(src)/include/classmap.h FORCE
+	$(call if_changed,flask)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
deleted file mode 100644
index fef2582b734..00000000000
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,870 +0,0 @@
-/* This file is automatically generated.  Do not edit. */
-#define COMMON_FILE__IOCTL                               0x00000001UL
-#define COMMON_FILE__READ                                0x00000002UL
-#define COMMON_FILE__WRITE                               0x00000004UL
-#define COMMON_FILE__CREATE                              0x00000008UL
-#define COMMON_FILE__GETATTR                             0x00000010UL
-#define COMMON_FILE__SETATTR                             0x00000020UL
-#define COMMON_FILE__LOCK                                0x00000040UL
-#define COMMON_FILE__RELABELFROM                         0x00000080UL
-#define COMMON_FILE__RELABELTO                           0x00000100UL
-#define COMMON_FILE__APPEND                              0x00000200UL
-#define COMMON_FILE__UNLINK                              0x00000400UL
-#define COMMON_FILE__LINK                                0x00000800UL
-#define COMMON_FILE__RENAME                              0x00001000UL
-#define COMMON_FILE__EXECUTE                             0x00002000UL
-#define COMMON_FILE__SWAPON                              0x00004000UL
-#define COMMON_FILE__QUOTAON                             0x00008000UL
-#define COMMON_FILE__MOUNTON                             0x00010000UL
-#define COMMON_SOCKET__IOCTL                             0x00000001UL
-#define COMMON_SOCKET__READ                              0x00000002UL
-#define COMMON_SOCKET__WRITE                             0x00000004UL
-#define COMMON_SOCKET__CREATE                            0x00000008UL
-#define COMMON_SOCKET__GETATTR                           0x00000010UL
-#define COMMON_SOCKET__SETATTR                           0x00000020UL
-#define COMMON_SOCKET__LOCK                              0x00000040UL
-#define COMMON_SOCKET__RELABELFROM                       0x00000080UL
-#define COMMON_SOCKET__RELABELTO                         0x00000100UL
-#define COMMON_SOCKET__APPEND                            0x00000200UL
-#define COMMON_SOCKET__BIND                              0x00000400UL
-#define COMMON_SOCKET__CONNECT                           0x00000800UL
-#define COMMON_SOCKET__LISTEN                            0x00001000UL
-#define COMMON_SOCKET__ACCEPT                            0x00002000UL
-#define COMMON_SOCKET__GETOPT                            0x00004000UL
-#define COMMON_SOCKET__SETOPT                            0x00008000UL
-#define COMMON_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                          0x00010000UL
-#define COMMON_SOCKET__RECVFROM                          0x00020000UL
-#define COMMON_SOCKET__SENDTO                            0x00040000UL
-#define COMMON_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                          0x00080000UL
-#define COMMON_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                          0x00100000UL
-#define COMMON_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                         0x00200000UL
-#define COMMON_IPC__CREATE                               0x00000001UL
-#define COMMON_IPC__DESTROY                              0x00000002UL
-#define COMMON_IPC__GETATTR                              0x00000004UL
-#define COMMON_IPC__SETATTR                              0x00000008UL
-#define COMMON_IPC__READ                                 0x00000010UL
-#define COMMON_IPC__WRITE                                0x00000020UL
-#define COMMON_IPC__ASSOCIATE                            0x00000040UL
-#define COMMON_IPC__UNIX_READ                            0x00000080UL
-#define COMMON_IPC__UNIX_WRITE                           0x00000100UL
-#define FILESYSTEM__MOUNT                         0x00000001UL
-#define FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT                       0x00000002UL
-#define FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT                       0x00000004UL
-#define FILESYSTEM__GETATTR                       0x00000008UL
-#define FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM                   0x00000010UL
-#define FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO                     0x00000020UL
-#define FILESYSTEM__TRANSITION                    0x00000040UL
-#define FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE                     0x00000080UL
-#define FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD                      0x00000100UL
-#define FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET                      0x00000200UL
-#define DIR__IOCTL                                0x00000001UL
-#define DIR__READ                                 0x00000002UL
-#define DIR__WRITE                                0x00000004UL
-#define DIR__CREATE                               0x00000008UL
-#define DIR__GETATTR                              0x00000010UL
-#define DIR__SETATTR                              0x00000020UL
-#define DIR__LOCK                                 0x00000040UL
-#define DIR__RELABELFROM                          0x00000080UL
-#define DIR__RELABELTO                            0x00000100UL
-#define DIR__APPEND                               0x00000200UL
-#define DIR__UNLINK                               0x00000400UL
-#define DIR__LINK                                 0x00000800UL
-#define DIR__RENAME                               0x00001000UL
-#define DIR__EXECUTE                              0x00002000UL
-#define DIR__SWAPON                               0x00004000UL
-#define DIR__QUOTAON                              0x00008000UL
-#define DIR__MOUNTON                              0x00010000UL
-#define DIR__ADD_NAME                             0x00020000UL
-#define DIR__REMOVE_NAME                          0x00040000UL
-#define DIR__REPARENT                             0x00080000UL
-#define DIR__SEARCH                               0x00100000UL
-#define DIR__RMDIR                                0x00200000UL
-#define DIR__OPEN                                 0x00400000UL
-#define FILE__IOCTL                               0x00000001UL
-#define FILE__READ                                0x00000002UL
-#define FILE__WRITE                               0x00000004UL
-#define FILE__CREATE                              0x00000008UL
-#define FILE__GETATTR                             0x00000010UL
-#define FILE__SETATTR                             0x00000020UL
-#define FILE__LOCK                                0x00000040UL
-#define FILE__RELABELFROM                         0x00000080UL
-#define FILE__RELABELTO                           0x00000100UL
-#define FILE__APPEND                              0x00000200UL
-#define FILE__UNLINK                              0x00000400UL
-#define FILE__LINK                                0x00000800UL
-#define FILE__RENAME                              0x00001000UL
-#define FILE__EXECUTE                             0x00002000UL
-#define FILE__SWAPON                              0x00004000UL
-#define FILE__QUOTAON                             0x00008000UL
-#define FILE__MOUNTON                             0x00010000UL
-#define FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS                    0x00020000UL
-#define FILE__ENTRYPOINT                          0x00040000UL
-#define FILE__EXECMOD                             0x00080000UL
-#define FILE__OPEN                                0x00100000UL
-#define LNK_FILE__IOCTL                           0x00000001UL
-#define LNK_FILE__READ                            0x00000002UL
-#define LNK_FILE__WRITE                           0x00000004UL
-#define LNK_FILE__CREATE                          0x00000008UL
-#define LNK_FILE__GETATTR                         0x00000010UL
-#define LNK_FILE__SETATTR                         0x00000020UL
-#define LNK_FILE__LOCK                            0x00000040UL
-#define LNK_FILE__RELABELFROM                     0x00000080UL
-#define LNK_FILE__RELABELTO                       0x00000100UL
-#define LNK_FILE__APPEND                          0x00000200UL
-#define LNK_FILE__UNLINK                          0x00000400UL
-#define LNK_FILE__LINK                            0x00000800UL
-#define LNK_FILE__RENAME                          0x00001000UL
-#define LNK_FILE__EXECUTE                         0x00002000UL
-#define LNK_FILE__SWAPON                          0x00004000UL
-#define LNK_FILE__QUOTAON                         0x00008000UL
-#define LNK_FILE__MOUNTON                         0x00010000UL
-#define CHR_FILE__IOCTL                           0x00000001UL
-#define CHR_FILE__READ                            0x00000002UL
-#define CHR_FILE__WRITE                           0x00000004UL
-#define CHR_FILE__CREATE                          0x00000008UL
-#define CHR_FILE__GETATTR                         0x00000010UL
-#define CHR_FILE__SETATTR                         0x00000020UL
-#define CHR_FILE__LOCK                            0x00000040UL
-#define CHR_FILE__RELABELFROM                     0x00000080UL
-#define CHR_FILE__RELABELTO                       0x00000100UL
-#define CHR_FILE__APPEND                          0x00000200UL
-#define CHR_FILE__UNLINK                          0x00000400UL
-#define CHR_FILE__LINK                            0x00000800UL
-#define CHR_FILE__RENAME                          0x00001000UL
-#define CHR_FILE__EXECUTE                         0x00002000UL
-#define CHR_FILE__SWAPON                          0x00004000UL
-#define CHR_FILE__QUOTAON                         0x00008000UL
-#define CHR_FILE__MOUNTON                         0x00010000UL
-#define CHR_FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS                0x00020000UL
-#define CHR_FILE__ENTRYPOINT                      0x00040000UL
-#define CHR_FILE__EXECMOD                         0x00080000UL
-#define CHR_FILE__OPEN                            0x00100000UL
-#define BLK_FILE__IOCTL                           0x00000001UL
-#define BLK_FILE__READ                            0x00000002UL
-#define BLK_FILE__WRITE                           0x00000004UL
-#define BLK_FILE__CREATE                          0x00000008UL
-#define BLK_FILE__GETATTR                         0x00000010UL
-#define BLK_FILE__SETATTR                         0x00000020UL
-#define BLK_FILE__LOCK                            0x00000040UL
-#define BLK_FILE__RELABELFROM                     0x00000080UL
-#define BLK_FILE__RELABELTO                       0x00000100UL
-#define BLK_FILE__APPEND                          0x00000200UL
-#define BLK_FILE__UNLINK                          0x00000400UL
-#define BLK_FILE__LINK                            0x00000800UL
-#define BLK_FILE__RENAME                          0x00001000UL
-#define BLK_FILE__EXECUTE                         0x00002000UL
-#define BLK_FILE__SWAPON                          0x00004000UL
-#define BLK_FILE__QUOTAON                         0x00008000UL
-#define BLK_FILE__MOUNTON                         0x00010000UL
-#define BLK_FILE__OPEN                            0x00020000UL
-#define SOCK_FILE__IOCTL                          0x00000001UL
-#define SOCK_FILE__READ                           0x00000002UL
-#define SOCK_FILE__WRITE                          0x00000004UL
-#define SOCK_FILE__CREATE                         0x00000008UL
-#define SOCK_FILE__GETATTR                        0x00000010UL
-#define SOCK_FILE__SETATTR                        0x00000020UL
-#define SOCK_FILE__LOCK                           0x00000040UL
-#define SOCK_FILE__RELABELFROM                    0x00000080UL
-#define SOCK_FILE__RELABELTO                      0x00000100UL
-#define SOCK_FILE__APPEND                         0x00000200UL
-#define SOCK_FILE__UNLINK                         0x00000400UL
-#define SOCK_FILE__LINK                           0x00000800UL
-#define SOCK_FILE__RENAME                         0x00001000UL
-#define SOCK_FILE__EXECUTE                        0x00002000UL
-#define SOCK_FILE__SWAPON                         0x00004000UL
-#define SOCK_FILE__QUOTAON                        0x00008000UL
-#define SOCK_FILE__MOUNTON                        0x00010000UL
-#define SOCK_FILE__OPEN                           0x00020000UL
-#define FIFO_FILE__IOCTL                          0x00000001UL
-#define FIFO_FILE__READ                           0x00000002UL
-#define FIFO_FILE__WRITE                          0x00000004UL
-#define FIFO_FILE__CREATE                         0x00000008UL
-#define FIFO_FILE__GETATTR                        0x00000010UL
-#define FIFO_FILE__SETATTR                        0x00000020UL
-#define FIFO_FILE__LOCK                           0x00000040UL
-#define FIFO_FILE__RELABELFROM                    0x00000080UL
-#define FIFO_FILE__RELABELTO                      0x00000100UL
-#define FIFO_FILE__APPEND                         0x00000200UL
-#define FIFO_FILE__UNLINK                         0x00000400UL
-#define FIFO_FILE__LINK                           0x00000800UL
-#define FIFO_FILE__RENAME                         0x00001000UL
-#define FIFO_FILE__EXECUTE                        0x00002000UL
-#define FIFO_FILE__SWAPON                         0x00004000UL
-#define FIFO_FILE__QUOTAON                        0x00008000UL
-#define FIFO_FILE__MOUNTON                        0x00010000UL
-#define FIFO_FILE__OPEN                           0x00020000UL
-#define FD__USE                                   0x00000001UL
-#define SOCKET__IOCTL                             0x00000001UL
-#define SOCKET__READ                              0x00000002UL
-#define SOCKET__WRITE                             0x00000004UL
-#define SOCKET__CREATE                            0x00000008UL
-#define SOCKET__GETATTR                           0x00000010UL
-#define SOCKET__SETATTR                           0x00000020UL
-#define SOCKET__LOCK                              0x00000040UL
-#define SOCKET__RELABELFROM                       0x00000080UL
-#define SOCKET__RELABELTO                         0x00000100UL
-#define SOCKET__APPEND                            0x00000200UL
-#define SOCKET__BIND                              0x00000400UL
-#define SOCKET__CONNECT                           0x00000800UL
-#define SOCKET__LISTEN                            0x00001000UL
-#define SOCKET__ACCEPT                            0x00002000UL
-#define SOCKET__GETOPT                            0x00004000UL
-#define SOCKET__SETOPT                            0x00008000UL
-#define SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                          0x00010000UL
-#define SOCKET__RECVFROM                          0x00020000UL
-#define SOCKET__SENDTO                            0x00040000UL
-#define SOCKET__RECV_MSG                          0x00080000UL
-#define SOCKET__SEND_MSG                          0x00100000UL
-#define SOCKET__NAME_BIND                         0x00200000UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__IOCTL                         0x00000001UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__READ                          0x00000002UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__WRITE                         0x00000004UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__CREATE                        0x00000008UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__GETATTR                       0x00000010UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__SETATTR                       0x00000020UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__LOCK                          0x00000040UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__RELABELFROM                   0x00000080UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__RELABELTO                     0x00000100UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__APPEND                        0x00000200UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__BIND                          0x00000400UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__CONNECT                       0x00000800UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__LISTEN                        0x00001000UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__ACCEPT                        0x00002000UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__GETOPT                        0x00004000UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__SETOPT                        0x00008000UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                      0x00010000UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM                      0x00020000UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__SENDTO                        0x00040000UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                      0x00080000UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                      0x00100000UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                     0x00200000UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__CONNECTTO                     0x00400000UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__NEWCONN                       0x00800000UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__ACCEPTFROM                    0x01000000UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND                     0x02000000UL
-#define TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT                  0x04000000UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__IOCTL                         0x00000001UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__READ                          0x00000002UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__WRITE                         0x00000004UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__CREATE                        0x00000008UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__GETATTR                       0x00000010UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__SETATTR                       0x00000020UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__LOCK                          0x00000040UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__RELABELFROM                   0x00000080UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__RELABELTO                     0x00000100UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__APPEND                        0x00000200UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__BIND                          0x00000400UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__CONNECT                       0x00000800UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__LISTEN                        0x00001000UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__ACCEPT                        0x00002000UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__GETOPT                        0x00004000UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__SETOPT                        0x00008000UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                      0x00010000UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM                      0x00020000UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__SENDTO                        0x00040000UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                      0x00080000UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                      0x00100000UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                     0x00200000UL
-#define UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND                     0x00400000UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__IOCTL                       0x00000001UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__READ                        0x00000002UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__WRITE                       0x00000004UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__CREATE                      0x00000008UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__GETATTR                     0x00000010UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__SETATTR                     0x00000020UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__LOCK                        0x00000040UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__RELABELFROM                 0x00000080UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__RELABELTO                   0x00000100UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__APPEND                      0x00000200UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__BIND                        0x00000400UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__CONNECT                     0x00000800UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__LISTEN                      0x00001000UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__ACCEPT                      0x00002000UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__GETOPT                      0x00004000UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__SETOPT                      0x00008000UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                    0x00010000UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM                    0x00020000UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__SENDTO                      0x00040000UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                    0x00080000UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                    0x00100000UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                   0x00200000UL
-#define RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND                   0x00400000UL
-#define NODE__TCP_RECV                            0x00000001UL
-#define NODE__TCP_SEND                            0x00000002UL
-#define NODE__UDP_RECV                            0x00000004UL
-#define NODE__UDP_SEND                            0x00000008UL
-#define NODE__RAWIP_RECV                          0x00000010UL
-#define NODE__RAWIP_SEND                          0x00000020UL
-#define NODE__ENFORCE_DEST                        0x00000040UL
-#define NODE__DCCP_RECV                           0x00000080UL
-#define NODE__DCCP_SEND                           0x00000100UL
-#define NODE__RECVFROM                            0x00000200UL
-#define NODE__SENDTO                              0x00000400UL
-#define NETIF__TCP_RECV                           0x00000001UL
-#define NETIF__TCP_SEND                           0x00000002UL
-#define NETIF__UDP_RECV                           0x00000004UL
-#define NETIF__UDP_SEND                           0x00000008UL
-#define NETIF__RAWIP_RECV                         0x00000010UL
-#define NETIF__RAWIP_SEND                         0x00000020UL
-#define NETIF__DCCP_RECV                          0x00000040UL
-#define NETIF__DCCP_SEND                          0x00000080UL
-#define NETIF__INGRESS                            0x00000100UL
-#define NETIF__EGRESS                             0x00000200UL
-#define NETLINK_SOCKET__IOCTL                     0x00000001UL
-#define NETLINK_SOCKET__READ                      0x00000002UL
-#define NETLINK_SOCKET__WRITE                     0x00000004UL
-#define NETLINK_SOCKET__CREATE                    0x00000008UL
-#define NETLINK_SOCKET__GETATTR                   0x00000010UL
-#define NETLINK_SOCKET__SETATTR                   0x00000020UL
-#define NETLINK_SOCKET__LOCK                      0x00000040UL
-#define NETLINK_SOCKET__RELABELFROM               0x00000080UL
-#define NETLINK_SOCKET__RELABELTO                 0x00000100UL
-#define NETLINK_SOCKET__APPEND                    0x00000200UL
-#define NETLINK_SOCKET__BIND                      0x00000400UL
-#define NETLINK_SOCKET__CONNECT                   0x00000800UL
-#define NETLINK_SOCKET__LISTEN                    0x00001000UL
-#define NETLINK_SOCKET__ACCEPT                    0x00002000UL
-#define NETLINK_SOCKET__GETOPT                    0x00004000UL
-#define NETLINK_SOCKET__SETOPT                    0x00008000UL
-#define NETLINK_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                  0x00010000UL
-#define NETLINK_SOCKET__RECVFROM                  0x00020000UL
-#define NETLINK_SOCKET__SENDTO                    0x00040000UL
-#define NETLINK_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                  0x00080000UL
-#define NETLINK_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                  0x00100000UL
-#define NETLINK_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                 0x00200000UL
-#define PACKET_SOCKET__IOCTL                      0x00000001UL
-#define PACKET_SOCKET__READ                       0x00000002UL
-#define PACKET_SOCKET__WRITE                      0x00000004UL
-#define PACKET_SOCKET__CREATE                     0x00000008UL
-#define PACKET_SOCKET__GETATTR                    0x00000010UL
-#define PACKET_SOCKET__SETATTR                    0x00000020UL
-#define PACKET_SOCKET__LOCK                       0x00000040UL
-#define PACKET_SOCKET__RELABELFROM                0x00000080UL
-#define PACKET_SOCKET__RELABELTO                  0x00000100UL
-#define PACKET_SOCKET__APPEND                     0x00000200UL
-#define PACKET_SOCKET__BIND                       0x00000400UL
-#define PACKET_SOCKET__CONNECT                    0x00000800UL
-#define PACKET_SOCKET__LISTEN                     0x00001000UL
-#define PACKET_SOCKET__ACCEPT                     0x00002000UL
-#define PACKET_SOCKET__GETOPT                     0x00004000UL
-#define PACKET_SOCKET__SETOPT                     0x00008000UL
-#define PACKET_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                   0x00010000UL
-#define PACKET_SOCKET__RECVFROM                   0x00020000UL
-#define PACKET_SOCKET__SENDTO                     0x00040000UL
-#define PACKET_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                   0x00080000UL
-#define PACKET_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                   0x00100000UL
-#define PACKET_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                  0x00200000UL
-#define KEY_SOCKET__IOCTL                         0x00000001UL
-#define KEY_SOCKET__READ                          0x00000002UL
-#define KEY_SOCKET__WRITE                         0x00000004UL
-#define KEY_SOCKET__CREATE                        0x00000008UL
-#define KEY_SOCKET__GETATTR                       0x00000010UL
-#define KEY_SOCKET__SETATTR                       0x00000020UL
-#define KEY_SOCKET__LOCK                          0x00000040UL
-#define KEY_SOCKET__RELABELFROM                   0x00000080UL
-#define KEY_SOCKET__RELABELTO                     0x00000100UL
-#define KEY_SOCKET__APPEND                        0x00000200UL
-#define KEY_SOCKET__BIND                          0x00000400UL
-#define KEY_SOCKET__CONNECT                       0x00000800UL
-#define KEY_SOCKET__LISTEN                        0x00001000UL
-#define KEY_SOCKET__ACCEPT                        0x00002000UL
-#define KEY_SOCKET__GETOPT                        0x00004000UL
-#define KEY_SOCKET__SETOPT                        0x00008000UL
-#define KEY_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                      0x00010000UL
-#define KEY_SOCKET__RECVFROM                      0x00020000UL
-#define KEY_SOCKET__SENDTO                        0x00040000UL
-#define KEY_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                      0x00080000UL
-#define KEY_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                      0x00100000UL
-#define KEY_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                     0x00200000UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__IOCTL                 0x00000001UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__READ                  0x00000002UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__WRITE                 0x00000004UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CREATE                0x00000008UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__GETATTR               0x00000010UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__SETATTR               0x00000020UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__LOCK                  0x00000040UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__RELABELFROM           0x00000080UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__RELABELTO             0x00000100UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__APPEND                0x00000200UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__BIND                  0x00000400UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECT               0x00000800UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__LISTEN                0x00001000UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__ACCEPT                0x00002000UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__GETOPT                0x00004000UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__SETOPT                0x00008000UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN              0x00010000UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__RECVFROM              0x00020000UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__SENDTO                0x00040000UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__RECV_MSG              0x00080000UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__SEND_MSG              0x00100000UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__NAME_BIND             0x00200000UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO             0x00400000UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__NEWCONN               0x00800000UL
-#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__ACCEPTFROM            0x01000000UL
-#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__IOCTL                  0x00000001UL
-#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__READ                   0x00000002UL
-#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__WRITE                  0x00000004UL
-#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__CREATE                 0x00000008UL
-#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__GETATTR                0x00000010UL
-#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SETATTR                0x00000020UL
-#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__LOCK                   0x00000040UL
-#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RELABELFROM            0x00000080UL
-#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RELABELTO              0x00000100UL
-#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__APPEND                 0x00000200UL
-#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__BIND                   0x00000400UL
-#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__CONNECT                0x00000800UL
-#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__LISTEN                 0x00001000UL
-#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__ACCEPT                 0x00002000UL
-#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__GETOPT                 0x00004000UL
-#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SETOPT                 0x00008000UL
-#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN               0x00010000UL
-#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RECVFROM               0x00020000UL
-#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SENDTO                 0x00040000UL
-#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RECV_MSG               0x00080000UL
-#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SEND_MSG               0x00100000UL
-#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__NAME_BIND              0x00200000UL
-#define PROCESS__FORK                             0x00000001UL
-#define PROCESS__TRANSITION                       0x00000002UL
-#define PROCESS__SIGCHLD                          0x00000004UL
-#define PROCESS__SIGKILL                          0x00000008UL
-#define PROCESS__SIGSTOP                          0x00000010UL
-#define PROCESS__SIGNULL                          0x00000020UL
-#define PROCESS__SIGNAL                           0x00000040UL
-#define PROCESS__PTRACE                           0x00000080UL
-#define PROCESS__GETSCHED                         0x00000100UL
-#define PROCESS__SETSCHED                         0x00000200UL
-#define PROCESS__GETSESSION                       0x00000400UL
-#define PROCESS__GETPGID                          0x00000800UL
-#define PROCESS__SETPGID                          0x00001000UL
-#define PROCESS__GETCAP                           0x00002000UL
-#define PROCESS__SETCAP                           0x00004000UL
-#define PROCESS__SHARE                            0x00008000UL
-#define PROCESS__GETATTR                          0x00010000UL
-#define PROCESS__SETEXEC                          0x00020000UL
-#define PROCESS__SETFSCREATE                      0x00040000UL
-#define PROCESS__NOATSECURE                       0x00080000UL
-#define PROCESS__SIGINH                           0x00100000UL
-#define PROCESS__SETRLIMIT                        0x00200000UL
-#define PROCESS__RLIMITINH                        0x00400000UL
-#define PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION                    0x00800000UL
-#define PROCESS__SETCURRENT                       0x01000000UL
-#define PROCESS__EXECMEM                          0x02000000UL
-#define PROCESS__EXECSTACK                        0x04000000UL
-#define PROCESS__EXECHEAP                         0x08000000UL
-#define PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE                     0x10000000UL
-#define PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE                    0x20000000UL
-#define IPC__CREATE                               0x00000001UL
-#define IPC__DESTROY                              0x00000002UL
-#define IPC__GETATTR                              0x00000004UL
-#define IPC__SETATTR                              0x00000008UL
-#define IPC__READ                                 0x00000010UL
-#define IPC__WRITE                                0x00000020UL
-#define IPC__ASSOCIATE                            0x00000040UL
-#define IPC__UNIX_READ                            0x00000080UL
-#define IPC__UNIX_WRITE                           0x00000100UL
-#define SEM__CREATE                               0x00000001UL
-#define SEM__DESTROY                              0x00000002UL
-#define SEM__GETATTR                              0x00000004UL
-#define SEM__SETATTR                              0x00000008UL
-#define SEM__READ                                 0x00000010UL
-#define SEM__WRITE                                0x00000020UL
-#define SEM__ASSOCIATE                            0x00000040UL
-#define SEM__UNIX_READ                            0x00000080UL
-#define SEM__UNIX_WRITE                           0x00000100UL
-#define MSGQ__CREATE                              0x00000001UL
-#define MSGQ__DESTROY                             0x00000002UL
-#define MSGQ__GETATTR                             0x00000004UL
-#define MSGQ__SETATTR                             0x00000008UL
-#define MSGQ__READ                                0x00000010UL
-#define MSGQ__WRITE                               0x00000020UL
-#define MSGQ__ASSOCIATE                           0x00000040UL
-#define MSGQ__UNIX_READ                           0x00000080UL
-#define MSGQ__UNIX_WRITE                          0x00000100UL
-#define MSGQ__ENQUEUE                             0x00000200UL
-#define MSG__SEND                                 0x00000001UL
-#define MSG__RECEIVE                              0x00000002UL
-#define SHM__CREATE                               0x00000001UL
-#define SHM__DESTROY                              0x00000002UL
-#define SHM__GETATTR                              0x00000004UL
-#define SHM__SETATTR                              0x00000008UL
-#define SHM__READ                                 0x00000010UL
-#define SHM__WRITE                                0x00000020UL
-#define SHM__ASSOCIATE                            0x00000040UL
-#define SHM__UNIX_READ                            0x00000080UL
-#define SHM__UNIX_WRITE                           0x00000100UL
-#define SHM__LOCK                                 0x00000200UL
-#define SECURITY__COMPUTE_AV                      0x00000001UL
-#define SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE                  0x00000002UL
-#define SECURITY__COMPUTE_MEMBER                  0x00000004UL
-#define SECURITY__CHECK_CONTEXT                   0x00000008UL
-#define SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY                     0x00000010UL
-#define SECURITY__COMPUTE_RELABEL                 0x00000020UL
-#define SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER                    0x00000040UL
-#define SECURITY__SETENFORCE                      0x00000080UL
-#define SECURITY__SETBOOL                         0x00000100UL
-#define SECURITY__SETSECPARAM                     0x00000200UL
-#define SECURITY__SETCHECKREQPROT                 0x00000400UL
-#define SYSTEM__IPC_INFO                          0x00000001UL
-#define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ                       0x00000002UL
-#define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD                        0x00000004UL
-#define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE                    0x00000008UL
-#define SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST                    0x00000010UL
-#define CAPABILITY__CHOWN                         0x00000001UL
-#define CAPABILITY__DAC_OVERRIDE                  0x00000002UL
-#define CAPABILITY__DAC_READ_SEARCH               0x00000004UL
-#define CAPABILITY__FOWNER                        0x00000008UL
-#define CAPABILITY__FSETID                        0x00000010UL
-#define CAPABILITY__KILL                          0x00000020UL
-#define CAPABILITY__SETGID                        0x00000040UL
-#define CAPABILITY__SETUID                        0x00000080UL
-#define CAPABILITY__SETPCAP                       0x00000100UL
-#define CAPABILITY__LINUX_IMMUTABLE               0x00000200UL
-#define CAPABILITY__NET_BIND_SERVICE              0x00000400UL
-#define CAPABILITY__NET_BROADCAST                 0x00000800UL
-#define CAPABILITY__NET_ADMIN                     0x00001000UL
-#define CAPABILITY__NET_RAW                       0x00002000UL
-#define CAPABILITY__IPC_LOCK                      0x00004000UL
-#define CAPABILITY__IPC_OWNER                     0x00008000UL
-#define CAPABILITY__SYS_MODULE                    0x00010000UL
-#define CAPABILITY__SYS_RAWIO                     0x00020000UL
-#define CAPABILITY__SYS_CHROOT                    0x00040000UL
-#define CAPABILITY__SYS_PTRACE                    0x00080000UL
-#define CAPABILITY__SYS_PACCT                     0x00100000UL
-#define CAPABILITY__SYS_ADMIN                     0x00200000UL
-#define CAPABILITY__SYS_BOOT                      0x00400000UL
-#define CAPABILITY__SYS_NICE                      0x00800000UL
-#define CAPABILITY__SYS_RESOURCE                  0x01000000UL
-#define CAPABILITY__SYS_TIME                      0x02000000UL
-#define CAPABILITY__SYS_TTY_CONFIG                0x04000000UL
-#define CAPABILITY__MKNOD                         0x08000000UL
-#define CAPABILITY__LEASE                         0x10000000UL
-#define CAPABILITY__AUDIT_WRITE                   0x20000000UL
-#define CAPABILITY__AUDIT_CONTROL                 0x40000000UL
-#define CAPABILITY__SETFCAP                       0x80000000UL
-#define CAPABILITY2__MAC_OVERRIDE                 0x00000001UL
-#define CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN                    0x00000002UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__IOCTL               0x00000001UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__READ                0x00000002UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__WRITE               0x00000004UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__CREATE              0x00000008UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__GETATTR             0x00000010UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__SETATTR             0x00000020UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__LOCK                0x00000040UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__RELABELFROM         0x00000080UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__RELABELTO           0x00000100UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__APPEND              0x00000200UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__BIND                0x00000400UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__CONNECT             0x00000800UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__LISTEN              0x00001000UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__ACCEPT              0x00002000UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__GETOPT              0x00004000UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__SETOPT              0x00008000UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN            0x00010000UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__RECVFROM            0x00020000UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__SENDTO              0x00040000UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__RECV_MSG            0x00080000UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__SEND_MSG            0x00100000UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NAME_BIND           0x00200000UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ          0x00400000UL
-#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE         0x00800000UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__IOCTL            0x00000001UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__READ             0x00000002UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__WRITE            0x00000004UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__CREATE           0x00000008UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__GETATTR          0x00000010UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__SETATTR          0x00000020UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__LOCK             0x00000040UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__RELABELFROM      0x00000080UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__RELABELTO        0x00000100UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__APPEND           0x00000200UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__BIND             0x00000400UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__CONNECT          0x00000800UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__LISTEN           0x00001000UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__ACCEPT           0x00002000UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__GETOPT           0x00004000UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__SETOPT           0x00008000UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN         0x00010000UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__RECVFROM         0x00020000UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__SENDTO           0x00040000UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__RECV_MSG         0x00080000UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__SEND_MSG         0x00100000UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NAME_BIND        0x00200000UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ       0x00400000UL
-#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE      0x00800000UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__IOCTL             0x00000001UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__READ              0x00000002UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__WRITE             0x00000004UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__CREATE            0x00000008UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__GETATTR           0x00000010UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__SETATTR           0x00000020UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__LOCK              0x00000040UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__RELABELFROM       0x00000080UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__RELABELTO         0x00000100UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__APPEND            0x00000200UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__BIND              0x00000400UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__CONNECT           0x00000800UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__LISTEN            0x00001000UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__ACCEPT            0x00002000UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__GETOPT            0x00004000UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__SETOPT            0x00008000UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN          0x00010000UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__RECVFROM          0x00020000UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__SENDTO            0x00040000UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__RECV_MSG          0x00080000UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__SEND_MSG          0x00100000UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NAME_BIND         0x00200000UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ        0x00400000UL
-#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE       0x00800000UL
-#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__IOCTL               0x00000001UL
-#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__READ                0x00000002UL
-#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__WRITE               0x00000004UL
-#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__CREATE              0x00000008UL
-#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__GETATTR             0x00000010UL
-#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__SETATTR             0x00000020UL
-#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__LOCK                0x00000040UL
-#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__RELABELFROM         0x00000080UL
-#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__RELABELTO           0x00000100UL
-#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__APPEND              0x00000200UL
-#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__BIND                0x00000400UL
-#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__CONNECT             0x00000800UL
-#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__LISTEN              0x00001000UL
-#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__ACCEPT              0x00002000UL
-#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__GETOPT              0x00004000UL
-#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__SETOPT              0x00008000UL
-#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN            0x00010000UL
-#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__RECVFROM            0x00020000UL
-#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__SENDTO              0x00040000UL
-#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__RECV_MSG            0x00080000UL
-#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__SEND_MSG            0x00100000UL
-#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__NAME_BIND           0x00200000UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__IOCTL                0x00000001UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__READ                 0x00000002UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__WRITE                0x00000004UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__CREATE               0x00000008UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__GETATTR              0x00000010UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__SETATTR              0x00000020UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__LOCK                 0x00000040UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__RELABELFROM          0x00000080UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__RELABELTO            0x00000100UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__APPEND               0x00000200UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__BIND                 0x00000400UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__CONNECT              0x00000800UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__LISTEN               0x00001000UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__ACCEPT               0x00002000UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__GETOPT               0x00004000UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__SETOPT               0x00008000UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN             0x00010000UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__RECVFROM             0x00020000UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__SENDTO               0x00040000UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__RECV_MSG             0x00080000UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__SEND_MSG             0x00100000UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NAME_BIND            0x00200000UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ           0x00400000UL
-#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE          0x00800000UL
-#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__IOCTL             0x00000001UL
-#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__READ              0x00000002UL
-#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__WRITE             0x00000004UL
-#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__CREATE            0x00000008UL
-#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__GETATTR           0x00000010UL
-#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__SETATTR           0x00000020UL
-#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__LOCK              0x00000040UL
-#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__RELABELFROM       0x00000080UL
-#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__RELABELTO         0x00000100UL
-#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__APPEND            0x00000200UL
-#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__BIND              0x00000400UL
-#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__CONNECT           0x00000800UL
-#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__LISTEN            0x00001000UL
-#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__ACCEPT            0x00002000UL
-#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__GETOPT            0x00004000UL
-#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__SETOPT            0x00008000UL
-#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN          0x00010000UL
-#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__RECVFROM          0x00020000UL
-#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__SENDTO            0x00040000UL
-#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__RECV_MSG          0x00080000UL
-#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__SEND_MSG          0x00100000UL
-#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__NAME_BIND         0x00200000UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__IOCTL               0x00000001UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__READ                0x00000002UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__WRITE               0x00000004UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__CREATE              0x00000008UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__GETATTR             0x00000010UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__SETATTR             0x00000020UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__LOCK                0x00000040UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__RELABELFROM         0x00000080UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__RELABELTO           0x00000100UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__APPEND              0x00000200UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__BIND                0x00000400UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__CONNECT             0x00000800UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__LISTEN              0x00001000UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__ACCEPT              0x00002000UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__GETOPT              0x00004000UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__SETOPT              0x00008000UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN            0x00010000UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__RECVFROM            0x00020000UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__SENDTO              0x00040000UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__RECV_MSG            0x00080000UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__SEND_MSG            0x00100000UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NAME_BIND           0x00200000UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ          0x00400000UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE         0x00800000UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY         0x01000000UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV      0x02000000UL
-#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT     0x04000000UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__IOCTL               0x00000001UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__READ                0x00000002UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__WRITE               0x00000004UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__CREATE              0x00000008UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__GETATTR             0x00000010UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__SETATTR             0x00000020UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__LOCK                0x00000040UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__RELABELFROM         0x00000080UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__RELABELTO           0x00000100UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__APPEND              0x00000200UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__BIND                0x00000400UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__CONNECT             0x00000800UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__LISTEN              0x00001000UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__ACCEPT              0x00002000UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__GETOPT              0x00004000UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__SETOPT              0x00008000UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN            0x00010000UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__RECVFROM            0x00020000UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__SENDTO              0x00040000UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__RECV_MSG            0x00080000UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__SEND_MSG            0x00100000UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NAME_BIND           0x00200000UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ          0x00400000UL
-#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE         0x00800000UL
-#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__IOCTL                0x00000001UL
-#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__READ                 0x00000002UL
-#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__WRITE                0x00000004UL
-#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__CREATE               0x00000008UL
-#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__GETATTR              0x00000010UL
-#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__SETATTR              0x00000020UL
-#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__LOCK                 0x00000040UL
-#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__RELABELFROM          0x00000080UL
-#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__RELABELTO            0x00000100UL
-#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__APPEND               0x00000200UL
-#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__BIND                 0x00000400UL
-#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__CONNECT              0x00000800UL
-#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__LISTEN               0x00001000UL
-#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__ACCEPT               0x00002000UL
-#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__GETOPT               0x00004000UL
-#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__SETOPT               0x00008000UL
-#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN             0x00010000UL
-#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__RECVFROM             0x00020000UL
-#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__SENDTO               0x00040000UL
-#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__RECV_MSG             0x00080000UL
-#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__SEND_MSG             0x00100000UL
-#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__NAME_BIND            0x00200000UL
-#define ASSOCIATION__SENDTO                       0x00000001UL
-#define ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM                     0x00000002UL
-#define ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT                   0x00000004UL
-#define ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH                     0x00000008UL
-#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__IOCTL      0x00000001UL
-#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__READ       0x00000002UL
-#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__WRITE      0x00000004UL
-#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__CREATE     0x00000008UL
-#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__GETATTR    0x00000010UL
-#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__SETATTR    0x00000020UL
-#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__LOCK       0x00000040UL
-#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
-#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__RELABELTO  0x00000100UL
-#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__APPEND     0x00000200UL
-#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__BIND       0x00000400UL
-#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__CONNECT    0x00000800UL
-#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__LISTEN     0x00001000UL
-#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__ACCEPT     0x00002000UL
-#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__GETOPT     0x00004000UL
-#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__SETOPT     0x00008000UL
-#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN   0x00010000UL
-#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__RECVFROM   0x00020000UL
-#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__SENDTO     0x00040000UL
-#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__RECV_MSG   0x00080000UL
-#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__SEND_MSG   0x00100000UL
-#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__NAME_BIND  0x00200000UL
-#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__IOCTL                   0x00000001UL
-#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__READ                    0x00000002UL
-#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__WRITE                   0x00000004UL
-#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__CREATE                  0x00000008UL
-#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__GETATTR                 0x00000010UL
-#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SETATTR                 0x00000020UL
-#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__LOCK                    0x00000040UL
-#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__RELABELFROM             0x00000080UL
-#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__RELABELTO               0x00000100UL
-#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__APPEND                  0x00000200UL
-#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__BIND                    0x00000400UL
-#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__CONNECT                 0x00000800UL
-#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__LISTEN                  0x00001000UL
-#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__ACCEPT                  0x00002000UL
-#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__GETOPT                  0x00004000UL
-#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SETOPT                  0x00008000UL
-#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                0x00010000UL
-#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__RECVFROM                0x00020000UL
-#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SENDTO                  0x00040000UL
-#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                0x00080000UL
-#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                0x00100000UL
-#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__NAME_BIND               0x00200000UL
-#define PACKET__SEND                              0x00000001UL
-#define PACKET__RECV                              0x00000002UL
-#define PACKET__RELABELTO                         0x00000004UL
-#define PACKET__FLOW_IN                           0x00000008UL
-#define PACKET__FLOW_OUT                          0x00000010UL
-#define PACKET__FORWARD_IN                        0x00000020UL
-#define PACKET__FORWARD_OUT                       0x00000040UL
-#define KEY__VIEW                                 0x00000001UL
-#define KEY__READ                                 0x00000002UL
-#define KEY__WRITE                                0x00000004UL
-#define KEY__SEARCH                               0x00000008UL
-#define KEY__LINK                                 0x00000010UL
-#define KEY__SETATTR                              0x00000020UL
-#define KEY__CREATE                               0x00000040UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__IOCTL                        0x00000001UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__READ                         0x00000002UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__WRITE                        0x00000004UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__CREATE                       0x00000008UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__GETATTR                      0x00000010UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__SETATTR                      0x00000020UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__LOCK                         0x00000040UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__RELABELFROM                  0x00000080UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__RELABELTO                    0x00000100UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__APPEND                       0x00000200UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__BIND                         0x00000400UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__CONNECT                      0x00000800UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__LISTEN                       0x00001000UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__ACCEPT                       0x00002000UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__GETOPT                       0x00004000UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__SETOPT                       0x00008000UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                     0x00010000UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM                     0x00020000UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__SENDTO                       0x00040000UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                     0x00080000UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                     0x00100000UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                    0x00200000UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND                    0x00400000UL
-#define DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT                 0x00800000UL
-#define MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO                     0x00000001UL
-#define PEER__RECV                                0x00000001UL
-#define KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE           0x00000001UL
-#define KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS           0x00000002UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__IOCTL                         0x00000001UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__READ                          0x00000002UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__WRITE                         0x00000004UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__CREATE                        0x00000008UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__GETATTR                       0x00000010UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__SETATTR                       0x00000020UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__LOCK                          0x00000040UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM                   0x00000080UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO                     0x00000100UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__APPEND                        0x00000200UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__BIND                          0x00000400UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__CONNECT                       0x00000800UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__LISTEN                        0x00001000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__ACCEPT                        0x00002000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__GETOPT                        0x00004000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__SETOPT                        0x00008000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                      0x00010000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__RECVFROM                      0x00020000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__SENDTO                        0x00040000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                      0x00080000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                      0x00100000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                     0x00200000UL
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/flask.h b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 5359ca2abf2..00000000000
--- a/security/selinux/include/flask.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
-/* This file is automatically generated.  Do not edit. */
-#ifndef _SELINUX_FLASK_H_
-#define _SELINUX_FLASK_H_
-
-/*
- * Security object class definitions
- */
-#define SECCLASS_SECURITY                                1
-#define SECCLASS_PROCESS                                 2
-#define SECCLASS_SYSTEM                                  3
-#define SECCLASS_CAPABILITY                              4
-#define SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM                              5
-#define SECCLASS_FILE                                    6
-#define SECCLASS_DIR                                     7
-#define SECCLASS_FD                                      8
-#define SECCLASS_LNK_FILE                                9
-#define SECCLASS_CHR_FILE                                10
-#define SECCLASS_BLK_FILE                                11
-#define SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE                               12
-#define SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE                               13
-#define SECCLASS_SOCKET                                  14
-#define SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET                              15
-#define SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET                              16
-#define SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET                            17
-#define SECCLASS_NODE                                    18
-#define SECCLASS_NETIF                                   19
-#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET                          20
-#define SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET                           21
-#define SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET                              22
-#define SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET                      23
-#define SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET                       24
-#define SECCLASS_SEM                                     25
-#define SECCLASS_MSG                                     26
-#define SECCLASS_MSGQ                                    27
-#define SECCLASS_SHM                                     28
-#define SECCLASS_IPC                                     29
-#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET                    30
-#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET                 31
-#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET                  32
-#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET                    33
-#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET                     34
-#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET                  35
-#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET                    36
-#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET                    37
-#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET                     38
-#define SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION                             39
-#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET           40
-#define SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET                        41
-#define SECCLASS_PACKET                                  42
-#define SECCLASS_KEY                                     43
-#define SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET                             44
-#define SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT                              45
-#define SECCLASS_PEER                                    46
-#define SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2                             47
-#define SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE                          48
-#define SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET                              49
-
-/*
- * Security identifier indices for initial entities
- */
-#define SECINITSID_KERNEL                               1
-#define SECINITSID_SECURITY                             2
-#define SECINITSID_UNLABELED                            3
-#define SECINITSID_FS                                   4
-#define SECINITSID_FILE                                 5
-#define SECINITSID_FILE_LABELS                          6
-#define SECINITSID_INIT                                 7
-#define SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET                           8
-#define SECINITSID_PORT                                 9
-#define SECINITSID_NETIF                                10
-#define SECINITSID_NETMSG                               11
-#define SECINITSID_NODE                                 12
-#define SECINITSID_IGMP_PACKET                          13
-#define SECINITSID_ICMP_SOCKET                          14
-#define SECINITSID_TCP_SOCKET                           15
-#define SECINITSID_SYSCTL_MODPROBE                      16
-#define SECINITSID_SYSCTL                               17
-#define SECINITSID_SYSCTL_FS                            18
-#define SECINITSID_SYSCTL_KERNEL                        19
-#define SECINITSID_SYSCTL_NET                           20
-#define SECINITSID_SYSCTL_NET_UNIX                      21
-#define SECINITSID_SYSCTL_VM                            22
-#define SECINITSID_SYSCTL_DEV                           23
-#define SECINITSID_KMOD                                 24
-#define SECINITSID_POLICY                               25
-#define SECINITSID_SCMP_PACKET                          26
-#define SECINITSID_DEVNULL                              27
-
-#define SECINITSID_NUM                                  27
-
-#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/Makefile b/security/selinux/ss/Makefile
index bad78779b9b..15d4e62917d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/Makefile
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/Makefile
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # Makefile for building the SELinux security server as part of the kernel tree.
 #
 
