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authorPetr Mladek <pmladek@suse.cz>2014-06-04 16:11:30 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2014-06-04 16:54:16 -0700
commitf40e4b9f70d48eb08f443642283fdd9d05b27c6d (patch)
tree6ccb314ef25a9316eeca024e8d2465d151d32904 /crypto/cts.c
parent0a581694ab7a5bc083d710df8a552a6a055b005f (diff)
printk: ignore too long messages
There was no check for too long messages. The check for free space always passed when first_seq and next_seq were equal. Enough free space was not guaranteed, though. log_store() might be called to store messages up to 64kB + 64kB + 16B. This is sum of maximal text_len, dict_len values, and the size of the structure printk_log. On the other hand, the minimal size for the main log buffer currently is 4kB and it is enforced only by Kconfig. The good news is that the usage looks safe right now. log_store() is called only from vprintk_emit() and cont_flush(). Here the "text" part is always passed via a static buffer and the length is limited to LOG_LINE_MAX which is 1024. The "dict" part is NULL in most cases. The only exceptions is when vprintk_emit() is called from printk_emit() and dev_vprintk_emit(). But printk_emit() is currently used only in devkmsg_writev() and here "dict" is NULL as well. In dev_vprintk_emit(), "dict" is limited by the static buffer "hdr" of the size 128 bytes. It meas that the current maximal printed text is 1024B + 128B + 16B and it always fit the log buffer. But it is only matter of time when someone calls printk_emit() with unsafe parameters, especially the "dict" one. This patch adds a check for the free space when the buffer is empty. It reuses the already existing log_has_space() function but it has to add an extra parameter. It defines whether the buffer is empty. Note that the same values of "first_idx" and "next_idx" might also mean that the buffer is full. If the buffer is empty, we must respect the current position of the indexes. We cannot reset them to the beginning of the buffer. Otherwise, the functions reading the buffer would get crazy. The question is what to do when the message is too long. This patch uses the easiest solution and just ignores the problematic message. Let's do something better in a followup patch. Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.cz> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/cts.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions