diff options
| author | Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> | 2012-05-24 01:13:01 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> | 2012-05-24 01:13:01 -0700 |
| commit | e644dae645e167d154c0526358940986682a72b0 (patch) | |
| tree | 972993c6568085b8d407fc7e13de10f4b93c651d /security/commoncap.c | |
| parent | 899c612d74d4a242158a4db20367388d6299c028 (diff) | |
| parent | 86809173ce32ef03bd4d0389dfc72df0c805e9c4 (diff) | |
Merge branch 'next' into for-linus
Diffstat (limited to 'security/commoncap.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 7 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 7ce191ea29a..71a166a0597 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ #include <linux/prctl.h> #include <linux/securebits.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> +#include <linux/binfmts.h> +#include <linux/personality.h> /* * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in @@ -504,6 +506,11 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) } skip: + /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ + if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) + bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; + + /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit */ |