Merge tag 'v3.7-rc1' into staging/for_v3.8

Linux 3.7-rc1

* tag 'v3.7-rc1': (9579 commits)
  Linux 3.7-rc1
  x86, boot: Explicitly include autoconf.h for hostprogs
  perf: Fix UAPI fallout
  ARM: config: make sure that platforms are ordered by option string
  ARM: config: sort select statements alphanumerically
  UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate include/linux/byteorder
  UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate include/linux
  UAPI: Unexport linux/blk_types.h
  UAPI: Unexport part of linux/ppp-comp.h
  perf: Handle new rbtree implementation
  procfs: don't need a PATH_MAX allocation to hold a string representation of an int
  vfs: embed struct filename inside of names_cache allocation if possible
  audit: make audit_inode take struct filename
  vfs: make path_openat take a struct filename pointer
  vfs: turn do_path_lookup into wrapper around struct filename variant
  audit: allow audit code to satisfy getname requests from its names_list
  vfs: define struct filename and have getname() return it
  btrfs: Fix compilation with user namespace support enabled
  userns: Fix posix_acl_file_xattr_userns gid conversion
  userns: Properly print bluetooth socket uids
  ...

1 files changed, 51 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h b/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..985aac9e6bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
+#define _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
+
+/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies
+   whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the
+   setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be
+   changed from user-level. */
+#define issecure_mask(X)	(1 << (X))
+
+#define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000
+
+/* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support
+   inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root executable under
+   compatibility mode. We raise the effective and inheritable bitmasks
+   *of the executable file* if the effective uid of the new process is
+   0. If the real uid is 0, we raise the effective (legacy) bit of the
+   executable file. */
+#define SECURE_NOROOT			0
+#define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED		1  /* make bit-0 immutable */
+
+#define SECBIT_NOROOT		(issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT))
+#define SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED	(issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED))
+
+/* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixup".
+   When unset, to provide compatiblility with old programs relying on
+   set*uid to gain/lose privilege, transitions to/from uid 0 cause
+   capabilities to be gained/lost. */
+#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP		2
+#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED	3  /* make bit-2 immutable */
+
+#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP	(issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP))
+#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED \
+			(issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED))
+
+/* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even after
+   transitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by
+   bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls exec(); setting both
+   bit 4 and 5 will create a barrier through exec that no exec()'d
+   child can use this feature again. */
+#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS		4
+#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED		5  /* make bit-4 immutable */
+
+#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS	(issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
+#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
+
+#define SECURE_ALL_BITS		(issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \
+				 issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \
+				 issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
+#define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS	(SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1)
+
+#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */