Merge branch 'master' into for-next

Sync up with Linus' tree to be able to apply Cesar's patch
against newer version of the code.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 49 deletions

diff --git a/include/linux/securebits.h b/include/linux/securebits.h
index 33406174cbe..da1b33b33af 100644
--- a/include/linux/securebits.h
+++ b/include/linux/securebits.h
@@ -1,54 +1,7 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
 #define _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H 1
 
-/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies
-   whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the
-   setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be
-   changed from user-level. */
-#define issecure_mask(X)	(1 << (X))
-#ifdef __KERNEL__
-#define issecure(X)		(issecure_mask(X) & current_cred_xxx(securebits))
-#endif
-
-#define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000
-
-/* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support
-   inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root executable under
-   compatibility mode. We raise the effective and inheritable bitmasks
-   *of the executable file* if the effective uid of the new process is
-   0. If the real uid is 0, we raise the effective (legacy) bit of the
-   executable file. */
-#define SECURE_NOROOT			0
-#define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED		1  /* make bit-0 immutable */
-
-#define SECBIT_NOROOT		(issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT))
-#define SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED	(issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED))
-
-/* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixup".
-   When unset, to provide compatiblility with old programs relying on
-   set*uid to gain/lose privilege, transitions to/from uid 0 cause
-   capabilities to be gained/lost. */
-#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP		2
-#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED	3  /* make bit-2 immutable */
-
-#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP	(issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP))
-#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED \
-			(issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED))
-
-/* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even after
-   transitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by
-   bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls exec(); setting both
-   bit 4 and 5 will create a barrier through exec that no exec()'d
-   child can use this feature again. */
-#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS		4
-#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED		5  /* make bit-4 immutable */
-
-#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS	(issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
-#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
-
-#define SECURE_ALL_BITS		(issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \
-				 issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \
-				 issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
-#define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS	(SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1)
+#include <uapi/linux/securebits.h>
 
+#define issecure(X)		(issecure_mask(X) & current_cred_xxx(securebits))
 #endif /* !_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */