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authorEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>2012-04-03 09:37:02 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-04-03 09:48:40 -0700
commit3b3b0e4fc15efa507b902d90cea39e496a523c3b (patch)
treed7b91c21ad6c6f4ac21dd51297b74eec47c61684
parent95694129b43165911dc4e8a972f0d39ad98d86be (diff)
LSM: shrink sizeof LSM specific portion of common_audit_data
Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop. This patch requires LSMs to declare the LSM specific portion separately rather than doing it in a union. Thus each LSM can be responsible for shrinking their portion and don't have to pay a penalty just because other LSMs have a bigger space requirement. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-rw-r--r--include/linux/lsm_audit.h54
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/audit.c38
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/capability.c6
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/file.c54
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/audit.h28
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/ipc.c10
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lib.c4
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c8
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy.c10
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c20
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/resource.c12
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c34
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c71
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/avc.h16
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack.h13
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_access.c11
16 files changed, 242 insertions, 147 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
index eab507f2b1c..6f4fb37aac8 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
@@ -72,61 +72,15 @@ struct common_audit_data {
/* this union contains LSM specific data */
union {
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
- /* SMACK data */
- struct smack_audit_data {
- const char *function;
- char *subject;
- char *object;
- char *request;
- int result;
- } smack_audit_data;
+ struct smack_audit_data *smack_audit_data;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
- /* SELinux data */
- struct {
- u32 ssid;
- u32 tsid;
- u16 tclass;
- u32 requested;
- u32 audited;
- u32 denied;
- /*
- * auditdeny is a bit tricky and unintuitive. See the
- * comments in avc.c for it's meaning and usage.
- */
- u32 auditdeny;
- struct av_decision *avd;
- int result;
- } selinux_audit_data;
+ struct selinux_audit_data *selinux_audit_data;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR
- struct {
- int error;
- int op;
- int type;
- void *profile;
- const char *name;
- const char *info;
- union {
- void *target;
- struct {
- long pos;
- void *target;
- } iface;
- struct {
- int rlim;
- unsigned long max;
- } rlim;
- struct {
- const char *target;
- u32 request;
- u32 denied;
- uid_t ouid;
- } fs;
- };
- } apparmor_audit_data;
+ struct apparmor_audit_data *apparmor_audit_data;
#endif
- };
+ }; /* per LSM data pointer union */
/* these callback will be implemented by a specific LSM */
void (*lsm_pre_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *);
void (*lsm_post_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index 5ff67776a5a..23f7eb658d9 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -115,23 +115,23 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
if (aa_g_audit_header) {
audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor=");
- audit_log_string(ab, aa_audit_type[sa->aad.type]);
+ audit_log_string(ab, aa_audit_type[sa->aad->type]);
}
- if (sa->aad.op) {
+ if (sa->aad->op) {
audit_log_format(ab, " operation=");
- audit_log_string(ab, op_table[sa->aad.op]);
+ audit_log_string(ab, op_table[sa->aad->op]);
}
- if (sa->aad.info) {
+ if (sa->aad->info) {
audit_log_format(ab, " info=");
- audit_log_string(ab, sa->aad.info);
- if (sa->aad.error)
- audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", sa->aad.error);
+ audit_log_string(ab, sa->aad->info);
+ if (sa->aad->error)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", sa->aad->error);
}
- if (sa->aad.profile) {
- struct aa_profile *profile = sa->aad.profile;
+ if (sa->aad->profile) {
+ struct aa_profile *profile = sa->aad->profile;
pid_t pid;
rcu_read_lock();
pid = rcu_dereference(tsk->real_parent)->pid;
@@ -145,9 +145,9 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->base.hname);
}
- if (sa->aad.name) {
+ if (sa->aad->name) {
audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad.name);
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->name);
}
}
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa,
void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *))
{
- sa->aad.type = type;
+ sa->aad->type = type;
sa->lsm_pre_audit = audit_pre;
sa->lsm_post_audit = cb;
common_lsm_audit(sa);
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
BUG_ON(!profile);
if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO) {
- if (likely(!sa->aad.error)) {
+ if (likely(!sa->aad->error)) {
if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
return 0;
type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
@@ -196,21 +196,21 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET ||
(type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED &&
AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET))
- return sa->aad.error;
+ return sa->aad->error;
if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED)
type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
if (!unconfined(profile))
- sa->aad.profile = profile;
+ sa->aad->profile = profile;
aa_audit_msg(type, sa, cb);
- if (sa->aad.type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
+ if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
(void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL, sa->tsk ? sa->tsk : current);
- if (sa->aad.type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
- return complain_error(sa->aad.error);
+ if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
+ return complain_error(sa->aad->error);
- return sa->aad.error;
+ return sa->aad->error;
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c
index 9982c48def4..088dba3bf7d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/capability.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c
@@ -64,11 +64,13 @@ static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task,
struct audit_cache *ent;
int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
struct common_audit_data sa;
+ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, CAP);
+ sa.aad = &aad;
sa.tsk = task;
sa.u.cap = cap;
- sa.aad.op = OP_CAPABLE;
- sa.aad.error = error;
+ sa.aad->op = OP_CAPABLE;
+ sa.aad->error = error;
if (likely(!error)) {
/* test if auditing is being forced */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index 5d176f2530c..2f8fcba9ce4 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -67,22 +67,22 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
uid_t fsuid = current_fsuid();
- if (sa->aad.fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+ if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
- audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad.fs.request);
+ audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad->fs.request);
}
- if (sa->aad.fs.denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+ if (sa->aad->fs.denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
- audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad.fs.denied);
+ audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad->fs.denied);
}
- if (sa->aad.fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+ if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d", fsuid);
- audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d", sa->aad.fs.ouid);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d", sa->aad->fs.ouid);
}
- if (sa->aad.fs.target) {
+ if (sa->aad->fs.target) {
audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad.fs.target);
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->fs.target);
}
}
@@ -107,45 +107,47 @@ int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms,
{
int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
struct common_audit_data sa;
+ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
- sa.aad.op = op,
- sa.aad.fs.request = request;
- sa.aad.name = name;
- sa.aad.fs.target = target;
- sa.aad.fs.ouid = ouid;
- sa.aad.info = info;
- sa.aad.error = error;
-
- if (likely(!sa.aad.error)) {
+ sa.aad = &aad;
+ aad.op = op,
+ aad.fs.request = request;
+ aad.name = name;
+ aad.fs.target = target;
+ aad.fs.ouid = ouid;
+ aad.info = info;
+ aad.error = error;
+
+ if (likely(!sa.aad->error)) {
u32 mask = perms->audit;
if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
mask = 0xffff;
/* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
- sa.aad.fs.request &= mask;
+ sa.aad->fs.request &= mask;
- if (likely(!sa.aad.fs.request))
+ if (likely(!sa.aad->fs.request))
return 0;
type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
} else {
/* only report permissions that were denied */
- sa.aad.fs.request = sa.aad.fs.request & ~perms->allow;
+ sa.aad->fs.request = sa.aad->fs.request & ~perms->allow;
- if (sa.aad.fs.request & perms->kill)
+ if (sa.aad->fs.request & perms->kill)
type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
/* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
- if ((sa.aad.fs.request & perms->quiet) &&
+ if ((sa.aad->fs.request & perms->quiet) &&
AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
- sa.aad.fs.request &= ~perms->quiet;
+ sa.aad->fs.request &= ~perms->quiet;
- if (!sa.aad.fs.request)
- return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad.error;
+ if (!sa.aad->fs.request)
+ return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad->error;
}
- sa.aad.fs.denied = sa.aad.fs.request & ~perms->allow;
+ sa.aad->fs.denied = sa.aad->fs.request & ~perms->allow;
return aa_audit(type, profile, gfp, &sa, file_audit_cb);
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index 4ba78c203af..3868b1e5d5b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -103,7 +103,33 @@ enum aa_ops {
};
-/* define a short hand for apparmor_audit_data portion of common_audit_data */
+struct apparmor_audit_data {
+ int error;
+ int op;
+ int type;
+ void *profile;
+ const char *name;
+ const char *info;
+ union {
+ void *target;
+ struct {
+ long pos;
+ void *target;
+ } iface;
+ struct {
+ int rlim;
+ unsigned long max;
+ } rlim;
+ struct {
+ const char *target;
+ u32 request;
+ u32 denied;
+ uid_t ouid;
+ } fs;
+ };
+};
+
+/* define a short hand for apparmor_audit_data structure */
#define aad apparmor_audit_data
void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa,
diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
index 7ee05c6f3c6..c3da93a5150 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
{
struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad.target);
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->target);
}
/**
@@ -41,10 +41,12 @@ static int aa_audit_ptrace(struct aa_profile *profile,
struct aa_profile *target, int error)
{
struct common_audit_data sa;
+ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
- sa.aad.op = OP_PTRACE;
- sa.aad.target = target;
- sa.aad.error = error;
+ sa.aad = &aad;
+ aad.op = OP_PTRACE;
+ aad.target = target;
+ aad.error = error;
return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, GFP_ATOMIC, &sa,
audit_cb);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c
index 9516948041a..e75829ba0ff 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lib.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c
@@ -65,8 +65,10 @@ void aa_info_message(const char *str)
{
if (audit_enabled) {
struct common_audit_data sa;
+ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
- sa.aad.info = str;
+ sa.aad = &aad;
+ aad.info = str;
aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, &sa, NULL);
}
printk(KERN_INFO "AppArmor: %s\n", str);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 97ce8fae49b..ad05d391974 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -588,10 +588,12 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args);
} else {
struct common_audit_data sa;
+ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
- sa.aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
- sa.aad.info = name;
- sa.aad.error = -EINVAL;
+ sa.aad = &aad;
+ aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
+ aad.info = name;
+ aad.error = -EINVAL;
return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED,
__aa_current_profile(), GFP_KERNEL,
&sa, NULL);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index 90641438302..f1f7506a464 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -964,11 +964,13 @@ static int audit_policy(int op, gfp_t gfp, const char *name, const char *info,
int error)
{
struct common_audit_data sa;
+ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
- sa.aad.op = op;
- sa.aad.name = name;
- sa.aad.info = info;
- sa.aad.error = error;
+ sa.aad = &aad;
+ aad.op = op;
+ aad.name = name;
+ aad.info = info;
+ aad.error = error;
return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, __aa_current_profile(), gfp,
&sa, NULL);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 25fd51edc8d..deab7c7e8dc 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -70,13 +70,13 @@ struct aa_ext {
static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
{
struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
- if (sa->aad.iface.target) {
- struct aa_profile *name = sa->aad.iface.target;
+ if (sa->aad->iface.target) {
+ struct aa_profile *name = sa->aad->iface.target;
audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name->base.hname);
}
- if (sa->aad.iface.pos)
- audit_log_format(ab, " offset=%ld", sa->aad.iface.pos);
+ if (sa->aad->iface.pos)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " offset=%ld", sa->aad->iface.pos);
}
/**
@@ -94,13 +94,15 @@ static int audit_iface(struct aa_profile *new, const char *name,
{
struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
struct common_audit_data sa;
+ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
+ sa.aad = &aad;
if (e)
- sa.aad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start;
- sa.aad.iface.target = new;
- sa.aad.name = name;
- sa.aad.info = info;
- sa.aad.error = error;
+ aad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start;
+ aad.iface.target = new;
+ aad.name = name;
+ aad.info = info;
+ aad.error = error;
return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa,
audit_cb);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c
index 72c25a4f2cf..2fe8613efe3 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/resource.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
audit_log_format(ab, " rlimit=%s value=%lu",
- rlim_names[sa->aad.rlim.rlim], sa->aad.rlim.max);
+ rlim_names[sa->aad->rlim.rlim], sa->aad->rlim.max);
}
/**
@@ -50,12 +50,14 @@ static int audit_resource(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
unsigned long value, int error)
{
struct common_audit_data sa;
+ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
- sa.aad.op = OP_SETRLIMIT,
- sa.aad.rlim.rlim = resource;
- sa.aad.rlim.max = value;
- sa.aad.error = error;
+ sa.aad = &aad;
+ aad.op = OP_SETRLIMIT,
+ aad.rlim.rlim = resource;
+ aad.rlim.max = value;
+ aad.error = error;
return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa,
audit_cb);
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 1a70fa26da7..00f3860c237 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -436,9 +436,9 @@ static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
{
struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
audit_log_format(ab, "avc: %s ",
- ad->selinux_audit_data.denied ? "denied" : "granted");
- avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass,
- ad->selinux_audit_data.audited);
+ ad->selinux_audit_data->denied ? "denied" : "granted");
+ avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass,
+ ad->selinux_audit_data->audited);
audit_log_format(ab, " for ");
}
@@ -452,9 +452,9 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
{
struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
audit_log_format(ab, " ");
- avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.ssid,
- ad->selinux_audit_data.tsid,
- ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass);
+ avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->ssid,
+ ad->selinux_audit_data->tsid,
+ ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass);
}
/* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */
@@ -464,10 +464,12 @@ static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
unsigned flags)
{
struct common_audit_data stack_data;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
if (!a) {
a = &stack_data;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(a, NONE);
+ a->selinux_audit_data = &sad;
}
/*
@@ -481,12 +483,12 @@ static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
(flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK))
return -ECHILD;
- a->selinux_audit_data.tclass = tclass;
- a->selinux_audit_data.requested = requested;
- a->selinux_audit_data.ssid = ssid;
- a->selinux_audit_data.tsid = tsid;
- a->selinux_audit_data.audited = audited;
- a->selinux_audit_data.denied = denied;
+ a->selinux_audit_data->tclass = tclass;
+ a->selinux_audit_data->requested = requested;
+ a->selinux_audit_data->ssid = ssid;
+ a->selinux_audit_data->tsid = tsid;
+ a->selinux_audit_data->audited = audited;
+ a->selinux_audit_data->denied = denied;
a->lsm_pre_audit = avc_audit_pre_callback;
a->lsm_post_audit = avc_audit_post_callback;
common_lsm_audit(a);
@@ -523,7 +525,7 @@ inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
if (unlikely(denied)) {
audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
/*
- * a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny is TRICKY! Setting a bit in
+ * a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny is TRICKY! Setting a bit in
* this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if
* the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that
* permission. Take notice that this is unrelated to the
@@ -532,15 +534,15 @@ inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
