Merge branch 'master' into for-next

Sync with Linus' tree to be able to apply patch to a newer
code (namely drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/psb_intel_lvds.c)

3 files changed, 19 insertions, 19 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index 96502b22b26..f3fafedd798 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
 		struct aa_profile *profile = sa->aad.profile;
 		pid_t pid;
 		rcu_read_lock();
-		pid = tsk->real_parent->pid;
+		pid = rcu_dereference(tsk->real_parent)->pid;
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 		audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%d", pid);
 		if (profile->ns != root_ns) {
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
index 38ccaea0820..df364956081 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -21,11 +21,11 @@
 
 /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
 extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
-extern int aa_g_audit_header;
-extern int aa_g_debug;
-extern int aa_g_lock_policy;
-extern int aa_g_logsyscall;
-extern int aa_g_paranoid_load;
+extern bool aa_g_audit_header;
+extern bool aa_g_debug;
+extern bool aa_g_lock_policy;
+extern bool aa_g_logsyscall;
+extern bool aa_g_paranoid_load;
 extern unsigned int aa_g_path_max;
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 2c0a0ff4139..97ce8fae49b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -136,16 +136,16 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred,
-			    struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
+static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+			    int cap, int audit)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	/* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
-	int error = cap_capable(task, cred, ns, cap, audit);
+	int error = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
 	if (!error) {
 		profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
 		if (!unconfined(profile))
-			error = aa_capable(task, profile, cap, audit);
+			error = aa_capable(current, profile, cap, audit);
 	}
 	return error;
 }
@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
 
 static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
 static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
-#define param_check_aabool(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
+#define param_check_aabool param_check_bool
 static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
 	.set = param_set_aabool,
 	.get = param_get_aabool
@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
 
 static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
 static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
-#define param_check_aauint(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
+#define param_check_aauint param_check_uint
 static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
 	.set = param_set_aauint,
 	.get = param_get_aauint
@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
 
 static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
 static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
-#define param_check_aalockpolicy(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
+#define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool
 static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
 	.set = param_set_aalockpolicy,
 	.get = param_get_aalockpolicy
@@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
 		  &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
 
 /* Debug mode */
-int aa_g_debug;
+bool aa_g_debug;
 module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
 
 /* Audit mode */
@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
 /* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages.  This
  * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
  */
-int aa_g_audit_header = 1;
+bool aa_g_audit_header = 1;
 module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
 		   S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
 
@@ -727,12 +727,12 @@ module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
  * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
  *       load policy, if lock_policy is set
  */
-int aa_g_lock_policy;
+bool aa_g_lock_policy;
 module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
 		   S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
 
 /* Syscall logging mode */
-int aa_g_logsyscall;
+bool aa_g_logsyscall;
 module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
 
 /* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
@@ -742,12 +742,12 @@ module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
 /* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
  * on the loaded policy is done.
  */
-int aa_g_paranoid_load = 1;
+bool aa_g_paranoid_load = 1;
 module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool,
 		   S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
 
 /* Boot time disable flag */
-static unsigned int apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
+static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
 module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aabool, S_IRUSR);
 
 static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)