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author | Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> | 2014-08-06 23:36:12 -0700 |
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committer | Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> | 2014-08-06 23:36:12 -0700 |
commit | 5e2aa2ed08e2e280121dc7cf5609c87d464f12ef (patch) | |
tree | ca7d7b1480285e3b617fecc5b41f0ce150a82c32 /kernel/capability.c | |
parent | f62d14a8072b9756db36ba394e2b267470a40240 (diff) | |
parent | fc8104bc5a3f6f49d79f45f2706f79f77a9fb2ae (diff) |
Merge branch 'next' into for-linus
Prepare first round of input updates for 3.17.
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/capability.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/capability.c | 26 |
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index a8d63df0c32..a5cf13c018c 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ */ const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set = CAP_EMPTY_SET; - EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set); int file_caps_enabled = 1; @@ -189,7 +188,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capget, cap_user_header_t, header, cap_user_data_t, dataptr) * * An alternative would be to return an error here * (-ERANGE), but that causes legacy applications to - * unexpectidly fail; the capget/modify/capset aborts + * unexpectedly fail; the capget/modify/capset aborts * before modification is attempted and the application * fails. */ @@ -395,7 +394,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); * This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV because the caller may not * actually be privileged. */ -bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) +bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap) { if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cap_valid(cap))) return false; @@ -424,23 +424,19 @@ bool capable(int cap) EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable); /** - * inode_capable - Check superior capability over inode + * capable_wrt_inode_uidgid - Check nsown_capable and uid and gid mapped * @inode: The inode in question * @cap: The capability in question * - * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability - * targeted at it's own user namespace and that the given inode is owned - * by the current user namespace or a child namespace. - * - * Currently we check to see if an inode is owned by the current - * user namespace by seeing if the inode's owner maps into the - * current user namespace. - * + * Return true if the current task has the given capability targeted at + * its own user namespace and that the given inode's uid and gid are + * mapped into the current user namespace. */ -bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap) +bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap) { struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); - return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid); + return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) && + kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_capable); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_wrt_inode_uidgid); |