*
* denied == READ
* avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule)
- * selinux_audit_data.auditdeny & ACCESS == 1
+ * selinux_audit_data->auditdeny & ACCESS == 1
*
* We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied
* permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for
* ACCESS
*/
if (a &&
- a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny &&
- !(a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny & avd->auditdeny))
+ a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny &&
+ !(a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny & avd->auditdeny))
audited = 0;
} else if (result)
audited = denied = requested;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 28482f9e15b..3861ce4b100 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1420,6 +1420,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
int cap, int audit)
{
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
struct av_decision avd;
u16 sclass;
u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
@@ -1427,6 +1428,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
int rc;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.tsk = current;
ad.u.cap = cap;
@@ -1492,9 +1494,11 @@ static int inode_has_perm_noadp(const struct cred *cred,
unsigned flags)
{
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
ad.u.inode = inode;
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
}
@@ -1507,9 +1511,11 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
}
@@ -1522,9 +1528,11 @@ static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
{
struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
ad.u.path = *path;
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
}
@@ -1543,11 +1551,13 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
int rc;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
ad.u.path = file->f_path;
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
if (sid != fsec->sid) {
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
@@ -1577,6 +1587,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
u32 sid, newsid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
int rc;
dsec = dir->i_security;
@@ -1587,6 +1598,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
@@ -1631,6 +1643,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
{
struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = current_sid();
u32 av;
int rc;
@@ -1640,6 +1653,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
av = DIR__SEARCH;
av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
@@ -1674,6 +1688,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
{
struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = current_sid();
u32 av;
int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
@@ -1685,6 +1700,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
@@ -1970,6 +1986,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
int rc;
@@ -2009,6 +2026,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
}
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
@@ -2098,6 +2116,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
struct files_struct *files)
{
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
struct tty_struct *tty;
struct fdtable *fdt;
@@ -2135,6 +2154,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
/* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
for (;;) {
@@ -2472,6 +2492,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
int rc;
rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
@@ -2483,6 +2504,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
return 0;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
}
@@ -2491,8 +2513,10 @@ static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
}
@@ -2656,6 +2680,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 perms;
bool from_access;
unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
@@ -2668,10 +2693,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
return 0;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.inode = inode;
if (from_access)
- ad.selinux_audit_data.auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS;
+ ad.selinux_audit_data->auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS;
perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
@@ -2737,6 +2763,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
int rc = 0;
@@ -2751,6 +2778,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
return -EPERM;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.dentry = dentry;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
@@ -3345,10 +3373,12 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
{
u32 sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
sid = task_sid(current);
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
@@ -3721,12 +3751,14 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
{
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
return 0;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.net.sk = sk;
return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
@@ -3805,6 +3837,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
char *addrp;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
unsigned short snum;
@@ -3831,6 +3864,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
if (err)
goto out;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
ad.u.net.family = family;
err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
@@ -3864,6 +3898,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
goto out;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
ad.u.net.family = family;
@@ -3897,6 +3932,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
unsigned short snum;
@@ -3922,6 +3958,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
@@ -4012,9 +4049,11 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
int err;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.net.sk = other;
err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
@@ -4042,8 +4081,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
@@ -4080,9 +4121,11 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
