Merge tag 'v3.13-rc3' into drm-intel-next-queued

Linux 3.13-rc3

I need a backmerge for two reasons:
- For merging the ppgtt patches from Ben I need to pull in the bdw
  support.
- We now have duplicated calls to intel_uncore_forcewake_reset in the
  setup code to due 2 different patches merged into -next and 3.13.
  The conflict is silen so I need the merge to be able to apply
  Deepak's fixup patch.

Conflicts:
	drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c

Trivial conflict, it doesn't even show up in the merge diff.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>

1 files changed, 41 insertions, 14 deletions

diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index 26559bdb4c4..10909c57149 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/ioport.h>
 #include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
 #include <net/addrconf.h>
 
 #include <asm/page.h>		/* for PAGE_SIZE */
@@ -1218,6 +1219,8 @@ int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
  *            The maximum supported length is 64 bytes of the input. Consider
  *            to use print_hex_dump() for the larger input.
  * - 'a' For a phys_addr_t type and its derivative types (passed by reference)
+ * - 'd[234]' For a dentry name (optionally 2-4 last components)
+ * - 'D[234]' Same as 'd' but for a struct file
  *
  * Note: The difference between 'S' and 'F' is that on ia64 and ppc64
  * function pointers are really function descriptors, which contain a
@@ -1312,11 +1315,37 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
 				spec.field_width = default_width;
 			return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
 		}
-		if (!((kptr_restrict == 0) ||
-		      (kptr_restrict == 1 &&
-		       has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG))))
+
+		switch (kptr_restrict) {
+		case 0:
+			/* Always print %pK values */
+			break;
+		case 1: {
+			/*
+			 * Only print the real pointer value if the current
+			 * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
+			 * same credentials it started with. This is because
+			 * access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK
+			 * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to
+			 * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using
+			 * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it.
+			 */
+			const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+			if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) ||
+			    !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
+			    !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid))
+				ptr = NULL;
+			break;
+		}
+		case 2:
+		default:
+			/* Always print 0's for %pK */
 			ptr = NULL;
+			break;
+		}
 		break;
+
 	case 'N':
 		switch (fmt[1]) {
 		case 'F':
@@ -1683,18 +1712,16 @@ int vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, va_list args)
 			break;
 
 		case FORMAT_TYPE_NRCHARS: {
-			u8 qualifier = spec.qualifier;
+			/*
+			 * Since %n poses a greater security risk than
+			 * utility, ignore %n and skip its argument.
+			 */
+			void *skip_arg;
 
-			if (qualifier == 'l') {
-				long *ip = va_arg(args, long *);
-				*ip = (str - buf);
-			} else if (_tolower(qualifier) == 'z') {
-				size_t *ip = va_arg(args, size_t *);
-				*ip = (str - buf);
-			} else {
-				int *ip = va_arg(args, int *);
-				*ip = (str - buf);
-			}
+			WARN_ONCE(1, "Please remove ignored %%n in '%s'\n",
+					old_fmt);
+
+			skip_arg = va_arg(args, void *);
 			break;
 		}