-EXTRA_CFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux/include
+EXTRA_CFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux -Isecurity/selinux/include
 obj-y := ss.o
 
 ss-y := ebitmap.o hashtab.o symtab.o sidtab.o avtab.o policydb.o services.o conditional.o mls.o
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2


From 941fc5b2bf8f7dd1d0a9c502e152fa719ff6578e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2009 14:48:23 -0400
Subject: selinux: drop remapping of netlink classes

Drop remapping of netlink classes and bypass of permission checking
based on netlink message type for policy version < 18.  This removes
compatibility code introduced when the original single netlink
security class used for all netlink sockets was split into
finer-grained netlink classes based on netlink protocol and when
permission checking was added based on netlink message type in Linux
2.6.8.  The only known distribution that shipped with SELinux and
policy < 18 was Fedora Core 2, which was EOL'd on 2005-04-11.

Given that the remapping code was never updated to address the
addition of newer netlink classes, that the corresponding userland
support was dropped in 2005, and that the assumptions made by the
remapping code about the fixed ordering among netlink classes in the
policy may be violated in the future due to the dynamic class/perm
discovery support, we should drop this compatibility code now.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c       |  6 +-----
 security/selinux/ss/services.c | 25 -------------------------
 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 30 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index a985d0bc59b..a29d6612a32 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -91,7 +91,6 @@
 
 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
 
-extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
 
@@ -4714,10 +4713,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
-		err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
-
-	return err;
+	return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
 }
 
 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index e19baa81fde..f270e378c0e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -65,7 +65,6 @@
 #include "audit.h"
 
 extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
-unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
 
 int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
 int selinux_policycap_openperm;
@@ -616,17 +615,6 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 	struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
 	unsigned int i, j;
 
-	/*
-	 * Remap extended Netlink classes for old policy versions.
-	 * Do this here rather than socket_type_to_security_class()
-	 * in case a newer policy version is loaded, allowing sockets
-	 * to remain in the correct class.
-	 */
-	if (policydb_loaded_version < POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
-		if (tclass >= unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET) &&
-		    tclass <= unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET))
-			tclass = unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET);
-
 	/*
 	 * Initialize the access vectors to the default values.
 	 */
@@ -761,17 +749,6 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 
 	tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
 
-	/*
-	 * Remap extended Netlink classes for old policy versions.
-	 * Do this here rather than socket_type_to_security_class()
-	 * in case a newer policy version is loaded, allowing sockets
-	 * to remain in the correct class.
-	 */
-	if (policydb_loaded_version < POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
-		if (tclass >= unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET) &&
-		    tclass <= unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET))
-			tclass = unmap_class(SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET);
-
 	if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized class %d\n",
 			__func__, tclass);
@@ -1766,7 +1743,6 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		security_load_policycaps();
-		policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
 		ss_initialized = 1;
 		seqno = ++latest_granting;
 		selinux_complete_init();
@@ -1829,7 +1805,6 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 	current_mapping = map;
 	current_mapping_size = map_size;
 	seqno = ++latest_granting;
-	policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
 	write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	/* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2


From 89eda06837094ce9f34fae269b8773fcfd70f046 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2009 21:49:47 +0900
Subject: LSM: Add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown().

This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chmod()/chown()
operations. Since notify_change() does not receive "struct vfsmount *",
we add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown() to the caller of
notify_change().

These hooks are used by TOMOYO.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 fs/open.c                | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
 include/linux/security.h | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/capability.c    | 13 +++++++++++++
 security/security.c      | 15 +++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 4f01e06227c..b5c294d35bd 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -616,6 +616,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fchmod, unsigned int, fd, mode_t, mode)
 	err = mnt_want_write_file(file);
 	if (err)
 		goto out_putf;
+	err = security_path_chmod(dentry, file->f_vfsmnt, mode);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_drop_write;
 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
 	if (mode == (mode_t) -1)
 		mode = inode->i_mode;
@@ -623,6 +626,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fchmod, unsigned int, fd, mode_t, mode)
 	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
 	err = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+out_drop_write:
 	mnt_drop_write(file->f_path.mnt);
 out_putf:
 	fput(file);
@@ -645,6 +649,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(fchmodat, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, mode_t, mode)
 	error = mnt_want_write(path.mnt);
 	if (error)
 		goto dput_and_out;
+	error = security_path_chmod(path.dentry, path.mnt, mode);
+	if (error)
+		goto out_drop_write;
 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
 	if (mode == (mode_t) -1)
 		mode = inode->i_mode;
@@ -652,6 +659,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(fchmodat, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, mode_t, mode)
 	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
 	error = notify_change(path.dentry, &newattrs);
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+out_drop_write:
 	mnt_drop_write(path.mnt);
 dput_and_out:
 	path_put(&path);
@@ -700,7 +708,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(chown, const char __user *, filename, uid_t, user, gid_t, group)
 	error = mnt_want_write(path.mnt);
 	if (error)
 		goto out_release;
-	error = chown_common(path.dentry, user, group);
+	error = security_path_chown(&path, user, group);
+	if (!error)
+		error = chown_common(path.dentry, user, group);
 	mnt_drop_write(path.mnt);
 out_release:
 	path_put(&path);
@@ -725,7 +735,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(fchownat, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, uid_t, user,
 	error = mnt_want_write(path.mnt);
 	if (error)
 		goto out_release;
-	error = chown_common(path.dentry, user, group);
+	error = security_path_chown(&path, user, group);
+	if (!error)
+		error = chown_common(path.dentry, user, group);
 	mnt_drop_write(path.mnt);
 out_release:
 	path_put(&path);
@@ -744,7 +756,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(lchown, const char __user *, filename, uid_t, user, gid_t, group
 	error = mnt_want_write(path.mnt);
 	if (error)
 		goto out_release;
-	error = chown_common(path.dentry, user, group);
+	error = security_path_chown(&path, user, group);
+	if (!error)
+		error = chown_common(path.dentry, user, group);
 	mnt_drop_write(path.mnt);
 out_release:
 	path_put(&path);
@@ -767,7 +781,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(fchown, unsigned int, fd, uid_t, user, gid_t, group)
 		goto out_fput;
 	dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
 	audit_inode(NULL, dentry);
-	error = chown_common(dentry, user, group);
+	error = security_path_chown(&file->f_path, user, group);
+	if (!error)
+		error = chown_common(dentry, user, group);
 	mnt_drop_write(file->f_path.mnt);
 out_fput:
 	fput(file);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 239e40d0450..c8a584c26f7 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -447,6 +447,18 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	@new_dir contains the path structure for parent of the new link.
  *	@new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_chmod:
+ *	Check for permission to change DAC's permission of a file or directory.
+ *	@dentry contains the dentry structure.
+ *	@mnt contains the vfsmnt structure.
+ *	@mode contains DAC's mode.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_chown:
+ *	Check for permission to change owner/group of a file or directory.
+ *	@path contains the path structure.
+ *	@uid contains new owner's ID.
+ *	@gid contains new group's ID.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @inode_readlink:
  *	Check the permission to read the symbolic link.
  *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the file link.
@@ -1488,6 +1500,9 @@ struct security_operations {
 			  struct dentry *new_dentry);
 	int (*path_rename) (struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 			    struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
+	int (*path_chmod) (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
+			   mode_t mode);
+	int (*path_chown) (struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid);
 #endif
 
 	int (*inode_alloc_security) (struct inode *inode);
@@ -2952,6 +2967,9 @@ int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
 		       struct dentry *new_dentry);
 int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 			 struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
+int security_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
+			mode_t mode);
+int security_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid);
 #else	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
 static inline int security_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
@@ -3001,6 +3019,18 @@ static inline int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir,
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static inline int security_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry,
+				      struct vfsmount *mnt,
+				      mode_t mode)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index fce07a7bc82..09279a8d4a1 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -308,6 +308,17 @@ static int cap_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static int cap_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
+			  mode_t mode)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif
 
 static int cap_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
@@ -977,6 +988,8 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_link);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_rename);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_truncate);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chmod);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chown);
 #endif
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_permission);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index c4c673240c1..5259270e558 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -434,6 +434,21 @@ int security_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
 		return 0;
 	return security_ops->path_truncate(path, length, time_attrs);
 }
+
+int security_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
+			mode_t mode)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
+		return 0;
+	return security_ops->path_chmod(dentry, mnt, mode);
+}
+
+int security_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+		return 0;
+	return security_ops->path_chown(path, uid, gid);
+}
 #endif
 
 int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2


From 8b8efb44033c7e86b3dc76f825c693ec92ae30e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2009 21:49:48 +0900
Subject: LSM: Add security_path_chroot().

This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chroot() operations.

This hook is used by TOMOYO.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 fs/open.c                |  3 +++
 include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++
 security/capability.c    |  6 ++++++
 security/security.c      |  5 +++++
 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index b5c294d35bd..201041dfca5 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -587,6 +587,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chroot, const char __user *, filename)
 	error = -EPERM;
 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
 		goto dput_and_out;
+	error = security_path_chroot(&path);
+	if (error)
+		goto dput_and_out;
 
 	set_fs_root(current->fs, &path);
 	error = 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index c8a584c26f7..ed0faea60b8 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -459,6 +459,10 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	@uid contains new owner's ID.
  *	@gid contains new group's ID.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_chroot:
+ *	Check for permission to change root directory.
+ *	@path contains the path structure.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @inode_readlink:
  *	Check the permission to read the symbolic link.
  *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the file link.
@@ -1503,6 +1507,7 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*path_chmod) (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
 			   mode_t mode);
 	int (*path_chown) (struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid);
+	int (*path_chroot) (struct path *path);
 #endif
 
 	int (*inode_alloc_security) (struct inode *inode);
@@ -2970,6 +2975,7 @@ int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 int security_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
 			mode_t mode);
 int security_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid);
+int security_path_chroot(struct path *path);
 #else	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
 static inline int security_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
@@ -3031,6 +3037,11 @@ static inline int security_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static inline int security_path_chroot(struct path *path)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 09279a8d4a1..4f3ab476937 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -319,6 +319,11 @@ static int cap_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static int cap_path_chroot(struct path *root)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif
 
 static int cap_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
@@ -990,6 +995,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_truncate);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chmod);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chown);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chroot);
 #endif
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_permission);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5259270e558..279757314a0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -449,6 +449,11 @@ int security_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
 		return 0;
 	return security_ops->path_chown(path, uid, gid);
 }
+
+int security_path_chroot(struct path *path)
+{
+	return security_ops->path_chroot(path);
+}
 #endif
 
 int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2


From b7f3008ad1d795935551e4dd810b0255a7bfa3c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2009 10:08:50 -0400
Subject: SELinux: fix locking issue introduced with c6d3aaa4e35c71a3

Ensure that we release the policy read lock on all exit paths from
security_compute_av.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 security/selinux/ss/services.c | 10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index f270e378c0e..77f6e54bb43 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -935,19 +935,22 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
 	u32 requested;
 	int rc;
 
+	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
 	if (!ss_initialized)
 		goto allow;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 	requested = unmap_perm(orig_tclass, orig_requested);
 	tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
 	if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
 		if (policydb.allow_unknown)
 			goto allow;
-		return -EINVAL;
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
 	}
 	rc = security_compute_av_core(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd);
 	map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
+out:
 	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 allow:
@@ -956,7 +959,8 @@ allow:
 	avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
 	avd->seqno = latest_granting;
 	avd->flags = 0;
-	return 0;
+	rc = 0;
+	goto out;
 }
 
 int security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2


From 3e1c2515acf70448cad1ae3ab835ca80be043d33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2009 13:48:33 +0900
Subject: security: remove root_plug

    Remove the root_plug example LSM code.  It's unmaintained and
    increasingly broken in various ways.

    Made at the 2009 Kernel Summit in Tokyo!

    Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
    Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 10 -----
 security/Kconfig                    | 13 ------
 security/Makefile                   |  1 -
 security/commoncap.c                |  2 +-
 security/root_plug.c                | 90 -------------------------------------
 5 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 115 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 security/root_plug.c

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index 6fa7292947e..5d386b4ff6a 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ parameter is applicable:
 	PPT	Parallel port support is enabled.
 	PS2	Appropriate PS/2 support is enabled.
 	RAM	RAM disk support is enabled.
-	ROOTPLUG The example Root Plug LSM is enabled.
 	S390	S390 architecture is enabled.
 	SCSI	Appropriate SCSI support is enabled.
 			A lot of drivers has their options described inside of
@@ -2163,15 +2162,6 @@ and is between 256 and 4096 characters. It is defined in the file
 			Useful for devices that are detected asynchronously
 			(e.g. USB and MMC devices).
 
-	root_plug.vendor_id=
-			[ROOTPLUG] Override the default vendor ID
-
-	root_plug.product_id=
-			[ROOTPLUG] Override the default product ID
-
-	root_plug.debug=
-			[ROOTPLUG] Enable debugging output
-
 	rw		[KNL] Mount root device read-write on boot
 
 	S		[KNL] Run init in single mode
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index fb363cd81cf..aeea8c2bb59 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -100,19 +100,6 @@ config SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 
 	  If in doubt, answer N.
 
-config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
-	bool "Root Plug Support"
-	depends on USB=y && SECURITY
-	help
-	  This is a sample LSM module that should only be used as such.
-	  It prevents any programs running with egid == 0 if a specific
-	  USB device is not present in the system.
-
-	  See <http://www.linuxjournal.com/article.php?sid=6279> for
-	  more information about this module.
-
-	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-
 config INTEL_TXT
 	bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
 	depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index 95ecc06392d..bb44e350c61 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT)			+= lsm_audit.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)		+= tomoyo/built-in.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG)		+= root_plug.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)		+= device_cgroup.o
 
 # Object integrity file lists
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index fe30751a6cd..45b87af4ae5 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o and root_plug.o
+/* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o.
  *
  *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
diff --git a/security/root_plug.c b/security/root_plug.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 2f7ffa67c4d..00000000000
--- a/security/root_plug.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Root Plug sample LSM module
- *
- * Originally written for a Linux Journal.
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
- *
- * Prevents any programs running with egid == 0 if a specific USB device
- * is not present in the system.  Yes, it can be gotten around, but is a
- * nice starting point for people to play with, and learn the LSM
- * interface.
- *
- * If you want to turn this into something with a semblance of security,
- * you need to hook the task_* functions also.
- *
- * See http://www.linuxjournal.com/article.php?sid=6279 for more information
- * about this code.
- *
- *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
- *	modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
- *	published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
- *	License.
- */
-
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/init.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/usb.h>
-#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
-
-/* default is a generic type of usb to serial converter */
-static int vendor_id = 0x0557;
-static int product_id = 0x2008;
-
-module_param(vendor_id, uint, 0400);
-module_param(product_id, uint, 0400);
-
-/* should we print out debug messages */
-static int debug = 0;
-
-module_param(debug, bool, 0600);
-
-#define MY_NAME "root_plug"
-
-#define root_dbg(fmt, arg...)					\
-	do {							\
-		if (debug)					\
-			printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: %s: " fmt ,	\
-				MY_NAME , __func__ , 	\
-				## arg);			\
-	} while (0)
-
-static int rootplug_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
-	struct usb_device *dev;
-
-	root_dbg("file %s, e_uid = %d, e_gid = %d\n",
-		 bprm->filename, bprm->cred->euid, bprm->cred->egid);
-
-	if (bprm->cred->egid == 0) {
-		dev = usb_find_device(vendor_id, product_id);
-		if (!dev) {
-			root_dbg("e_gid = 0, and device not found, "
-				 "task not allowed to run...\n");
-			return -EPERM;
-		}
-		usb_put_dev(dev);
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static struct security_operations rootplug_security_ops = {
-	.bprm_check_security =		rootplug_bprm_check_security,
-};
-
-static int __init rootplug_init (void)
-{
-	/* register ourselves with the security framework */
-	if (register_security (&rootplug_security_ops)) {
-		printk (KERN_INFO 
-			"Failure registering Root Plug module with the kernel\n");
-			return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	printk (KERN_INFO "Root Plug module initialized, "
-		"vendor_id = %4.4x, product id = %4.4x\n", vendor_id, product_id);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-security_initcall (rootplug_init);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2


From 6e8e16c7bc298d7887584c3d027e05db3e86eed9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2009 15:38:26 -0400
Subject: SELinux: add .gitignore files for dynamic classes

The SELinux dynamic class work in c6d3aaa4e35c71a32a86ececacd4eea7ecfc316c
creates a number of dynamic header files and scripts.  Add .gitignore files
so git doesn't complain about these.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 Documentation/dontdiff                | 3 +++
 scripts/selinux/genheaders/.gitignore | 1 +
 security/selinux/.gitignore           | 2 ++
 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 scripts/selinux/genheaders/.gitignore
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/.gitignore

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/Documentation/dontdiff b/Documentation/dontdiff
index e1efc400bed..e151b2a3626 100644
--- a/Documentation/dontdiff
+++ b/Documentation/dontdiff
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ aicdb.h*
 asm-offsets.h
 asm_offsets.h
 autoconf.h*
+av_permissions.h
 bbootsect
 bin2c
 binkernel.spec
@@ -95,12 +96,14 @@ docproc
 elf2ecoff
 elfconfig.h*
 fixdep
+flask.h
 fore200e_mkfirm
 fore200e_pca_fw.c*
 gconf
 gen-devlist
 gen_crc32table
 gen_init_cpio
+genheaders
 genksyms
 *_gray256.c
 ihex2fw
diff --git a/scripts/selinux/genheaders/.gitignore b/scripts/selinux/genheaders/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..4c0b646ff8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/selinux/genheaders/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+genheaders
diff --git a/security/selinux/.gitignore b/security/selinux/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..2e5040a3d48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+av_permissions.h
+flask.h
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2


From 6c21a7fb492bf7e2c4985937082ce58ddeca84bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2009 17:30:13 -0400
Subject: LSM: imbed ima calls in the security hooks

Based on discussions on LKML and LSM, where there are consecutive
security_ and ima_ calls in the vfs layer, move the ima_ calls to
the existing security_ hooks.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 fs/exec.c                      |  4 ----
 fs/file_table.c                |  2 --
 fs/inode.c                     | 10 ----------
 mm/mmap.c                      |  4 ----
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig |  1 +
 security/security.c            | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 6 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index d49be6bc179..d164342c2b6 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@
 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/tsacct_kern.h>
 #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
@@ -1209,9 +1208,6 @@ int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm,struct pt_regs *regs)
 	struct linux_binfmt *fmt;
 
 	retval = security_bprm_check(bprm);
-	if (retval)
-		return retval;
-	retval = ima_bprm_check(bprm);
 	if (retval)
 		return retval;
 
diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
index 8eb44042e00..4bef4c01ec6 100644
--- a/fs/file_table.c
+++ b/fs/file_table.c
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/eventpoll.h>
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
@@ -280,7 +279,6 @@ void __fput(struct file *file)
 	if (file->f_op && file->f_op->release)
 		file->f_op->release(inode, file);
 	security_file_free(file);
-	ima_file_free(file);
 	if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL))
 		cdev_put(inode->i_cdev);
 	fops_put(file->f_op);
diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
index 4d8e3be5597..06c1f02de61 100644
--- a/fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/inode.c
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
 #include <linux/hash.h>
 #include <linux/swap.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
 #include <linux/cdev.h>
 #include <linux/bootmem.h>
@@ -157,11 +156,6 @@ int inode_init_always(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *inode)
 
 	if (security_inode_alloc(inode))
 		goto out;
-
-	/* allocate and initialize an i_integrity */
-	if (ima_inode_alloc(inode))
-		goto out_free_security;
-
 	spin_lock_init(&inode->i_lock);
 	lockdep_set_class(&inode->i_lock, &sb->s_type->i_lock_key);
 
@@ -201,9 +195,6 @@ int inode_init_always(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *inode)
 #endif
 
 	return 0;
-
-out_free_security:
-	security_inode_free(inode);
 out:
 	return -ENOMEM;
 }
@@ -235,7 +226,6 @@ static struct inode *alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb)
 void __destroy_inode(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	BUG_ON(inode_has_buffers(inode));
-	ima_inode_free(inode);
 	security_inode_free(inode);
 	fsnotify_inode_delete(inode);
 #ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 73f5e4b6401..292ddc3cef9 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
 #include <linux/profile.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
@@ -1059,9 +1058,6 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	}
 
 	error = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, 0);
-	if (error)
-		return error;
-	error = ima_file_mmap(file, prot);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 53d9764e8f0..3d7846de806 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 config IMA
 	bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)"
 	depends on ACPI
+	depends on SECURITY
 	select SECURITYFS
 	select CRYPTO
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 279757314a0..684d5ee655d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 
 /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
 static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
@@ -235,7 +236,12 @@ int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	return security_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = security_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
 }
 
 void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -352,12 +358,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_parse_opts_str);
 
 int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
 {
+	int ret;
+
 	inode->i_security = NULL;
-	return security_ops->inode_alloc_security(inode);
+	ret =  security_ops->inode_alloc_security(inode);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	ret = ima_inode_alloc(inode);
+	if (ret)
+		security_inode_free(inode);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 {
+	ima_inode_free(inode);
 	security_ops->inode_free_security(inode);
 }
 
@@ -648,6 +663,8 @@ int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
 void security_file_free(struct file *file)
 {
 	security_ops->file_free_security(file);
+	if (file->f_dentry)
+		ima_file_free(file);
 }
 
 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
@@ -659,7 +676,12 @@ int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 			unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
 			unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
 {
-	return security_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = security_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	return ima_file_mmap(file, prot);
 }
 
 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2


From 024e1a49411a1a7363e65db48edf1b09e9ee68ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2009 19:24:46 -0700
Subject: tomoyo: improve hash bucket dispersion

When examining the network device name hash, it was discovered that
the low order bits of full_name_hash() are not very well dispersed
across the possible values. When used by filesystem code, this is handled
by folding with the function hash_long().

The only other non-filesystem usage of full_name_hash() at this time
appears to be in TOMOYO. This patch should fix that.

I do not use TOMOYO at this time, so this patch is build tested only.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 security/tomoyo/realpath.c | 13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c
index 5f2e3326337..917f564cdab 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/mnt_namespace.h>
 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
+#include <linux/hash.h>
+
 #include "common.h"
 #include "realpath.h"
 
@@ -263,7 +265,8 @@ static unsigned int tomoyo_quota_for_savename;
  * table. Frequency of appending strings is very low. So we don't need
  * large (e.g. 64k) hash size. 256 will be sufficient.
  */
-#define TOMOYO_MAX_HASH 256
+#define TOMOYO_HASH_BITS  8
+#define TOMOYO_MAX_HASH (1u<<TOMOYO_HASH_BITS)
 
 /*
  * tomoyo_name_entry is a structure which is used for linking
@@ -315,6 +318,7 @@ const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_save_name(const char *name)
 	struct tomoyo_free_memory_block_list *fmb;
 	int len;
 	char *cp;
+	struct list_head *head;
 
 	if (!name)
 		return NULL;
@@ -325,9 +329,10 @@ const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_save_name(const char *name)
 		return NULL;
 	}
 	hash = full_name_hash((const unsigned char *) name, len - 1);
+	head = &tomoyo_name_list[hash_long(hash, TOMOYO_HASH_BITS)];
+
 	mutex_lock(&lock);
-	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_name_list[hash % TOMOYO_MAX_HASH],
-			     list) {
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, head, list) {
 		if (hash == ptr->entry.hash && !strcmp(name, ptr->entry.name))
 			goto out;
 	}
@@ -365,7 +370,7 @@ const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_save_name(const char *name)
 	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&ptr->entry);
 	fmb->ptr += len;
 	fmb->len -= len;
-	list_add_tail(&ptr->list, &tomoyo_name_list[hash % TOMOYO_MAX_HASH]);
+	list_add_tail(&ptr->list, head);
 	if (fmb->len == 0) {
 		list_del(&fmb->list);
 		kfree(fmb);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2


From 0e1a6ef2dea88101b056b6d9984f3325c5efced3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 2009 09:37:00 -0800
Subject: sysctl: require CAP_SYS_RAWIO to set mmap_min_addr

Currently the mmap_min_addr value can only be bypassed during mmap when
the task has CAP_SYS_RAWIO.  However, the mmap_min_addr sysctl value itself
can be adjusted to 0 if euid == 0, allowing a bypass without CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
This patch adds a check for the capability before allowing mmap_min_addr to
be changed.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 security/min_addr.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/min_addr.c b/security/min_addr.c
index c844eed7915..fc43c9d3708 100644
--- a/security/min_addr.c
+++ b/security/min_addr.c
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ int mmap_min_addr_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 {
 	int ret;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	ret = proc_doulongvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
 
 	update_mmap_min_addr();
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2


From 6e65f92ff0d6f18580737321718d09035085a3fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2009 17:03:20 -0800
Subject: Config option to set a default LSM

The LSM currently requires setting a kernel parameter at boot to select
a specific LSM.  This adds a config option that allows specifying a default
LSM that is used unless overridden with the security= kernel parameter.
If the the config option is not set the current behavior of first LSM
to register is used.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 security/Kconfig    | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/security.c |  9 ++++++---
 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index aeea8c2bb59..95cc08913ca 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -152,5 +152,37 @@ source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
 
 source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
 
+choice
+	prompt "Default security module"
+	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
+	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
+	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
+
+	help
+	  Select the security module that will be used by default if the
+	  kernel parameter security= is not specified.
+
+	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
+		bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
+
+	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
+		bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
+
+	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
+		bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
+
+	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
+		bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
+
+endchoice
+
+config DEFAULT_SECURITY
+	string
+	default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
+	default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
+	default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
+
 endmenu
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 684d5ee655d..aad71b2ca19 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 
 /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
-static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
+static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
+	CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
 
 /* things that live in capability.c */
 extern struct security_operations default_security_ops;
@@ -80,8 +81,10 @@ __setup("security=", choose_lsm);
  *
  * Return true if:
  *	-The passed LSM is the one chosen by user at boot time,
- *	-or user didn't specify a specific LSM and we're the first to ask
- *	 for registration permission,
+ *	-or the passed LSM is configured as the default and the user did not
+ *	 choose an alternate LSM at boot time,
+ *	-or there is no default LSM set and the user didn't specify a
+ *	 specific LSM and we're the first to ask for registration permission,
  *	-or the passed LSM is currently loaded.
  * Otherwise, return false.
  */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2


From dd8dbf2e6880e30c00b18600c962d0cb5a03c555 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2009 16:35:32 +1100
Subject: security: report the module name to security_module_request

For SELinux to do better filtering in userspace we send the name of the
module along with the AVC denial when a program is denied module_request.

Example output:

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : arch=x86_64 syscall=write success=yes exit=2 a0=3 a1=7fc28c0d56c0 a2=2 a3=7fffca0d7440 items=0 ppid=1727 pid=1729 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=rpc.nfsd exe=/usr/sbin/rpc.nfsd subj=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : avc:  denied  { module_request } for  pid=1729 comm=rpc.nfsd kmod="net-pf-10" scontext=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tclass=system

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 include/linux/lsm_audit.h | 18 ++++++++++--------
 include/linux/security.h  |  7 ++++---
 kernel/kmod.c             |  8 ++++----
 security/capability.c     |  2 +-
 security/lsm_audit.c      |  4 ++++
 security/security.c       |  4 ++--
 security/selinux/hooks.c  | 13 +++++++++++--
 7 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
index 190c3785487..f78f83d7663 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
@@ -26,14 +26,15 @@
 
 /* Auxiliary data to use in generating the audit record. */
 struct common_audit_data {
-	char    type;
-#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS      1
-#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET     2
-#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP     3
-#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC     4
-#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK    5
-#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY     6
-#define LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT     7
+	char type;
+#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS	1
+#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET	2
+#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP	3
+#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC	4
+#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK	5
+#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY	6
+#define LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT	7
+#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD	8
 	struct task_struct *tsk;
 	union 	{
 		struct {
@@ -66,6 +67,7 @@ struct common_audit_data {
 			char *key_desc;
 		} key_struct;
 #endif
+		char *kmod_name;
 	} u;
 	/* this union contains LSM specific data */
 	union {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ed0faea60b8..466cbadbd1e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -706,6 +706,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  * @kernel_module_request:
  *	Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for
  *	userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
+ *	@kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel
  *	Return 0 if successful.
  * @task_setuid:
  *	Check permission before setting one or more of the user identity
@@ -1577,7 +1578,7 @@ struct security_operations {
 	void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 	int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
 	int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
-	int (*kernel_module_request)(void);
+	int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
 	int (*task_setuid) (uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags);
 	int (*task_fix_setuid) (struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 				int flags);
@@ -1842,7 +1843,7 @@ void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
-int security_kernel_module_request(void);
+int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
 int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags);
 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			     int flags);
@@ -2407,7 +2408,7 @@ static inline int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *cred,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_kernel_module_request(void)
+static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c
index 9fcb53a11f8..25b10319036 100644
--- a/kernel/kmod.c
+++ b/kernel/kmod.c
@@ -80,16 +80,16 @@ int __request_module(bool wait, const char *fmt, ...)
 #define MAX_KMOD_CONCURRENT 50	/* Completely arbitrary value - KAO */
 	static int kmod_loop_msg;
 
-	ret = security_kernel_module_request();
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
 	va_start(args, fmt);
 	ret = vsnprintf(module_name, MODULE_NAME_LEN, fmt, args);
 	va_end(args);
 	if (ret >= MODULE_NAME_LEN)
 		return -ENAMETOOLONG;
 
+	ret = security_kernel_module_request(module_name);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	/* If modprobe needs a service that is in a module, we get a recursive
 	 * loop.  Limit the number of running kmod threads to max_threads/2 or
 	 * MAX_KMOD_CONCURRENT, whichever is the smaller.  A cleaner method
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 4f3ab476937..5c700e1a4fd 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ static int cap_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int cap_kernel_module_request(void)
+static int cap_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
index 3bb90b6f1dd..51bd0fd9c9f 100644
--- a/security/lsm_audit.c
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -354,6 +354,10 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 		}
 		break;
 #endif
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD:
+		audit_log_format(ab, " kmod=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, a->u.kmod_name);
+		break;
 	} /* switch (a->type) */
 }
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index aad71b2ca19..24e060be9fa 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -764,9 +764,9 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 	return security_ops->kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
 }
 
-int security_kernel_module_request(void)
+int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 {
-	return security_ops->kernel_module_request();
+	return security_ops->kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
 }
 
 int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index a29d6612a32..c96d63ec475 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3337,9 +3337,18 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int selinux_kernel_module_request(void)
+static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 {
-	return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST);
+	u32 sid;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	sid = task_sid(current);
+
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD);
+	ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+			    SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2


From 0bce95279909aa4cc401a2e3140b4295ca22e72a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2009 16:47:23 -0500
Subject: SELinux: print denials for buggy kernel with unknown perms

Historically we've seen cases where permissions are requested for classes
where they do not exist.  In particular we have seen CIFS forget to set
i_mode to indicate it is a directory so when we later check something like
remove_name we have problems since it wasn't defined in tclass file.  This
used to result in a avc which included the permission 0x2000 or something.
Currently the kernel will deny the operations (good thing) but will not
print ANY information (bad thing).  First the auditdeny field is no
extended to include unknown permissions.  After that is fixed the logic in
avc_dump_query to output this information isn't right since it will remove
the permission from the av and print the phrase "<NULL>".  This takes us
back to the behavior before the classmap rewrite.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 security/selinux/avc.c         | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c | 7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 18f4103e02b..f2dde268165 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
 	i = 0;
 	perm = 1;
 	while (i < (sizeof(av) * 8)) {
-		if (perm & av) {
+		if ((perm & av) && perms[i]) {
 			audit_log_format(ab, " %s", perms[i]);
 			av &= ~perm;
 		}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 77f6e54bb43..d6bb20cbad6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -239,6 +239,13 @@ static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
 			if (!allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
 				result |= 1<<i;
 		}
+		/*
+		 * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission
+		 * between num_perms and the maximum permission number, we
+		 * should audit that denial
+		 */
+		for (; i < (sizeof(u32)*8); i++)
+			result |= 1<<i;
 		avd->auditdeny = result;
 	}
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2


From b3a222e52e4d4be77cc4520a57af1a4a0d8222d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2009 16:21:30 -0600
Subject: remove CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES compile option

As far as I know, all distros currently ship kernels with default
CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y.  Since having the option on
leaves a 'no_file_caps' option to boot without file capabilities,
the main reason to keep the option is that turning it off saves
you (on my s390x partition) 5k.  In particular, vmlinux sizes
came to:

without patch fscaps=n:		 	53598392
without patch fscaps=y:		 	53603406
with this patch applied:		53603342

with the security-next tree.

Against this we must weigh the fact that there is no simple way for
userspace to figure out whether file capabilities are supported,
while things like per-process securebits, capability bounding
sets, and adding bits to pI if CAP_SETPCAP is in pE are not supported
with SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=n, leaving a bit of a problem for
applications wanting to know whether they can use them and/or why
something failed.

It also adds another subtly different set of semantics which we must
maintain at the risk of severe security regressions.

So this patch removes the SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES compile
option.  It drops the kernel size by about 50k over the stock
SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y kernel, by removing the
cap_limit_ptraced_target() function.

Changelog:
	Nov 20: remove cap_limit_ptraced_target() as it's logic
		was ifndef'ed.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 include/linux/capability.h |  2 --
 include/linux/init_task.h  |  4 ---
 kernel/capability.c        |  2 --
 security/Kconfig           |  9 ------
 security/commoncap.c       | 72 ++--------------------------------------------
 5 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index c8f2a5f70ed..39e5ff512fb 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -92,9 +92,7 @@ struct vfs_cap_data {
 #define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
 #define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S    _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 extern int file_caps_enabled;
-#endif
 
 typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
 	__u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
diff --git a/include/linux/init_task.h b/include/linux/init_task.h
index 21a6f5d9af2..8d10aa7fd4c 100644
--- a/include/linux/init_task.h
+++ b/include/linux/init_task.h
@@ -83,16 +83,12 @@ extern struct group_info init_groups;
 #define INIT_IDS
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 /*
  * Because of the reduced scope of CAP_SETPCAP when filesystem
  * capabilities are in effect, it is safe to allow CAP_SETPCAP to
  * be available in the default configuration.
  */
 # define CAP_INIT_BSET  CAP_FULL_SET
-#else
-# define CAP_INIT_BSET  CAP_INIT_EFF_SET
-#endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_TREE_PREEMPT_RCU
 #define INIT_TASK_RCU_PREEMPT(tsk)					\
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index c450375e855..7f876e60521 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_full_set);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_init_eff_set);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 int file_caps_enabled = 1;
 
 static int __init file_caps_disable(char *str)
@@ -38,7 +37,6 @@ static int __init file_caps_disable(char *str)
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("no_file_caps", file_caps_disable);
-#endif
 
 /*
  * More recent versions of libcap are available from:
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 95cc08913ca..226b9556b25 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -91,15 +91,6 @@ config SECURITY_PATH
 	  implement pathname based access controls.
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
-config SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
-	bool "File POSIX Capabilities"
-	default n
-	help
-	  This enables filesystem capabilities, allowing you to give
-	  binaries a subset of root's powers without using setuid 0.
-
-	  If in doubt, answer N.
-
 config INTEL_TXT
 	bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
 	depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 45b87af4ae5..f800fdb3de9 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -173,7 +173,6 @@ int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
  */
 static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 
 	/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
 	 * capability
@@ -181,7 +180,6 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
 	if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP,
 			SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
 		return 0;
-#endif
 	return 1;
 }
 
@@ -239,8 +237,6 @@ static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	bprm->cap_effective = false;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
-
 /**
  * cap_inode_need_killpriv - Determine if inode change affects privileges
  * @dentry: The inode/dentry in being changed with change marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV
@@ -421,49 +417,6 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-#else
-int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps)
-{
-	memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data));
- 	return -ENODATA;
-}
-
-static inline int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective)
-{
-	bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Determine whether a exec'ing process's new permitted capabilities should be
- * limited to just what it already has.
- *
- * This prevents processes that are being ptraced from gaining access to
- * CAP_SETPCAP, unless the process they're tracing already has it, and the
- * binary they're executing has filecaps that elevate it.
- *
- *  Returns 1 if they should be limited, 0 if they are not.
- */
-static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void)
-{
-#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
-	if (capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
-		return 0;
-#endif
-	return 1;
-}
-
 /**
  * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
  * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
@@ -523,9 +476,8 @@ skip:
 			new->euid = new->uid;
 			new->egid = new->gid;
 		}
-		if (cap_limit_ptraced_target())
-			new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted,
-							   old->cap_permitted);
+		new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted,
+						   old->cap_permitted);
 	}
 
 	new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;
@@ -739,7 +691,6 @@ int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 /*
  * Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and
  * task_setnice, assumes that
@@ -820,22 +771,6 @@ static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-#else
-int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
-			   struct sched_param *lp)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
 /**
  * cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module
  * @option: The process control function requested
@@ -866,7 +801,6 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 		error = !!cap_raised(new->cap_bset, arg2);
 		goto no_change;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 	case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
 		error = cap_prctl_drop(new, arg2);
 		if (error < 0)
@@ -917,8 +851,6 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 		error = new->securebits;
 		goto no_change;
 
-#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
-
 	case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
 		if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
 			error = 1;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2


From 7539cf4b92be4aecc573ea962135f246a7a33401 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2009 22:00:05 +0900
Subject: TOMOYO: Add recursive directory matching operator support.

TOMOYO 1.7.1 has recursive directory matching operator support.
I want to add it to TOMOYO for Linux 2.6.33 .
----------
[PATCH] TOMOYO: Add recursive directory matching operator support.

This patch introduces new operator /\{dir\}/ which matches
'/' + 'One or more repetitions of dir/' (e.g. /dir/ /dir/dir/ /dir/dir/dir/ ).

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 security/tomoyo/common.c | 200 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 security/tomoyo/common.h |   4 -
 2 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 83 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index 3c8bd8ee0b9..e0d0354008b 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -187,6 +187,8 @@ bool tomoyo_is_correct_path(const char *filename, const s8 start_type,
 			    const s8 pattern_type, const s8 end_type,
 			    const char *function)
 {
+	const char *const start = filename;
+	bool in_repetition = false;
 	bool contains_pattern = false;
 	unsigned char c;
 	unsigned char d;
@@ -212,9 +214,13 @@ bool tomoyo_is_correct_path(const char *filename, const s8 start_type,
 		if (c == '/')
 			goto out;
 	}
-	while ((c = *filename++) != '\0') {
+	while (1) {
+		c = *filename++;
+		if (!c)
+			break;
 		if (c == '\\') {
-			switch ((c = *filename++)) {
+			c = *filename++;
+			switch (c) {
 			case '\\':  /* "\\" */
 				continue;
 			case '$':   /* "\$" */
@@ -231,6 +237,22 @@ bool tomoyo_is_correct_path(const char *filename, const s8 start_type,
 					break; /* Must not contain pattern */
 				contains_pattern = true;
 				continue;
+			case '{':   /* "/\{" */
+				if (filename - 3 < start ||
+				    *(filename - 3) != '/')
+					break;
+				if (pattern_type == -1)
+					break; /* Must not contain pattern */
+				contains_pattern = true;
+				in_repetition = true;
+				continue;
+			case '}':   /* "\}/" */
+				if (*filename != '/')
+					break;
+				if (!in_repetition)
+					break;
+				in_repetition = false;
+				continue;
 			case '0':   /* "\ooo" */
 			case '1':
 			case '2':
@@ -246,6 +268,8 @@ bool tomoyo_is_correct_path(const char *filename, const s8 start_type,
 					continue; /* pattern is not \000 */
 			}
 			goto out;
+		} else if (in_repetition && c == '/') {
+			goto out;
 		} else if (tomoyo_is_invalid(c)) {
 			goto out;
 		}
@@ -254,6 +278,8 @@ bool tomoyo_is_correct_path(const char *filename, const s8 start_type,
 		if (!contains_pattern)
 			goto out;
 	}
+	if (in_repetition)
+		goto out;
 	return true;
  out:
 	printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Invalid pathname '%s'\n", function,
@@ -359,33 +385,6 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain(const char *domainname)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-/**
- * tomoyo_path_depth - Evaluate the number of '/' in a string.
- *
- * @pathname: The string to evaluate.
- *
- * Returns path depth of the string.
- *
- * I score 2 for each of the '/' in the @pathname
- * and score 1 if the @pathname ends with '/'.
- */
-static int tomoyo_path_depth(const char *pathname)
-{
-	int i = 0;
-
-	if (pathname) {
-		const char *ep = pathname + strlen(pathname);
-		if (pathname < ep--) {
-			if (*ep != '/')
-				i++;
-			while (pathname <= ep)
-				if (*ep-- == '/')
-					i += 2;
-		}
-	}
-	return i;
-}
-
 /**
  * tomoyo_const_part_length - Evaluate the initial length without a pattern in a token.
  *
@@ -444,11 +443,10 @@ void tomoyo_fill_path_info(struct tomoyo_path_info *ptr)
 	ptr->is_dir = len && (name[len - 1] == '/');
 	ptr->is_patterned = (ptr->const_len < len);
 	ptr->hash = full_name_hash(name, len);
-	ptr->depth = tomoyo_path_depth(name);
 }
 
 /**
- * tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2 - Pattern matching without '/' character
+ * tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2 - Pattern matching without '/' character
  * and "\-" pattern.
  *
  * @filename:     The start of string to check.
@@ -458,10 +456,10 @@ void tomoyo_fill_path_info(struct tomoyo_path_info *ptr)
  *
  * Returns true if @filename matches @pattern, false otherwise.
  */
-static bool tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2(const char *filename,
-					    const char *filename_end,
-					    const char *pattern,
-					    const char *pattern_end)
+static bool tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2(const char *filename,
+					 const char *filename_end,
+					 const char *pattern,
+					 const char *pattern_end)
 {
 	while (filename < filename_end && pattern < pattern_end) {
 		char c;
@@ -519,7 +517,7 @@ static bool tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2(const char *filename,
 		case '*':
 		case '@':
 			for (i = 0; i <= filename_end - filename; i++) {
-				if (tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2(
+				if (tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2(
 						    filename + i, filename_end,
 						    pattern + 1, pattern_end))
 					return true;
@@ -550,7 +548,7 @@ static bool tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2(const char *filename,
 					j++;
 			}
 			for (i = 1; i <= j; i++) {
-				if (tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2(
+				if (tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2(
 						    filename + i, filename_end,
 						    pattern + 1, pattern_end))
 					return true;
@@ -567,7 +565,7 @@ static bool tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2(const char *filename,
 }
 
 /**
- * tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern - Pattern matching without without '/' character.
+ * tomoyo_file_matches_pattern - Pattern matching without without '/' character.
  *
  * @filename:     The start of string to check.
  * @filename_end: The end of string to check.
@@ -576,7 +574,7 @@ static bool tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2(const char *filename,
  *
  * Returns true if @filename matches @pattern, false otherwise.
  */
-static bool tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern(const char *filename,
+static bool tomoyo_file_matches_pattern(const char *filename,
 					   const char *filename_end,
 					   const char *pattern,
 					   const char *pattern_end)
@@ -589,10 +587,10 @@ static bool tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern(const char *filename,
 		/* Split at "\-" pattern. */
 		if (*pattern++ != '\\' || *pattern++ != '-')
 			continue;
-		result = tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2(filename,
-							 filename_end,
-							 pattern_start,
-							 pattern - 2);
+		result = tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2(filename,
+						      filename_end,
+						      pattern_start,
+						      pattern - 2);
 		if (first)
 			result = !result;
 		if (result)
@@ -600,13 +598,79 @@ static bool tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern(const char *filename,
 		first = false;
 		pattern_start = pattern;
 	}
-	result = tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2(filename, filename_end,
-						 pattern_start, pattern_end);
+	result = tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2(filename, filename_end,
+					      pattern_start, pattern_end);
 	return first ? result : !result;
 }
 
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_matches_pattern2 - Do pathname pattern matching.
+ *
+ * @f: The start of string to check.
+ * @p: The start of pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @f matches @p, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern2(const char *f, const char *p)
+{
+	const char *f_delimiter;
+	const char *p_delimiter;
+
+	while (*f && *p) {
+		f_delimiter = strchr(f, '/');
+		if (!f_delimiter)
+			f_delimiter = f + strlen(f);
+		p_delimiter = strchr(p, '/');
+		if (!p_delimiter)
+			p_delimiter = p + strlen(p);
+		if (*p == '\\' && *(p + 1) == '{')
+			goto recursive;
+		if (!tomoyo_file_matches_pattern(f, f_delimiter, p,
+						 p_delimiter))
+			return false;
+		f = f_delimiter;
+		if (*f)
+			f++;
+		p = p_delimiter;
+		if (*p)
+			p++;
+	}
+	/* Ignore trailing "\*" and "\@" in @pattern. */
+	while (*p == '\\' &&
+	       (*(p + 1) == '*' || *(p + 1) == '@'))
+		p += 2;
+	return !*f && !*p;
+ recursive:
+	/*
+	 * The "\{" pattern is permitted only after '/' character.
+	 * This guarantees that below "*(p - 1)" is safe.
+	 * Also, the "\}" pattern is permitted only before '/' character
+	 * so that "\{" + "\}" pair will not break the "\-" operator.
+	 */
+	if (*(p - 1) != '/' || p_delimiter <= p + 3 || *p_delimiter != '/' ||
+	    *(p_delimiter - 1) != '}' || *(p_delimiter - 2) != '\\')
+		return false; /* Bad pattern. */
+	do {
+		/* Compare current component with pattern. */
+		if (!tomoyo_file_matches_pattern(f, f_delimiter, p + 2,
+						 p_delimiter - 2))
+			break;
+		/* Proceed to next component. */
+		f = f_delimiter;
+		if (!*f)
+			break;
+		f++;
+		/* Continue comparison. */
+		if (tomoyo_path_matches_pattern2(f, p_delimiter + 1))
+			return true;
+		f_delimiter = strchr(f, '/');
+	} while (f_delimiter);
+	return false; /* Not matched. */
+}
+
 /**
  * tomoyo_path_matches_pattern - Check whether the given filename matches the given pattern.
+ *
  * @filename: The filename to check.
  * @pattern:  The pattern to compare.
  *
@@ -615,24 +679,24 @@ static bool tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern(const char *filename,
  * The following patterns are available.
  *   \\     \ itself.
  *   \ooo   Octal representation of a byte.
- *   \*     More than or equals to 0 character other than '/'.
- *   \@     More than or equals to 0 character other than '/' or '.'.
+ *   \*     Zero or more repetitions of characters other than '/'.
+ *   \@     Zero or more repetitions of characters other than '/' or '.'.
  *   \?     1 byte character other than '/'.
- *   \$     More than or equals to 1 decimal digit.
+ *   \$     One or more repetitions of decimal digits.
  *   \+     1 decimal digit.
- *   \X     More than or equals to 1 hexadecimal digit.
+ *   \X     One or more repetitions of hexadecimal digits.
  *   \x     1 hexadecimal digit.
- *   \A     More than or equals to 1 alphabet character.
+ *   \A     One or more repetitions of alphabet characters.
  *   \a     1 alphabet character.
+ *
  *   \-     Subtraction operator.
+ *
+ *   /\{dir\}/   '/' + 'One or more repetitions of dir/' (e.g. /dir/ /dir/dir/
+ *               /dir/dir/dir/ ).
  */
 bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
 				 const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern)
 {
-	/*
-	  if (!filename || !pattern)
-	  return false;
-	*/
 	const char *f = filename->name;
 	const char *p = pattern->name;
 	const int len = pattern->const_len;
@@ -640,37 +704,15 @@ bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
 	/* If @pattern doesn't contain pattern, I can use strcmp(). */
 	if (!pattern->is_patterned)
 		return !tomoyo_pathcmp(filename, pattern);
-	/* Dont compare if the number of '/' differs. */
-	if (filename->depth != pattern->depth)
+	/* Don't compare directory and non-directory. */
+	if (filename->is_dir != pattern->is_dir)
 		return false;
 	/* Compare the initial length without patterns. */
 	if (strncmp(f, p, len))
 		return false;
 	f += len;
 	p += len;
-	/* Main loop. Compare each directory component. */
-	while (*f && *p) {
-		const char *f_delimiter = strchr(f, '/');
-		const char *p_delimiter = strchr(p, '/');
-		if (!f_delimiter)
-			f_delimiter = f + strlen(f);
-		if (!p_delimiter)
-			p_delimiter = p + strlen(p);
-		if (!tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern(f, f_delimiter,
-						    p, p_delimiter))
-			return false;
-		f = f_delimiter;
-		if (*f)
-			f++;
-		p = p_delimiter;
-		if (*p)
-			p++;
-	}
-	/* Ignore trailing "\*" and "\@" in @pattern. */
-	while (*p == '\\' &&
-	       (*(p + 1) == '*' || *(p + 1) == '@'))
-		p += 2;
-	return !*f && !*p;
+	return tomoyo_path_matches_pattern2(f, p);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index 31df541911f..92169d29b2d 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -56,9 +56,6 @@ struct tomoyo_page_buffer {
  * (5) "is_patterned" is a bool which is true if "name" contains wildcard
  *     characters, false otherwise. This allows TOMOYO to use "hash" and
  *     strcmp() for string comparison if "is_patterned" is false.
- * (6) "depth" is calculated using the number of "/" characters in "name".
- *     This allows TOMOYO to avoid comparing two pathnames which never match
- *     (e.g. whether "/var/www/html/index.html" matches "/tmp/sh-thd-\$").
  */
 struct tomoyo_path_info {
 	const char *name;
@@ -66,7 +63,6 @@ struct tomoyo_path_info {
 	u16 const_len;     /* = tomoyo_const_part_length(name)     */
 	bool is_dir;       /* = tomoyo_strendswith(name, "/")      */
 	bool is_patterned; /* = tomoyo_path_contains_pattern(name) */
-	u16 depth;         /* = tomoyo_path_depth(name)            */
 };
 
 /*
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2