char *addrp;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
ad.u.net.family = family;
err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
@@ -4111,6 +4154,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
char *addrp;
u8 secmark_active;
u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -4135,6 +4179,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return 0;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
ad.u.net.family = family;
err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
@@ -4471,6 +4516,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
char *addrp;
u32 peer_sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u8 secmark_active;
u8 netlbl_active;
u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -4488,6 +4534,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
return NF_DROP;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
ad.u.net.family = family;
if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
@@ -4576,6 +4623,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
char *addrp;
u8 proto;
@@ -4584,6 +4632,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
sksec = sk->sk_security;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
ad.u.net.family = family;
if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
@@ -4607,6 +4656,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
u32 peer_sid;
struct sock *sk;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
char *addrp;
u8 secmark_active;
u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -4653,6 +4703,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
}
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
ad.u.net.family = family;
if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
@@ -4769,11 +4820,13 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = current_sid();
isec = ipc_perms->security;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
@@ -4794,6 +4847,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
@@ -4804,6 +4858,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
isec = msq->q_perm.security;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
@@ -4824,11 +4879,13 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = current_sid();
isec = msq->q_perm.security;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
@@ -4868,6 +4925,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct msg_security_struct *msec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
@@ -4889,6 +4947,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
}
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
/* Can this process write to the queue? */
@@ -4913,6 +4972,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct msg_security_struct *msec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = task_sid(target);
int rc;
@@ -4920,6 +4980,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
msec = msg->security;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
@@ -4935,6 +4996,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
@@ -4945,6 +5007,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
@@ -4965,11 +5028,13 @@ static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = current_sid();
isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
@@ -5027,6 +5092,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
@@ -5037,6 +5103,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
@@ -5057,11 +5124,13 @@ static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = current_sid();
isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 005a91bcb20..fa13f17ce0f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -46,6 +46,22 @@ struct avc_cache_stats {
unsigned int frees;
};
+struct selinux_audit_data {
+ u32 ssid;
+ u32 tsid;
+ u16 tclass;
+ u32 requested;
+ u32 audited;
+ u32 denied;
+ /*
+ * auditdeny is a bit tricky and unintuitive. See the
+ * comments in avc.c for it's meaning and usage.
+ */
+ u32 auditdeny;
+ struct av_decision *avd;
+ int result;
+};
+
/*
* AVC operations
*/
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 2ad00657b80..ccba3823d9e 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -185,6 +185,15 @@ struct smack_known {
*/
#define SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE 5
+/* SMACK data */
+struct smack_audit_data {
+ const char *function;
+ char *subject;
+ char *object;
+ char *request;
+ int result;
+};
+
/*
* Smack audit data; is empty if CONFIG_AUDIT not set
* to save some stack
@@ -192,6 +201,7 @@ struct smack_known {
struct smk_audit_info {
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
struct common_audit_data a;
+ struct smack_audit_data sad;
#endif
};
/*
@@ -311,7 +321,8 @@ static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
{
memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
a->a.type = type;
- a->a.smack_audit_data.function = func;
+ a->a.smack_audit_data = &a->sad;
+ a->a.smack_audit_data->function = func;
}
static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index cc7cb6edba0..2af7fcc98a7 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -275,9 +275,9 @@ static inline void smack_str_from_perm(char *string, int access)
static void smack_log_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
{
struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
- struct smack_audit_data *sad = &ad->smack_audit_data;
+ struct smack_audit_data *sad = ad->smack_audit_data;
audit_log_format(ab, "lsm=SMACK fn=%s action=%s",
- ad->smack_audit_data.function,
+ ad->smack_audit_data->function,
sad->result ? "denied" : "granted");
audit_log_format(ab, " subject=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->subject);
@@ -310,11 +310,12 @@ void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
if (result == 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_ACCEPT) == 0)
return;
- if (a->smack_audit_data.function == NULL)
- a->smack_audit_data.function = "unknown";
+ sad = a->smack_audit_data;
+
+ if (sad->function == NULL)
+ sad->function = "unknown";
/* end preparing the audit data */
- sad = &a->smack_audit_data;
smack_str_from_perm(request_buffer, request);
sad->subject = subject_label;
sad->object = object_label;